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PREFACE
This project addresses the freedom/foreknowledge problem through an analysis of future
contingents. A few points are worth making before starting the essay. This preface discusses
the approach used here and introduces the reader to some mechanisms used to enhance the
clarity of this work.

Degrees of Formality
Formal apparatus are often helpful for designating a succinct picture without the limitations inherent in visuals. However, formality comes with at least two drawbacks. First,
formal systems have limited (although important) use. Selecting a particular formal system
can bury crucial philosophical issues as assumptions lurking behind the system. This phenomenon is ne when understood, for then the system can be used to test and analyze the
underlying views.

The risk is that, occasionally, thinkers do not pay enough attention to

the assumptions of the system. In such cases, formal systems are merely blind mechanisms
supporting various results. There should instead be a dynamic justicatory relationship between results, which may be plausible or implausible for reasons independent of the system,
and the system itself.
Second, too many symbols can generate unnecessary confusion. Although writers may
have steeped themselves in the formal mechanisms and particular statements they are writing
about, it takes some eort for readers to understand a string of symbols. Natural language
correlates are often easier to comprehend.

Indeed, not all readers interested in a subject

want to intimately acquaint themselves with a formal system.
Regarding the topic of discussion, the philosophical literature contains two relatively separate branches. The future contingents literature is more formal. The freedom/foreknowledge
literature, on the other hand, involves only minimal formalism. Yet, as those in the future
contingents literature are fond of pointing out, the two problems are closely related. In the
ii

freedom/foreknowledge literature, the lack of references to important work by, say, Belnap
or Øhrstrøm is suspicious.

To make the situation worse, both areas in the philosophical

literature tend to ignore relevant scholarship in linguistics.
Attempting to render this document relatively accessible to all parties, formalism is
portrayed in varying degrees. Throughout most of the essay, symbolism is restricted to a
level approximating that in much of the freedom/foreknowledge literature. The less formal
results should stand on their own.

Formal systems are relegated to Chapter 8.

Several

mechanisms are in place to facilitate ecient transitions between related areas of the text.
There is a system of inter-text references with hyperlinks, an index, a set of bookmarks, and
of course a table of contents. Obviously, some of these devices are only available in digital
versions of the le.
Where somewhat informal presentations are given, it is assumed that formally inclined
readers can generate an appropriate formalization. Informal portrayals should be unambiguous to a point of either isolating a particular formalization or a class of adequate formalizations. Usually, this goal is achievable without dense symbolization in the text. Exceptions
are made where necessary.

For instance, using brackets  ⌜ and  ⌝ tends to be excessive

in this sort of text; but these brackets are used where it is important to separate certain
elements of metatheory from propositions or forms, as in the discussion of supervaluationism.

Figures
The discussion contains several gures and illustrations. Visual illustrations, while often
helpful, have certain obvious limitations. For instance, unbounded lines cannot be depicted
perfectly by a bounded image. To enhance clarity, the illustrations given here are further
simplied in the following ways.

(0.1) Figures involving modal or temporal relations typically do not depict all of
possible relationships between nodes.
iii

For instance, all nodes are logically

accessible to one another, but gures usually do not represent this accessibility
relation. Completely connected graphs can be very confusing with more than
just a few nodes.

Transitivity can also be quite a mess, so it is often not

directly illustrated.

(0.2) Despite appearances, temporal structures are unbounded both from above and
from below. This holds for both linear and branching temporal structures.

(0.3) Figures involving temporal structures depict moments discretely.

Removing

this discrete representation would make it dicult to represent the relations
between nodes. However, temporal structures are presumably continuous.

The following is an example of an image that demonstrates the aforementioned simplications.

Not all relations are depicted (transitivity is left out).

The tree is presumably

unbounded although not depicted as such. Additionally, the temporal structure is continuous even though only certain nodes are emphasized.

real
moment
no
TRL
counterfactual
standpoint

Acronyms and Symbols
Acronyms are useful for some purposes.

For example, if one uses non-bivalent open

futurism several dozen times in a chapter, it might be a good idea to introduce an acronym
to represent the term. To avoid obscurity, acronyms should remind the reader of the terms
iv

they represent. In the case of non-bivalent open futurism, NBivOF might be appropriate.
Additionally, one should try not to introduce too many acronyms.
In a work this size, the collection of acronyms can be quite large. The reader is reminded
of what acronyms represent where appropriate. Some other mechanisms are also used to make
it easier for the reader to use acronyms. The appendix contains denitions for acronyms and
symbols used in this document. Once can also look up acronyms alphabetically in the index,
where each acronym is also dened. Readers using the digitized version of the document will
nd that each acronym links to the page on which it is dened in the appendix. That makes
it easier to use a PDF reader to hop to appendix, then use a

back

button to return to the

main text.

Jones, Smith, and God
Unfortunately, English uses a bifurcated notion of gender. English lacks adequate neuter
pronouns, for instance. The characters that appear most often in this text are Jones, Smith,
and God. The (perhaps only) upshot to English's gender-dependence is that gender makes
it easier to disambiguate between individuals using pronouns. In this essay, Jones is given a
feminine gender. Most of the examples involving Jones have to do with whether or not she
has drunk, is drinking, or will drink coee; and the contingency of her actions or possible
actions. Smith has a masculine gender. He typically predicts that Jones will drink coee.
God is assigned the masculine gender in accordance with the Abrahamic tradition. Pronouns
referring to God are not capitalized here. Fortunately, it is easy to tell the dierence between
Smith and God, so there is no need to use he for one and He for the other.

v
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1

Summary of Results

This essay proposes developments for branching temporal logics, using the enhanced systems to address logical and theological fatalism. The theory endorsed is dubbed standpoint
inheritance.

Standpoint inheritance allows branching temporal logics to avoid wantonly

changing perspectives by making a perspective or standpoint parameter explicit in the truth
function. Below is a list of this project's major results. More explanation is given in upcoming sections.

(1.1) Standpoint inheritance allows true futurism and open futurism to avoid signicant linguistic problems and claries the semantics for those views.

(1.2) Under open futurism with standpoint inheritance, all strings of consecutive

will

's and

was

's are reducible to at most two such operators.

(1.3) Standpoint inheritance enables supervaluationism to have an open-futurist basis rather than the usual true-futurist basis.

(1.4) Under open futurism, standpoint inheritance commandeers the best semantic
evidence for true futurism. Standpoint inheritance accounts for the evidence

2

but the evidence does not support true futurism's stronger claims.

(1.5) Theistic eternalism is incompatible with dynamic/branching time.

(1.6) In the context of dynamic/branching time, true futurism does not avoid the
generalized grounding problem, by which true futurism is either

ad hoc

or

entails fatalism.

(1.7) If true futurism is viable at all, it is so only within an absolutist framework
employing general eternalism and the B-theory.

(1.8) Standpoint inheritance shows that Ockhamism is not viable by clarifying how
Ockhamism requires that God's beliefs are drastically unlike normal beliefs.

(1.9) Based on the preceding results, the only way to avoid logical fatalism given
dynamic/branching time is with open futurism; and the only way to avoid
theological fatalism within that framework is with open theism.

1.2

From the Beginning

Arthur Prior, notorious for his work on temporal logic, was drawn to philosophy through
the challenges of reconciling predestination and foreknowledge with freedom and contingency.1

William Rowe gave a pleasantly concise rendition of the freedom/foreknowledge

problem, an argument for theological fatalism:

(1.10) God knows before we are born everything we will do.

(1.11) If God knows before we are born everything we will do, then it is never in our
power to do otherwise.

(1.12) If it is never in our power to do otherwise, then there is no human freedom.

1 [Hasle(2012)]
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(1.13) Therefore, there is no human freedom.2

Prior's interest in freedom, foreknowledge, and morality led to his development of temporal
logic. He passionately maintained that formal analyses could yield great insight into those
and other problems.3 Since Prior, much of the scholarship on theological fatalism has neglected the relevance of temporal logic and logical fatalism, the latter being the view that
everything is either accidentally necessary or accidentally impossible. Recent literature on
the freedom/foreknowledge problem developed largely in isolation of the future-contingents
literature. Lack of communication has led to some embarrassing results. For instance, Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature have failed to capture the hard/soft fact
distinction4 although Peter Øhrstrøm developed a well-known system for it three decades
ago.5

Fortunately, renewed interest in both theological fatalism and Prior's work has led

a few scholars to return to logical fatalismand how to avoid itto handle theological
fatalism.6
This essay is a contribution to the new trend and old tradition of analyzing theological
fatalism in light of its relationship to logical fatalism. The project focuses on two kinds of
views about branching time. One position is true futurism, which designates what will occur
regardless of contingency. The opposing view is open futurism, by which no possible course
of events is privileged over others; that is, there are no soft facts.
Along the way, a contextualist theory of temporal standpoints is designed to enhance
Priorian temporal logics.

The proposal helps all branching time systems, not only those

with an open future. Despite the fact that an account of temporal standpoints goes a long

2 [Rowe(2007)],

p. 166

3 [Copeland(1996)]
4 Soft

facts are facts about the contingent future. Soft facts correspond to what will happen contingently
or what agents will do freely, where freedom is taken in the libertarian sense. Hard facts are not contingent,
although they may have been so. See Section 2.7.
5 See [Todd(2012)] for the problems with explicating the hard/soft fact distinction, [Øhrstrøm(1981),
Øhrstrøm(1983), Øhrstrøm(1984)] for Øhrstrøm’s most notable early contributions to Ockhamist temporal
logic, and [Øhrstrøm(2009), Øhrstrøm and Hasle(2011)] for updated synopses of those systems.
6 Most of the push to reconnect logical and theological fatalism is by some open theists. See, for instance, [Boyd(2003), Rhoda et al.(2006)Rhoda, Boyd, and Belt, Tuggy(2007), Rhoda(2003), Boyd(2010),
Arbour(2013)].
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way towards aiding various analyses from a linguistic standpoint, theories that designate a
true future ultimately succumb to philosophical diculties. Attempts to explain why one
timeline is privileged as the actual future lead to fatalism.

Open futurism and a related

kind of open theism are the only viable alternatives under dynamic, branching time. If true
futurism is feasible at all, it is so only with a static or eternalist basis.

1.3

Fatalism

The problems of logical and theological fatalism have provoked scholars for millennia.
Logical fatalism is the view that whatever happens was necessary in some disconcerting
sense. For instance, start with the premise that either Jones will drink coee tomorrow or
she will not. Suppose that she will drink coee. Were it to be the case that she does not
drink coee, then it would be false that she was going to drink coee. Thus, it is not possible
that she does not drink coee given that she will. What is impossible is necessarily not the
case, so it is necessary that Jones drinks coee. In general, whatever will be the case must
be so, which is fatalism.
No one, presumably, accepts the fatalistic conclusion. Thinkers have proposed various
ways of avoiding fatalism.

The response endorsed by Prior and (arguably) Aristotle is to

deny that Jones either will drink coee or she will not.7

Another way of dismantling the

argument is to reject the connection between time and modality, a tactic associated with
Ockham. An important task of this essay is to analyze and critique those two views, open
futurism and true futurism, respectively.
Addressing logical fatalism is important because the task demands a rened explication
of temporal language.

There are some conicting intuitions about time brought out by

the argument for logical fatalism. The tension needs to be sorted out for several reasons.
One motivation is to develop an adequate theory that represents actual use and speakers'
presuppositions as well as possible. Another reason is that decision-making procedures, for-

7 [Prior(1967)]

contains a mature formulation of Prior’s view.

5

mally represented by decision theory and game theory, require a coherent analysis integrating
time and modality. Decision-making presupposes future-contingency, at least epistemically.
So avoiding logical fatalism is necessary to adequately represent decision-making processes.
Some thinkers also maintain that libertarian freedom, which involves future-contingency,
is important for responsibility; in which case logical fatalism challenges not only decisionmaking, but the basis of morality itself.
There is some division on whether or not theological fatalism is related to logical fatalism. There are two kinds of argument for theological fatalism. One type develops theological
fatalism from logical fatalism in that God's comprehensive foreknowledge resuscitates some
otherwise-avoidable argument for logical fatalism. This approach was taken by Edwards and
Prior, and more recently by open theists like Gregory Boyd, Alan Rhoda, and Dale Tuggy.8
The second kind of position takes arguments for logical and theological fatalism separately.
There is something special about God's comprehensive foreknowledge, perhaps that he has
it necessarily. This sort of incompatibilism fueled much of the freedom/foreknowledge scholarship in the second half of the twentieth century. Opponents of theological fatalism may
need to address both types of argument but this essay emphasizes only the rst type.
Theological fatalism is not relevant to many inuential varieties of theism.

Providen-

tialism is stronger than fatalism, so providentialists like Luther and Calvin need not worry
about fatalism

per se

. Providentialism aside, many contemporary theists hold views contrary

to fatalism, like libertarian freedom, close to their hearts. These theists must nd a way to
dismantle arguments for theological fatalism. One route, open theism, denies that God has
comprehensive foreknowledge. Other theists, freedom/foreknowledge compatibilists, maintain God's comprehensive foreknowledge. Some compatibilists follow Ockham and Lavenham
in separating time from modality while retaining God's temporality. Theistic eternalists advocate compatibilism for dierent reasons. According to theistic eternalists, God is outside
of time; so he does not have foreknowledge as such.

8 [Prior(1967),

Rhoda et al.(2006)Rhoda, Boyd, and Belt, Tuggy(2007)]
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This project emphasizes the connections between logical and theological fatalism. The
analysis draws out a number of common elements in scholars' responses to arguments for
those fatalisms. This observation is hardly new. The future-contingents literature emphasizes
those similarities. The soft facts of Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature are
necessary and sucient for specifying the temporal relation used by true futurists (frequently
also called Ockhamists, but not here) in the future-contingents literature. At the end of
the day, the evidence weighs in against true futurism and Ockhamism. The biggest problem
faced by true futurists has to do with attempts to identify a specic, privileged future over
merely possible futures. Under the dynamic framework used here, any such attempt is either

ad hoc

or leads to fatalism. In terms of the freedom/foreknowledge literature, the criticism

pertains to the existence of soft facts; in terms of the future-contingents literature, the issue
is the temporal relation, the so-called thin red line.

1.4

Temporal Standpoints

Traditional branching-time theories for open- and true futurism encounter some linguistic
diculties. All of these theories yield unsavory results. True futurism has yet to overcome
Nuel Belnap and Mitchell Green's criticism that the theory cannot handle some combinations

was

of past and future operators (

and

will

) at counterfactual scenarios. Suppose that a coin

toss did in fact come up heads. Consider the counterfactual situation in which the toss came
up tails. Of that circumstance, true futurism yields the following awkward result:

The coin came up tails, but this is not what was going to happen. The coin was
going to come up heads. It's just that it didn't.9

The issue is further complicated when God is around.

Ockhamists maintain that if the

coin had come up tails, then God would have believed that it was going to come up tails.
Branching true futurism does not accommodate this result. The coin was going to come up

9 [Belnap

and Green(1994)], p. 380.
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heads even if it had not done so. As such, if the result of the toss had been tails, then God
would have held the incorrect belief that the coin was going to come up heads, not tails.
For similar reasons, open futurism (and supervaluationism) give incorrect results for
predictions of future-contingent events. Suppose that Jones drank a cup of coee although
she might have done otherwise, and that Smith predicted that Jones would do so. Smith's
prediction was correct, but not according to traditional open futurism.
The source of these problems is that traditional systems do not account for perspective.
Without explicitly acknowledging temporal standpoints, branching time logics eectively
shift perspective too frequently.

The unhappy results of traditional systems indicate that

a more conservative approach is warranted. One should only change to a new standpoint
when absolutely necessary; that is, when evaluating at a relatively counterfactual node.
The examples that raise diculties for canonical theories show that, in English, temporal
operators are limited by perspective in ways that their genuinely modal counterparts are not.
In Belnap and Green's coin toss example, the perspective throughout the example is one in
which the coin came up tails. Traditional true futurism gets the wrong answer because it
abandons the tails perspective in the middle of the proposition:

(1.14) The coin was going to come up heads,

which should only be true from the heads perspective. True futurism can avoid this problem
by retaining the tails perspective rather than abandoning it.

Traditional open futurism

suers from essentially the same diculty. From the perspective in which Jones drank coee,
she was going to do so and hence Smith's prediction was correct.

The traditional theory

abandons the perspective in which Jones drank coee in the middle of the proposition:

(1.15) Jones was going to drink coee.

(1.15) is untrue in traditional open futurism since, from the perspective before Jones drank
coee, it was untrue that Jones would drink coee. These wanton shifts in perspective are
not only troublesome but seem outright baseless when made explicit.
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A temporal standpoint is a moment representing a perspective in time. The theory of
temporal standpoints proposed here is called standpoint inheritance.
inheritance, standpoints limit temporal operators

Under standpoint

was, will, was-always,

and

will-always

.

These operators never yield an evaluation that is counterfactual with respect to their stand-

necessarily, possibly, was-inevitably,

points. Modal operators

and

will-inevitably

are not

so restricted and can access counterfactual nodes, thereby forcing occasional standpoint
shifts. All operators pass their standpoints down to their sub-propositions.
Standpoint inheritance has a number of advantages.

The theory is very general.

It

is applied to every system discussed in this analysis to handle shortcomings of traditional
logics. With standpoint inheritance, true futurism avoids the criticism given by Belnap and
Green while open futurism accounts for predictions.

Standpoint inheritance helps clarify

what it is for characterizations of God's beliefs to be soft and how his beliefs must dier
from normal beliefs to retain softness. For open futurism, all strings of consecutive
and

was

will

's

's can be reduced to at most two such operators under standpoint inheritance, but

not under traditional theories. The open futurist distinction between

will

and

will-inevitably

is claried, too. Standpoint inheritance allows for a supervaluationist semantics using open
futurism as its basis instead of the usual true futurism. The theory of standpoint inheritance
enhances dynamic, branching accounts of time to better compete with their static correlates.

1.5

Background Assumptions

This project devotes signicant eort towards clarifying analyses that play important
background roles in debates on fatalism and temporal semantics. These underlying views
make a dierence although they are often relegated to the sidelines, as if they were someone
else's problem. Logical and theological fatalism draw a lot from many areas of study. Some
steps are taken here to further work done by others towards integrating relevant areas of
study.
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With so many relevant background views, it is important to specify a framework for the
discussion. Much of the future contingents literature takes a Priorian view of modality and
time. Time is dynamic, represented by branching time structures. Additionally, the Priorian
approach is endurantist, presentist, and emphasizes the A-theory of time. These views are
assumed for this project without much in the way of argument. Chapter 2 provides some
explanation of the dynamic approach to modality and time.
The conclusions derived here should be taken in the context of the aforementioned background assumptions.

For instance, if the dynamic view of time holds, then true futurism

is not the best theory and open futurism/theism win the day.

Put in other terms, true

futurism is incompatible with the dynamic view; and true futurism entails the static view.
Static or absolutist views like (general) eternalism, the B-theory, and perdurantism call for
substantial treatment that is beyond this project.

1.6

Overview

Part I develops relevant background assumptions and preliminaries for other aspects of
the analysis. Chapter 2 is about modality and time. There are various types of possibility
and necessity, but familiar genuine modalities tend to be captured by sets of principles. These
principles yield accessibility relations depicting their corresponding modalities. Besides this
propositional modality, there are other senses in which a relation can be modal. Four types
of modality are formal, grammatical, propositional, and ontological.

Only the latter two

directly bear on contingency and fatalism. Chapter 2 also sheds light on the dynamic view
of modality that is used to explicate necessity

per accidens
per accidens

, which is opposed to future-

contingency. An adequate representation of necessity
the hard/soft fact distinction.
Chapter 3 discusses the role of
modal.

will

in English.

This is an important point about how

Will
will

, in turn, easily captures

, like

can

and

should

, is grammatically

should be analyzed but does not in
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itself threaten contingency. After all,
the term is grammatically modal.

should

does not interfere with contingency although

Nevertheless,

will

's grammatical modality is later seen

to favor a variety of open futurism over other theories.

The next portion of Chapter 3

characterizes some future-oriented laws of excluded middle. The subtle distinctions among
excluded middles constitutes a signicant dierence between open futurism on the one hand,
and true futurism and supervaluationism on the other. These future excluded middles play
substantial roles in analyzing particular theories. Finally, there is an introduction to temporal
standpoints and standpoint inheritance. Some of the features and advantages of standpoint
inheritance are given, although many details and view-specic descriptions are reserved for
later chapters.
With much of the background out of the way, Chapter 4 returns to freedom and fatalism.
Arguments for logical and theological fatalism are given in more detail than before, together
with popular responses to those arguments.

Chapter 4 also discusses the importance of

fatalism to libertarians and freedom/determinism compatibilists alike.
Specic views are assessed in Part II. Chapter 5 is about theistic eternalism, sometimes
called Boethianism, according to which God is outside of time.

Some work is done to

capture what God's atemporality amounts to. Varieties of theistic eternalism are described
and critiqued. Outside of a more general eternalism, theistic eternalism does not appear to
work.

Regardless of its viability or lack thereof, theistic eternalism entails true futurism.

Even if God is outside of time, there is a relevant sense in which it is true that he knows
what will occur even though he does not apprehend future events as such.
True futurism is the topic of Chapter 6.

True futurists identify a particular course of

events as actual, privileging this timeline over merely possible ones.

The actual timeline,

called the thin red line, is equivalently identied by a comprehensive set of soft facts together with facts about the past and present. The thin red line plays a semantic role as the
temporal relation behind

will was
,

, and other temporal operators. According to true futur-

ists, the thin red line is not modal in any sense that interferes with contingency, separating
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temporal operators from genuinely modal operators. This distinction between temporal and
modal operators is what allows true futurists to reject both logical and theological fatalism.
Although true futurism has been challenged on linguistic grounds, standpoint inheritance
allows the view to handle some of the most pressing criticisms. True futurism nevertheless
faces insurmountable diculties.
preting

will will-actually
as

On one hand, true futurists cannot explain

will.

Inter-

, as some authors have proposed, does not avoid fatalism.10 On

the other hand, there is the problem of explaining the thin red line or, equivalently, the
dependence of soft facts on future things and events. Any such explanation opens the door
to fatalism.

Molinism is a case in point.

The only alternative left for true futurists is to

abandon the dynamic framework and turn towards a general eternalism. An additional difculty is encountered by Ockhamists, who maintain that characterizations of God's past or
present beliefs can themselves be soft facts. Standpoint inheritance claries that just as soft
facts are standpoint-dependent, God's beliefs must be standpoint-dependent in order to be
soft. Under Ockhamism, God's beliefs are radically dierent from those of typical agents.
Ockhamists have yet to explain this peculiarity.
Chapter 7 is about open futurism and related views; in particular, supervaluationism and
open theism. Those theories are described along with their most inuential variations. Open
futurism and supervaluationism maintain that there is no privileged future when genuine
future-contingency is involved. Open theism is the view that God does not have comprehensive foreknowledge. Assuming that God exists, open theism follows from open futurism
(but not conversely). Hence, endorsements of open futurism are likewise of open theism. In
support of open futurism and open theism, a few arguments are given to challenge intuitions
that appear to favor the strong future law of excluded middle, the principle by which a given
event either will occur or it will not. For instance, either Jones will drink coee or she will
not. Additionally, a signicant problem with traditional kinds of open futurism is that they
do not adequately handle predictions. This issue with predictions is symptomatic of the fact

10 [Malpass

and Wawer(2012)] is especially clear about endorsing this interpretation of will. See also
[Øhrstrøm(2009)].
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that canonical depictions of open futurism do not capture the wait-and-see semantics that is
supposed to characterized the view. Open futurism can represent predictions using wait-andsee semantics by incorporating standpoint inheritance. Standpoint inheritance also allows
open futurism to reduce all strings of consecutive

will

's and

was

's to at most two operators.

Additionally, standpoint inheritance, which is independently required by true futurism, allows open futurism to accommodate what otherwise appears to be logico-linguistic evidence
for true futurism.
The formal details are given in Chapter 8. A generic multi-modal system is developed
from which particular systems are individuated. All of the major logics discussed in preceding
chapters are given some formal treatment. The generality of the multi-modal system helps
with comparing various logics and also in depicting the general character of standpoint
inheritance. After traditional systems are given, standpoint inheritance is added and applied
to the major systems. Most of the results in Chapter 8 are intended to clarify the discussions
in earlier chapters for the formally inclined reader.
Chapter 9 summarizes important results and suggests avenues of research. The analyses
in preceding chapters indicate that under a dynamic conception of time and modality, open
futurism and a corresponding version of open theism are the best options. If true futurism
and freedom/foreknowledge compatibilism work at all, it is under a static view of time and
general eternalism. Although this project introduces standpoint inheritance and uses it to
solve a number of problems, there is still a lot more to be said about the theory and how it
benets the A-theory in general. Static views like eternalism, the B-theory, and perdurantism
are not addressed here.
Overall, this project emphasizes Prior's contributions, both in the choice of puzzles assessed and in the use of logic to handle those challenges. Old and recent developments are
inspected in the context of a unied analysis; even a single, general formal system. In addition to the formal system developed here, this essay makes a number of other valuable
contributions.

Several new arguments are given for or against certain views, while some
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familiar arguments are cast in a new light. The most important contribution may be the
theory of standpoint inheritance.

The theory greatly improves the linguistic standing of

all branching time logics, open- and true futurist alike, enabling those theories to better
challenge their static, two-dimensional counterparts.
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Part I

Preliminaries
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Chapter 2

Modality and Time

Kripkean modal logics have four basic components: nodes, accessibility relations, propositions, and truth functions.

Modal systems can illustrate many dierent kinds of items.

These systems have been used in analyses ranging from metaphysics to ethics, mathematics
to nite state machines. Modal logic's fruitfulness, breadth of application, theoretical generality, and connection to graph theory testify to the fascinating character of modal systems.
The signicance of modal systems, what the components of models represent, may change
from one application to another. This chapter aims to clarify how modal systems are used
in this project, shedding light on how to understand nodes, dierent ways of viewing accessibility relations, what sorts of propositions are involved here, what kind of system forms the
basis of this analysis, and the fundamentals of how to depict time and modality.
Philosophically (as opposed to, say, grammatically1 ), modalities are modes of possibility
and necessity.

There are various ways in which events, propositions and things can be

possible or necessary. Types of possibility and necessity are discussed in Section 2.1.
Modalities are formally represented using so-called accessibility relations. However, not
all accessibility relations correspond to modalities. Determining which accessibility relations
are modalities, which are not, and in what sense is the topic of Section 2.2. Four senses of

modality
1 See

are distinguished: formal, propositional, ontological, and grammatical.

Section 3.1 for more on grammatical modality.
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An important type of possibility/necessity, the foundation of the dynamic branching
structure used in many temporal logics, is here called all-things-considered (ATC) possibility/necessity. ATC necessity is sometimes called necessity

per accidens

or hypothetical

necessity. The characteristics of the ATC relation are the topic of Section 2.3.
Contingency and fatalism are obviously important facets of this analysis. In section 2.4,
contingency and fatalism are dened in terms of the multi-modal approach outlined in
the preceding sections, emphasizing logical and theological fatalism. Section 2.4 concludes
with some remarks on the distinction between fatalism and determinism within temporallysensitive modal logics.
Section 2.5 contains a discussion of how to interpret accessibility between possible worlds
or moments.

Static accessibility can be explicated by taking consistency as the starting

point. Dynamic accessibility, on the other hand, begins with the ow of time along the ATC
relation. More and less stringent accessibilities can be derived from ATC accessibility, thus
allowing for a dynamic account of other types of accessibility.
Section 2.6 provides a rough categorization of views about time. This taxonomy is used
throughout the project. The three most important views discussed here are open futurism,
supervaluationism, and true futurism. These positions are explicated in terms of branching
time semantics. Section 2.6 gives a basic description of those positions while some details
are reserved for later chapters.
Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature have failed to provide an adequate
explication of the hard/soft fact distinction. Meanwhile, true futurists in the future contingents literature, who share the Ockhamistic belief that the hard/soft fact distinction holds,
seemed unconcerned. The dierence between hard and soft facts turns out to be relatively
simple to portray in terms of branching time. Section 2.7 contains denitions for hard and
soft facts, and a discussion of the characteristics of those denitions.
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2.1

Types of Possibility and Necessity

Modalities (in the philosophical sense) correspond to types of possibility and necessity.
When something is necessary, it is necessary in some sense or other.

There are dierent

modes or ways in which a proposition, event, or thing can be necessary.

For instance,

physical determinists hold that events, things, or propositions are physically necessary given
their antecedent conditions. The modality in this case is physical or material, as encapsulated
by physical principles. Physical laws on this view determine whether or not the sun will rise
next Tuesday and whether or not Jones will have a cup of coee tomorrow.
Physical modality is a good example because the notion is fairly ordinary.

One way

of capturing physical modality is in terms of consistency with physical laws expressed as
propositions. A proposition is physically possible if and only if it is consistent with the laws
of nature (perhaps given some antecedent conditions about the current and past state of the
world). A proposition is physically necessary if its opposite is inconsistent with the laws of
nature. There is a close relationship between physical modality and physical laws.
Natural laws

could

be dierent.

The modality selected by

sumably not along the lines of physical modality.

could

, in this case, is pre-

Physical possibility operates under the

stipulation that physical laws remain unbroken and are thus unaltered across possibilities.
That the laws of nature could be other than they are requires a change in physical principles
across possibilities. Whenever physical laws are not held constant across possibilities, the
modality involved is at least partially non-physical. Logically, the laws of nature could be
dierent. There are other consistent sets of physical principles aside from those that actually
obtain.
Hence, there are dierent ways in which events, propositions and things can be possible or
necessary. The example of physical modality also indicates that modalities can often be analyzed in terms of consistency with a set or sets of principles expressed as propositions. Logical possibility involves consistency with logical principles, which is consistency simpliciter.
Metaphysical possibility involves consistency with metaphysical principles. Physical possibil-
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Logical
Metaphysical
Physical

Practical

Figure 2.1.1:

Intensional categorization of types of possibility/necessity. This is one way

in which some kinds of possibility and necessity may be categorized. The principles of each
inner set are properly contained in the principles of each respective outer set.

ity involves consistency with physical principles. Permissibility, ethical possibility, involves
consistency with a set of moral rules. Legality, legal possibility, involves consistency with
a set of legal principles.
principles.

Et cetera

Practical possibility involves consistency with a set of practical

.

Figure 2.1.1 shows a taxonomy of a few common varieties of possibility/necessity in
terms of their basic principles. Some philosophers treat metaphysical and logical possibility
identically. If logical possibility is associated with consistency, then metaphysical possibility
is more restrictive than logical possibility.

Metaphysical possibility requires some extra

principles, like that no object can be two dierent colors all over at the same time. Such
laws are not true on account of their structure; that is, not logically true.

The truth of

metaphysical laws depends on their content. One might stipulate that metaphysical rules
hold in all possible worlds.

In that case, logical and metaphysical possibility would be

extensionally equivalent since every world would be logically and metaphysically accessible to
every other world, although logical principles are a proper subset of metaphysical principles.
For this project, modalities are primarily classied intensionally, in terms of the strictness
of their dening principles. So metaphysical possibility is a proper part of logical given that
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the rules of the former contain and are stricter than the those of the latter.
Here are some examples illustrating the distinction between types of possibility.

(2.1)

An object can be red and green all over at the same time

.

This proposition is logically possible, but not metaphysically possible.

(2.2)

A glass marble dropped in a vacuum near the Earth's surface will fall away
from the Earth
.

This proposition is logically possible, but not physically possible.

(2.3)

If Jones punches her boss in the face, she will not be red

.

This proposition is physically possible, but perhaps not practically possible.

(2.1) is logically possible since there is no logical rule by which an object cannot be red
and green all over at the same time. However, given the metaphysical rule that
and

being green

being red

are contrary properties, (2.1) is not metaphysically possible. In the case of

(2.2), it is not logically absurd that the marble would fall away from the Earth, but for the
marble to do so would be inconsistent with the laws of physics.

Granted, if the universe

were relevantly dierentif there were an incredibly massive object whose center of gravity
is close enough to the marblethen the marble might fall away from the Earth. One might
want to block such possibilities by involving antecedent conditions about the way the world
is or similarly by using

ceteris paribus

clauses. Finally, in (2.3), the laws of physics do not

entail that Jones will be red if she punches her boss in the face. There might be some other
set of rules, like laws or mores, by which she cannot drive the punch home and still retain
her job.
The propositions corresponding to a modality may even be world-dependent.
stance, dierent sets of possible worlds may vary in their physical laws.

For in-

It is logically

possible that empirical constants are other than they are, such as that the speed of light in
a vacuum is faster than

3.00 × 108 m/s.

What is physically possible with respect to worlds
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with one set of physical principles is not the same as what is physically possible from worlds
with dierent physical laws.
A set or sets of principles need not be given explicitly to designate a modality. It is not
a requirement that one knows everything about physical laws to speak meaningfully about
physical possibilities. It is enough that there is a cohesive set of principles even if no one
knows exactly what they are.

A thousand years ago, most natural science was relatively

underdeveloped. That does not entail that the same physical laws that hold today did not
hold a thousand years ago.

A thousand years from now, natural science may adhere to

dierent theories than the ones held today, but it does not follow that the natural world
would operate dierently in the future than it does now.
One type of modality that is especially important for this project is all-things-considered
(ATC) possibility/necessity. ATC necessity goes by several other names, including necessity

per accidens

, hypothetical necessity, and antecedent necessity. ATC possibility is whatever

is required for an event to occur, be actualizable, or be realizable. For instance, Jones can
drink coee tomorrow if and only if, all things considered, it is possible for her to do so. ATC
possibility is at least as stringent as physical possibility in the sense that ATC possibility
requires physical possibility; so the former incorporates the principles of the latter. Unlike
some renditions of physical possibility, ATC possibility/necessity changes over time.
Again, ATC possibility is accidental possibility, whatever that amounts to.

The most

plausible explication of ATC possibility is that the things to be considered are the principles
relevant to determining whether or not Jones' coee-drinking, for instance, is genuinely
possible, actualizable, or realizable.

Physical principles and antecedent conditions are of

course relevant. One might impose additional factors when determining things like whether
or not Jones will inevitably be red if she punches her boss, but the context-sensitivity of
all things considered is ignored here for simplicity.

It is assumed that there is only one

ATC possibility.
Ocially, ATC possibility is dened broadly.

The reason for the nebulous denition
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Figure 2.2.1:

Graphical structure of a modal logic model. Possible worlds are nodes and

accessibility relations are directed edges between nodes.

of ATC possibility is that what exactly it consists of is at the heart of the debate about
logical fatalism. Some readers may nd it convenient to think of ATC possibility as physical
possibility in the sense described for branching time systems in Section 2.4.3. Presumably,
laws and antecedent conditions should be enough to dictate ATC possibility.

It will be

made clear when ATC possibility threatens to elude capture by principles and antecedent
conditions. ATC possibility will be discussed further throughout this project.

2.2

Types of Modality

Formal systems are very general.

They need not have anything to do with modality

despite involving accessibility relations. Structurally, models of modal logic are just graphs
like the one shown in Figure 2.2.1. Possible worlds are just nodes or vertices, abstracta
lacking inherent meaning, and accessibility relations are sets of directed edges between
nodes.
The rest of the semantics has no more intrinsic meaning. A truth function is a function
taking two parameters, a proposition and a possible world, and mapping them to things
called truth values. For any application, it is important to explicate the parts of a modal
system and give some details about how models relate to the analysanda.
Logical systems can be helpful for creating explicit illustrations and analytic mechanisms.
In this sense, logical systems need not attend to propositions, possible worlds, truth values,
accessibility relations, or even logic.

Suppose, for instance, that one wants to develop a

system for bags of colored marbles. Non-modal propositions represent colors and possible
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worlds represent sizes. Colors can be manipulated by taking their complement with
their combination with

than

∧.

The accessibility relation between sizes is understood as

¬

or

is larger

. The truth function may be partial, mapping size/color pairs to true just in case

there is a marble of that color and size. The modal operator
is a larger marble. For instance,

◇

red

◇

is used to indicate that there

holds at 1.5cm if there is a red marble larger than

1.5cm.
There is nothing wrong with using modal systems to represent one thing as opposed
to another, although it is desirable to avoid confusion no matter how a logical system is
applied. The marble example is not evidently harmful, illustrating that modal systems can
by interpreted in ways having little to do with modality or propositions. Anything that can
be depicted using an accessibility relation may be called

formally modal

to distinguish the

mere formality of accessibility in the technical sense from more modal senses of modal.
Formal systems can be applied in various ways and formally modal elements of a system
need not be modal in other senses of the term.

It may therefore be desirable to identify

criteria for separating genuinely modal accessibility relations from simply formal ones.
As indicated in Section 2.1, genuine modalities like logical, metaphysical, and physical
are explicable in terms of a set or sets of principles expressed as propositions. Such relations
may be called

propositionally modal

. The structure of propositional modalities reduces to

consistency with the laws characterizing those modalities. This is not to say that propositional modalities themselves reduce to consistency. Rather, the accessibility relations used
to illustrate those modalities can be dened using consistency.
Propositional modalities always unambiguously pick out an accessibility relation. Here
is an explication for the formally inclined.

Let

Lp

be the set of laws corresponding to a

propositional modality. For a given language in which
unique accessibility relation,

(2.4)

2 This

Rp ,

Rp = {⟨m, m′ ⟩ ∣Lp

Lp

is expressible, each model has a

such that:

is satised at

m}2

definition assumes that moments are characterized by the set of propositions that are true there.
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Again, this denition just states that the laws
is represented by the accessibility relation

Lp

Rp .

characterize the modality, which in turn

For instance, consider physical modality.

Physical laws dictate what is physically possible or necessary.
principles can only physically access certain other nodes.

Nodes respecting physical

As a more concrete example,

stipulate a modality, Sisyphean modality, having a single law:

(2.5) The deceitful necessarily roll boulders.

(2.5) holds at moments at which no one is deceitful. (2.5) is also satised by moments at
which there are deceitful individuals provided that those moments only access moments in
which the deceitful persons roll boulders. The most inclusive accessibility relation satisfying
those criteria represents the Sisyphean modality.
There are two cases of propositional modality.

On the one hand, the set of laws may

be node-independent. Logical possibility is the prime example here. Given that all nodes
are consistent, each node relates to every other. The principles of logic are not world- or
moment-dependent. Additionally, there may be no need to consider more than one set of
physical laws.

These laws are presumably the actual physical laws, although they do not

have to be. On the other hand, it may be important to represent dierent logically possible
physical laws, legal laws, moral rules,
laws

at a world

et cetera

. It would thus be appropriate to refer to the

rather than the laws simpliciter. World- or moment-dependent accessibility

relations will play an important role in this analysis (although there will be no need to
employ node-dependent laws).
All propositional modalities are formal modalities. The converse is false; that is, not all
formal modalities are propositionally modal. Unlike formal modality, propositional modality

It is also assumed that there is a moment corresponding to each set of propositions that is both consistent
and closed under entailment.
Note that the definition does not directly require that Lp is also satisfied at m′ . Consider the case
of physical laws. Standard physical laws seem to be physically necessary in that if φ ∈ Lp , then
physically-necessarily:φ ∈ Lp . In this case, if Lp is satisfied at m and mRp m′ , then Lp is satisfied at
m′ . However, it is possible that the current physical laws change; for instance, if there were another big
bang and some constants change. So it is not in the nature of physical modality, and thus propositional
modality generally, that the same laws must be satisfied at both nodes. Only the source node must satisfy
the modality’s laws.
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(a)
Figure 2.2.2:

5

(b)

A formal modality that is not propositional. The modality

by an accessibility relation,
two candidates for

RF

RF , such that RF

F

is represented

consists of one simple cycle. (a) and (b) depict

in otherwise identical models. This ambiguity shows that

F

is not

propositionally modal.

necessarily involves what is true at nodes (possible worlds/moments). Formally modal relations might have little or nothing to do with principles given that these rules are propositions
represented by the object language. Put another way, propositional modality has to do with
what is going in at nodes, their content. Formal modality is not so limited.
A formal modality that is not propositional is such that no set of laws is both necessary
and sucient to characterize the modality. It is a simple matter to create a modality that is
formal but not propositional. Let

RF . RF

F

be a modality with a corresponding accessibility relation

is a subset of logical accessibility having just one simple cycle of nodes. The scenario

is illustrated in Figure 2.2.2. There may be several options for
which must be chosen arbitrarily.

F

RF

in a given model, one of

is not characterized by a set of principles.

The thin red line, the temporal relation of true-futurist theories, is supposed to be a
formal modality that is not propositional.

The thin red line is a linear subset of ATC

accessibility.3 Whenever contingency plays a role, there is more than one possible thin red
line but there is no special rule for prioritizing one timeline over others.
Although propositional modality is stricter than formal modality, propositional modality
is still not enough to pick out all and only genuine modalities. A case in point is permissibility,
which does not amount to any sense of genuine possibility. Even assuming that permissibility is propositionally modal and that only possible acts are permissible, permissibility is not

3 In

the case of indexical true futurism, the arbitrariness stems from the assignment of timelines to nodes;
that is, the precedence of one thin red line over another.
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necessary for any genuine possibility. Genuine modality ultimately stems from the object
of analysis, the philosophical interpretation of the formal system. Physical possibility, for
instance, can be represented in terms of consistency with propositions corresponding to the
laws of nature.

That the representation is of physical possibility depends on identifying

the relation's characterizing propositions as the laws of nature, and that is something that
must be done outside of the system.

So propositional modality is not sucient for gen-

uine modality. Nevertheless, familiar genuine modalities are propositionally modal, making
propositional modality an indicator of genuine modality.
An empiricist might insist that propositional modalities are the only genuine modalities.
Propositional modalities are characterized by a set of principles. Principles in that sense
denotes propositions; but the term may also pick out mechanisms. Here is a candidate example. It is logically possible that some physical mechanism is entirely arbitrary, objectively
random. There is a possible universe in which physical determinism holds except that there
is a special, troublesome machine. This machine periodically outputs a binary digit, 0 or
1. The catch is that the number chosen by the machine is objectively random. The arbitrariness of the selection process renders the mechanism impossible to describe using a law.
The machine ensures that the universe, which would otherwise be physically determined, is
indeterministic. It is possible that the next number will be 0, and it is possible that the next
number is 1. So there is a mechanism, a principle in the ontological sense, that signicantly
alters the physical accessibility relation for that universe.

Propositional modality cannot

account for this accessibility relation because the indeterminism generated by the machine
cannot be depicted by laws. A new sense of modality is required,

ontological modality

.

One might object that ontological modality is nonsense if taken apart from propositional
modality. A genuine mechanism can always be captured by propositions in a suciently rich
language. Objective randomness stems from an absence of mechanisms, of principles in the
ontological sense, not their presence. The contrived example of the indeterministic machine
is indeed representable as a physical modality. The propositions representing physical laws
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must become as contrived as the objective principles themselves: some laws must contain
clauses exempting the machine. These exemptions correspond to an absence of principles in
the ontological sense.
If ontological modality can be explicated in terms of propositional modality, the former
may be considered a subtype of the latter. Under such a taxonomy, propositional modalities
may be divided into two groups, ontological and artifactual.

Artifactual modalities stem

from human artice or convention, including legal laws and mores. Ontological modalities,
in this pacied sense, may simply be non-artifactual or they might be explicated positively.
This pacied notion of ontological modality is not used in this essay.
Even if all legitimate instances of ontological modality are reducible to propositional
modality, the ontological sense of modality is nevertheless intensionally distinct from the
propositional sense. As such, ontological modality is here added to the list of types of modality. The arguments given later in this essay do not hinge on the legitimacy of ontological
modality.

grammatically modal
could would should can might
Finally, terms can be
,

,

,

.

,

Familiar grammatical modalities include

, and so forth. Interestingly,

matically modal, as discussed in Section 3.1.

will

shall
will shall

and

Ignoring terms like

are also gram-

and

to avoid

begging the question herethose terms are primary analysanda of this essayother stock
grammatical modalities are propositionally modal and hence formally modal.

Such terms

are propositionally modal in that they can be represented by operators dened using propositionally modal accessibility relations, although those accessibility relations may depend on
the context of utterance.

2.3

Can

, for instance, might address logical or physical possibility.

Temporally Sensitive Modality

Nodes are accessible with respect to a set of propositions or laws if and only if those
propositions hold at those worlds and consistency is maintained.

For example, the node
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representing the actual world physically accesses any node that satises the actual physical
laws as long as such accessibility does not yield inconsistency.

This characterization of

accessibility is fairly simple and also popular, but it turns out to be quite distant from the
ordinary sense if nodes are taken to span time. As such, it is important to be more specic
about the type of node under discussion before moving on.
The notion that nodes span time leads to problems when accessibility needs to change
over time.

When nodes span time, it does not make sense to use principles to specify

dierent accessibility relations at dierent times. For instance, suppose a stone is dropped
from atop a building and nothing can interfere with its descent. If a single node represents
both the scenario before the stone was dropped and the situation afterwards, then one cannot
formulate:

(2.6) It is necessary that the stone will hit the sidewalk, yet before the stone was
dropped it was not necessary that it would hit the sidewalk.

(2.7) (necessarily: will:

hit

) and (was: not necessarily: will:

hit

)

Accessibility is dened between nodes; so if nodes span time, accessibility cannot change
over time.
There are two common ways to depict temporally-specic nodes. Some analysts prefer
a two-dimensional system in which the parameters are time and possible world.4 Note that
possible world in this case does not refer to a node that spans time, but rather a parameter.
On this view, nodes amount to world-time pairs. The other representation of temporallyspecic nodes uses branching time. The branching interpretation is emphasized here.

2.3.1 Necessity

per Accidens

Temporally sensitive characterizations of the worldmetaphorically, snapshots of possible worldsare here called

4 See

moments

. Temporal sensitivity is required to account for ATC

[MacFarlane(2012)] for a synopsis of the two-dimensional view that is relevant to this discussion.
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(all-things-considered) necessity, necessity
tarian) freedom and contingency.

per accidens

, an important component of (liber-

According to the principle of the xedness of the past,

facts about the past (and present) are now unalterable. Such facts are physically necessary
insofar as physical principles require that these facts cannot be altered once their corresponding events occur, but not in that these facts are logically necessary, nor in that they must
be physically determined before the respective associated events happen. The xedness of
the past generates a type of necessity that is quite dierent from logical necessity. Ockham
made the distinction as follows:

I claim that every necessary proposition is

per se

in either the rst mode or the

per

second mode. This is obvious, since I am talking about all propositions that are

accidens
per accidens

necessary simpliciter. I add this because of propositions that are necessary

, as is the case with many past tense propositions. They are necessary

, because it was contingent that they be necessary, and because they

were not always necessary.5

Some facts about the past are such that they were contingent and became necessary. Considering both physical principles and antecedent conditions, states of the world become unalterable once the events they capture have occurred. The notion of modality behind necessity

per accidens

is here called ATC (all-things-considered) modality, which constitutes the basis

of branching time systems. All of the things to be considered include some modalities and,
as a result, antecedent conditions describing the state of the world up to and at the time
at which necessity

per accidens

is being evaluated.

The modalities in question are all of

the relevant ones, which presumably include propositional modalities like logical, metaphysical, and physical. ATC modality might not be stronger than temporally sensitive physical
modality, but the possibility is left open.
As in Ockham's description of necessity

per accidens

, ATC necessity changes with time.

Thus, it may have been contingent that a stone was dropped from atop a building, as
illustrated in Figure 2.3.1. Physical considerations entail that such facts cannot be undone
once they are complete. After the stone has been dropped, nothing respecting the physical

5 Ockham

Ordinatio I Prologue q.6
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principles that do in fact hold, in which causes are not preceded by their eects in accordance
with the arrow of time (or light cones), can make it the case that the stone was not dropped.
Examples like that of the stone dropped from atop a building indicate not only that
temporally sensitive nodes are crucial for representing cases in which accessibility changes
over time, but also that the state of the world (that the stone was dropped) is relevant to
accessibility. The current state of the world is that the stone has been dropped. Physical
laws, which are statements involving modal and temporal operators, dictate that the stone
will hit the sidewalk in a few seconds. So of the moments at which it is a few seconds from
now, only (but not all) those moments in which the stone hits the sidewalk are accessible
from the current moment. Thus, the stone will necessarily hit the sidewalk, as far as physical
possibility is concerned. Logical laws do not require that the stone will hit the sidewalk in
a few seconds. So there are some logically accessible moments at which it is a few seconds
from now and the stone does not hit the ground.
One popular way to represent ATC modality is to use branching time systems.

The

branching structure of those logics is designed to model ATC modality. Although branching
is used to represent ATC modality here, other depictions are possible. That said, branching
systems are the most sensible choice given a dynamic understanding of accessibility.6

2.3.2 Antecedent Conditions
A lot has been said thus far about the importance of antecedent conditions. The remainder of this section claries the role of antecedents for nodes in general, temporal sensitivity
aside, then returns the discussion to how antecedent conditions are relevant to ATC modality
in particular.
In moving towards a unied explication of accessibility, there are two cases to consider,
the general case of formal modalities and the special case of propositional modalities. Assuming that there are no inconsistent nodes, consistency is the only limitation on accessibility

6 See

Section 2.5 for more on dynamic accessibility.
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Building

Building

Sidewalk

Sidewalk

accessible

m4 : Stone does not hit sidewalk

accessible

m2 : Stone hits sidewalk

Building

Building

Stone

Sidewalk

Sidewalk

m1 : Drop stone

m3 : Do not drop stone
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b
ssi

ce
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Building

accessibility
structure

Sidewalk
m0 : Considering drop
Figure 2.3.1:

Dropping a stone from a building.

is possible that it will not hit the ground (m4 ).
inevitably hit the ground (m2 ).
nodes are

logically

m4

Before the stone is dropped (m0 ), it

Once the stone is dropped (m1 ), it will

is inaccessible from

accessible from one another.

m1 .

Although not physically, all
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pertaining to all formal modalities. For instance, if

then

m

(2.8)

M -necessarily:φ

(2.9)

¬φ

holds at moment

holds at moment

cannot be related to

¬φ would hold at m′

m′

m,

m′ ,
M 's

by

accessibility relation,

since (2.8) entails that

RM .

Otherwise, both

φ is true at all nodes accessible from m.

concrete terms, something like the following absurdity would hold at

m

if

m

φ

and

In more

relates to

m′ :

(2.10) It is necessary that Jones will drink coee, but she might not.

If

M

is a propositional modality, then

M -accesses

another just in case

L

M

is characterized by a set of laws,

L.

One node

is satised at the rst while consistency is maintained.

The consistency requirement plays a signicant role in determining both the structure of

M -accessibility

and the relevance of antecedent conditions.

Examples like the one above

involving (2.8) and (2.9) show that consistency may rule out reexivity, for instance, if
identical to

m

is

m′ .

Antecedent conditions are important because they can determine modal statements when
combined with certain laws. Physical modality serves as a helpful example. Suppose that a
stone is dropped from atop a building. Physical considerations may require that the stone
will inevitably hit the sidewalk. It is assumed that many physical laws assert that particular
consequents, like the stone's hitting the sidewalk, necessarily follow from certain antecedent
conditions, like that the stone was dropped.

Physical laws, although typically stated in

general terms, entail a set of conditionals, like:

(2.11) If a stone is dropped from the building, the stone will inevitably be falling at
9.8m/s in one second;

(2.12) If a stone is dropped from the building, the stone will inevitably hit the sidewalk in two seconds;
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and so forth. Such conditionals help bring out the role of antecedent conditions. If the antecedent in (2.12) is not satised, (2.12) generates no modal requirements. The circumstance
is dierent if the antecedent is satised, in which case

(2.13) The stone will inevitably hit the sidewalk in two seconds

follows. (2.13) is akin to (2.8), which limits accessibility based on the consistency requirement. Moments in which the stone does not hit the sidewalk in two seconds are not accessible
from a node satisfying (2.13). (2.13) follows from (2.12) combined with the antecedent that
the stone was dropped but not from (2.12) alone. Thus, antecedent conditions can determine
modal relations for propositional modalities.
Antecedent conditions tend to be relevant to propositional modalities broadly. If moment

m relates to m′
M -antecedent

by modality

M , then one might say that the state of the world at m provides
m′ .

conditions for the state of the world at

This sort of

M -antecedence

is

more general than what is typically meant by antecedent conditions. In the usual sense,
antecedent conditions involve something like temporal or causal antecedence.

2.4

Contingency and Fatalism

Contingency and fatalism must be explicated in terms of the current analysis. The parameterization given in this section allows for more explicit denitions of future-contingency,
logical fatalism, and theological fatalism in terms of dierent modalities.
Start with a familiar notion of contingency dened in terms of propositions:

contingent proposition

a proposition

φ

is contingent if and only if it is neither necessary

nor impossible. Put another way, both

possibly:φ

φ

∧

and

¬φ

are possible. That is,

possibly:¬φ

Fatalism is taken to be the view that there are no contingencies. Thus:

fatalism

the thesis that no

φ

is contingent. For any

φ,
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necessarily:φ

∨

necessarily:¬φ

2.4.1 Contingency and Fatalism in Multi-Modal Branching Time
The preceding denitions of contingency and fatalism need to be improved in two ways.
First, there are dierent types of modality and ways in which a proposition, event, or thing
can be possible.7

A statement might be logically possible but not physically possible, for

instance. Correspondingly, a statement can be logically contingent yet not physically contingent. A formal modality is anything that can be represented using an accessibility relation.8
So the denitions of contingency and fatalism should make explicit the type of formal modality,

M,

involved. Second, in the branching time semantics used here, truth is dened with

respect to moments, temporally specic possible worlds. Something may be contingent at
one moment and not at another. Thus, the second parameter is the moment,

m,

at which

contingency is evaluated.

M -contingent proposition
M -contingent

at

m

For formal modality

if and only if

Put another way, both

φ

M

is neither

and moment

M -necessary

φ and ¬φ are M -possible at m.

m,

nor

a proposition

M -impossible

φ

at

That is, the following holds

is

m.
m:9

M -possibly:φ ∧ M -possibly:¬φ
M -fatalism

For formal modality

M,

the view that no proposition is

moment, in which case everything is either
for any

7 See

φ,

M -necessary

or

M -contingent

M -impossible.10

at any

That is,

the following holds at all moments:

Section 2.1.
course, formal modalities need not be modal in other senses. For a discussion of formal modality, see
Section 2.2.
9 Regarding this and upcoming definitions, it may be better to bring the main connective—∧ for contingency and ∨ in the case of fatalism—into the metatheory if supervaluationism is under consideration. The
shift is not used here for clarity.
10 It may be desirable to further restrict fatalism to particular sets of moments. This may be desirable if,
for instance, different sets of physical laws are taken into consideration. In this case, there are also various
types of (moment-specific) ATC modality corresponding to different sets of physical laws. Some sets of laws,
physical or otherwise, may yield fatalism while others do not. This notion of restricted fatalism could be
defined without much trouble, but it is unnecessary here.
8 Of
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M -necessarily:φ ∨ M -necessarily:¬φ
This project emphasizes future-contingency. Future-contingency uses

all-things-considered

(ATC) modality. Although it is not standard practice, one might use  ATC-contingency or
accidental contingency instead of future contingency.

future contingent

a proposition

φ

is future-contingent at moment

m

if and only if

φ

is

neither ATC-necessary nor ATC-impossible. Put another way, the following holds at

m.
ATC-possibly:φ

∧

ATC-possibly:¬φ

Instances of future contingency are opposed to ATC-fatalism.

ATC-fatalism

For any proposition

impossible at

m.

φ

and moment

m, φ

That is, the following holds for all

ATC-necessarily:φ

∨

is either ATC-necessary or ATC-

φ

and

m:

ATC-necessarily:¬φ

Consider a specic example. Suppose that it is contingent whether or not Jones has a
cup of coee tomorrow. The event of Jones' coee-drinking may come to pass and it may
not. In terms of propositions,

coee ∧

(2.14) possibly:

coee

possibly:¬

,

where possibility is understood as ATC-possibility.

2.4.2 Explicating Logical and Theological Fatalism
The preceding discussion aside, varieties of fatalism tend not to be named after their
associated modalities in the philosophical literture. For example,
view that all truths are

logically

logical

fatalism is not the

necessary. The threatening variety of modality is instead the

more stringent ATC modality. Similarly, theological fatalism is not the view that all truths
are theologically necessary, whatever that means. What distinguishes theological fatalism
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from logical fatalism is that in the theological case but not the logical case, God plays an
essential role through his comprehensive foreknowledge or atemporal direct apprehension of
events.
Types of fatalism are instead named after the

considerations

that render some type of

contingency inconsistent, regardless of the type of contingency or necessity involved. Physical
fatalism is based on considerations about the physical world and about natural laws. Logical
fatalism is based on logical and linguistic concerns, especially worries pertaining to time.
Theological fatalism has to do with theological considerations, plus those of logical fatalism.

logical fatalism

ATC-fatalism stemming from the incoherence of future-contingency.

theological fatalism

ATC-fatalism stemming from God's comprehensive foreknowledge or

his atemporal direct apprehension of events.

2.4.3 Fatalism and Determism
A nal point worth mentioning here pertains to the distinction between fatalism and
determinism. Determinism is typically understood as physical determinism although the
notion can be generalized to

M -determinism

just as contingency and fatalism were.

The

dierence between fatalism and determinism is often said to be that antecedent conditions
are relevant to determinism, not fatalism. Some elaboration is called for.
Using the denitions of the preceding sections, one might stipulate that fatalism simpliciter is logical fatalism while determinism simpliciter is just physical fatalism. This way
of making the distinction shifts emphasis away from antecedent conditions and towards
laws. There is not in general anything special about antecedent conditions. They are always
lurking and which conditions obtain need not have any bearing on fatalism.

The issue is

whether or not the relevant set of laws is enough to defeat contingency given the antecedent
conditions. In the case of determinism, laws together with antecedent conditions block contingency.

In the case of fatalism, laws together with antecedent conditions do not entail
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necessity. Necessity, lack of contingency, is rather arbitrary.
Modalities can be distinguished by their characterizing principles and whether or not
there are such principles.

In the context of a branching system, both determinism and

fatalism involve a linear modality.

The ATC tree may collapse into a line.

Suppose that

ATC-possibility is physical possibility. In this case, ATC modality is propositional. If this
modality linearizes the tree, it is because physical laws together with antecedent conditions
are sucient to determine the future.

This kind of entailment may be used characterize

determinism: the principles of the modality together with antecedent conditions generate
necessity. Next, suppose that physical possibility is not sucient for ATC-possibility and
that ATC-modality is not propositionally modal. In this case, there is no characterizing set
of laws which, when combined with antecedent conditions, yield necessity. If the relation is
nevertheless linear, involving necessity, then it is fatalistic. The necessity of fatalism does
not stem from principles, but is instead arbitrary. While a determined future event is present
in its causes, a fated future event need not be.
The fatalism/determinism distinction may also be stated in terms of which considerations
are relevant. Logical fatalism has nothing to do with what physical laws are or whether or not
attitudes towards science engender physical determinism. Physical principles are relevant to
time ow, the rule that eects cannot precede their causes, and perhaps other considerations
relevant to logical fatalism. Although some such physical rules are at work behind the logic of
temporal statements through which logical fatalism is studied, physical determinism involves
much more. A pointed example is the rule that every event has a cause. Some such law is
relevant to physical determinism, but logical fatalism is compatible with uncaused events.
Consider again the example of Jones' coee-drinking. If her coee-drinking is physically
determined, then prior conditions together with physical laws are sucient for her coeedrinking, and her choice stems from physical causes. Now, suppose that physical determinism
is false.

Whatever the physical laws are, they are not enough to determine Jones' coee-

drinking from the relevant antecedent conditions. Logical or theological fatalism may still
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hold.

Neither logical nor theological fatalism require that Jones' actions are caused by

something, let alone something physical. It may be that Jones' coee-drinking or abstinence
is ATC-necessary on account of a basic assumption about temporal propositions, such as that
she will either drink coee or she will not do so, or that

will

is covertly modalnot the sort

of thing one worries about when dealing with physical determinismthus yielding logical
fatalism. In the theological case, the ATC-necessity of her coee-drinking or abstinence may
follow from God's comprehensive foreknowledge or atemporal apprehension of all events,
again not the sort of consideration that is relevant to physical determinism.

2.5

Dynamic Accessibilities

Various notions of accessibility appear in the literature.

Accessibility is given a par-

ticular understanding in this essay, in keeping with the tradition of branching time logics.
Roughly, a nodefor clarity, call it the target nodeis accessible from another nodecall
it the source nodejust in case the target is realizable or actualizable from the source; that
the source might transition into the target.

For instance, there is a genuine transition or

potential transition between the states depicted in Figure 2.3.1 on page 30.

This notion

of accessibility will be called the dynamic account of accessibility. The dynamic account is
relatively intuitive and has been the prevalent take on accessibility in branching time logics,
used heavily throughout this essay. Such focus, especially in the eld of temporal logic, is no
doubt inuenced by Prior, to whom Peter Geach suggested this understanding of accessibility
for temporal logics.11
There is no pretension that the brief discussion here proves that the dynamic notion of
accessibility is the best. Ocially, the dynamic account is taken as a background assumption.
It is nevertheless worthwhile to clarify Priorian accessibility, comment on its generality, and
explain why it is relevant to this project.
In ordinary language, a thing is accessible to someone if and only if the person can get to

11 [Copeland(1996)]
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it. If and only if Jones can reach a book on a shelf, the book is accessible to her. Provided
that the book is inaccessible to her, then she cannot get to it, perhaps because it is locked in
a vault. One might say that a target node is accessible from a source node if and only if the
source can get to the target. This portrayal makes it look as if nodes are like people in space,
some of whom can touch some others. Another analogy might convey nodes as places, like
Detroit and Chicago. Detroit and Chicago are connected by the interstate highway. They
are accessible from one another; that is, people can go from one to the other. Maybe a target
node is accessible from a source node if and only if one can go from the source to the target.
These analogies provide an intuitive start, but they appear circular if mistaken for explications. Accessibility is itself a modal notion, indicating that a (grammatical) subject
access an object, and was just described using modal terms; in this case,

can

get to the target, one

can

can

can

. The course

go from the source to the target, and so forth. Modality, in

turn, is explicated using accessibility; hence the apparent circularity.
Seeking to avoid circularity, many philosophers nowadays use consistency as the foundation of accessibility.12 Propositional modality plays a signicant role here. The weakest
form of accessibility is just logical accessibility. Every node is accessible to every other node.
For propositional modalities in general, a source node accesses a target node just in case the
source satises the laws of the modality, given that consistency is not violated. This denition makes it so that accessibility depends on what is true at nodes, with modal statements
playing an especially important role in limiting accessibility; even though modal operators
are characterized in terms of accessibility.
There is no circularity, at least no vicious circularity, in interdening accessibility relations
and modal operators using the above method; but such denitions do not capture very much
in the way of content. That is exactly what one would expect for accessibility and modality.
Propositional modalities specify accessibility structure in connection with true propositions.

12 This

is not to say that those scholars think that there is no more to modality than consistency. One
must know what the laws are, which laws are relevant to genuine modality (whatever that means), how a
formal system must be developed to represent modal statements involving individuals, and so forth. Such
issues are tangential to this discussion.
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There is no more content to be found when accounting for propositional modality because
those modalities are so diverse. For instance, physical and deontic modality may not have
much in common besides the fact that both lend themselves to this type of characterization
in terms of propositional modality.

Additional content, accounts of accessibility relations

and modal operators, is only to be found when addressing those rather dierent modalities
individually, not in a more general account including both.

The sources of content for

physical and deontic modality, if not independent, are at least disparate.
The account of accessibility indicated so far is static. The static notion is based primarily
on consistency, which generates no ow or movement, not even possible ow or movement.
The ordinary notion of accessibility, to the contrary, involves

accessing

.

It has been argued that the dynamic content associated with nodes accessing each other
is only metaphorical.13

There are, however, reasons to include dynamic content.

Many

philosophers, especially those who use branching time systems, hold that time ows.14

In

branching time logics, the present moves along accessibility paths. The debate about whether
or not time ows has a very long history, dating back at least to Heraclitus and Parmenides
in the Western canon, and remains too contentious to address in satisfactory detail here.
The dynamic view of time is taken as a background assumption for most of this essay.
The problems of logical and theological fatalism are in part about what might
the case or, put in terms of agents, what is within an agent's power to

bring about

become

. If it is

within Jones' power to drink coee tomorrow, then she can make her coee-drinking real or
actual tomorrow. Put in terms of moments, there is some moment in which Jones drinks
coee tomorrow and it is in her power to make that moment real.

Agents aside, if some

event is future-contingent, then there is a moment representing its occurrence that might
become real. A static account of accessibility is insucient to explicate libertarian freedom
and future contingency, which have dynamic content. Freedom and contingency are not just

13 See,

for instance, [Smart(1949), Nerlich(1998), Sider(2003)].
idea is prevalent in Prior. See, for instance, [Prior(1957), Prior(1967)]. McCall also advocates time
flow [McCall(1998)].
14 This
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a matter of consistency, but of change or potential change.
A good candidate source of accessibility's dynamic character is the so-called ow of time.
In branching time models, present moments move along the tree as if it were a road.15 The
notion of time ow works well with the ordinary idea of accessibility and has been used in
formal settings involving both branching time logics and relativistic branching space-time
logics.
A common question (or criticism) is, how fast does time ow? The standard answer is,
one second per second.16 Consider an analogy. One might watch a lm at various speeds
fast, slow, even backwards.
or backwards.

The characters do the same things, although faster, slower,

Similarly, one can imagine present moments moving through a branching

time model at dierent speedsagain faster, slower, or even backwards. That movement is
faster, slower, and backwards is only in comparison between the time scale of the lm or the
model to another, relatively external time scale of the viewer. From the perspective of the
lm characters or someone in the model, there is no dierence in time owit ows at one
second per second. From the perspective of the viewer, time also ows at one second per
second, although the viewer apprehends that the lm's time scale can dier. This analogy
illustrates two points. First, no matter how the viewer plays the lm or the logician imagines
the model, it makes no dierence to those in the lm or model. Second, no matter which
frame of reference one is in, time ows at the same rateone second per second, although
the rate at other frames may appear dierent.
A more rigorous account of dynamic accessibility is called for. Such an explication might
be given by just tacking on the property of being dynamic to the static account; but that
approach is misleading, if not backwards.

The static account may be taken to start with

logical accessibility, using it to build stronger types. This direction of construction is not
appropriate for the dynamic account because it is not evident how movement is supposed to

15 The

same may be said of branching space-time models, although past, present, and future are frame
specific. See, for instance, [Belnap(1992), McCall(1976), McCall(1994), McCall(1998)].
16 See [Prior(1967), McCall(1998)]. Cf. [Smart(1949), Nerlich(1998)].
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come from logical accessibility.
Whatever accessibility is involved in future contingency and libertarian freedom might
be called

all-things-considered

(ATC) accessibility. It was indicated above that ATC acces-

sibility has a dynamic character that goes beyond mere consistency. Future contingency is
about what might

about

become

the case; libertarian freedom is about what an agent can

bring

. Time ow is part of ATC accessibility. So ATC accessibility, not logical accessibility,

is the starting point of the dynamic account.

Other propositional modalities are derived

from ATC modality, and the former inherit the latter's dynamic character.
Suppose that ATC accessibility is propositional. In fact, physical accessibility is a good
candidate for ATC accessibility, although the issue is ocially left open here. Given that ATC
accessibility is propositional, its structure can be represented in terms of consistency just
as in the static account described above. The structure of ATC accessibility is represented
using consistency, but ATC accessibility is not derived from logical accessibility

per se

. It

follows that ATC accessibility is free to retain its dynamic character. ATC accessibility is
more than its structure.
Let

P

be the set of laws characterizing ATC accessibility.

to be considered in all-things-considered accessibility. Thus, if
then

S

generates a some-things-considered accessibility. If

S

P
S

represents all of the rules
is a nonempty subset of

is the empty set, then

to a no-things-considered accessibility, which is just logical accessibility.
superset of

P,

then

S

yields an extra-things-considered accessibility.

If

S

Et cetera

S

P,

leads

is a proper

.

Here are some examples. It is not ATC-possible to drop a stone from atop a building
without it falling.

However, ignoring physical principles, it is possible to drop the stone

without it falling.

Considering only some principles or no principles at all, the type of

accessibility can be weakened. Suppose that it is ATC-possible for Jones to punch her boss
in the face without getting red. Given extra considerations, like the rules of her workplace,
Jones will inevitably get red for punching her boss. So it is not possible in this stronger
sense for Jones to punch her boss without getting red.
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ATC accessibility can be weakened, strengthened, or some combination thereof to construct any propositional modality. The dynamic character of ATC accessibility is inherited
by those accessibility relations derived from it.

Thus, propositional modalities in general

are dynamic under this interpretation of accessibility.

It does not follow that all formal

modalities are dynamic, nor that propositional modalities are dynamic if they are given a
dierent interpretation, one by which ATC modality is not taken as primary. The dynamic
interpretation is nevertheless the most appropriate for considering future contingency and
libertarian freedom.

2.6

Views about Time and Temporal Language

Scholars propose many dierent accounts of time and temporal language.

Several of

these analyses are portrayed as responses to the problems of logical and theological fatalism,
although these theories have implications that go beyond directly addressing fatalism. At
least, logical and theological fatalism involve a lot more than fatalism. Historically, the many
views on time and temporal language can be divided into two categories: open futurism
(OF) and true futurism (TF). A third approach, supervaluationism (Sup), falls somewhere
in between. These theories are discussed throughout most of this essay. At this point, only
preliminary descriptions are in order.
One inuential account is open futurism (OF), the topic of Chapter 7. OF is a doctrine
by which contingent futures should be left open in all senses.

Open futurists hold that

designating an actual or otherwise privileged future makes that future the only genuinely
actualizable possibility. Statements involving

will

, like:

(2.15) Jones will drink coee

single out a particular future. If Jones were to not drink coee, then (2.15) would be rendered
false. So if (2.15) is true, Jones cannot fail to drink coee, where the modality of

cannot

is ATC. Thus, there is a conict between statements like (2.15) and contingency/freedom.
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coffee

¬coffee

present

Figure 2.6.1:

Open futurism: Jones might drink coee and she might not. Open futurists

hold that assigning a privileged future conicts with contingency and freedom.

It is nei-

ther true that Jones will drink coee nor that she will not. The temporal relation is ATC
accessibility.

coffee

¬coffee

present

Figure 2.6.2:

True futurism: Jones will contingently drink coee. True futurists designate

an actual timeline (TRL); in this case, the left branch. It is nevertheless possible that Jones
will not drink coee.

Both future moments are ATC-possible, but only the left one will

occur.

It follows that there is no fact of the matter regarding what will happen until contingency
is resolved, and no particular future can be singled out. This notion is illustrated in Figure 2.6.1. Friends of OF would say that it is neither true that Jones will drink coee nor
that she will not. Note that only somenot allforms of OF involve rejecting bivalence or
the law of excluded middle. Prior ultimately held a form of OF that retains bivalence and
excluded middle.17
True futurism (TF) is the topic of Chapter 6.

Adherents seek to divorce

will

from

possibility/necessity. On this account, Jones might drink coee tomorrow and she and might
not, although she will drink coee. That is, Jones will contingently (or freely) drink coee.
This notion is illustrated in Figure 2.6.2.
TF interprets

17 [Prior(1967)]

will

as something like

will-actually Will
.

is not modal, at least not in any
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sense required by freedom or future contingency.

This move is accomplished by dening

a separate, linear temporal relation on top of ATC-accessibility. This temporal relation is
often called the thin red line (TRL). ATC accessibility is what is required for contingency
and freedom.

Will

does not aect ATC accessibility, but only follows the TRL.

Supervaluationism (Sup), discussed briey in Section 7.2.3, has elements of OF and TF.
Acknowledging that TF and OF both have virtues and shortcomings, Sup is an attempt to
combine the advantages of both theories while minimizing their disadvantages. Sup friends
retain all of TF's intuitively plausible validities, such as:

(2.16) Either Jones will have coee or she will not

which OF does not account for.

Nevertheless, Sup does not assign a privileged future,

thereby avoiding some of TF's most troublesome criticisms.

2.7

Hard and Soft Facts

Most scholars in both the future contingents and freedom/foreknowledge debates acknowledge necessity

per accidens

, here represented in terms of ATC modality, discussed in

Section 2.3. Suppose that whether or not Jones drinks coee tomorrow is ATC-contingent.
That is,

(2.17) Jones might drink coee and she might not

Jones' coee drinking is not ATC-necessary. In other words, her coee drinking is not ATCnecessary

now

. Tomorrow, whatever Jones decides to do will become necessary. Her choice

cannot be undone once she implements it.
Following Ockham and others, TF maintains that there are facts about the future, soft
facts, that are nevertheless contingent. For instance,

(2.18) Jones will drink coee.
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TF supplements an account of ATC necessity with a stronger distinction between hard

and soft facts. Roughly, soft facts are those facts about the future that are not necessary
while hard facts are about the past or present, which are always ATC-necessary.

Having

enough soft facts to specify a particular future as the actual one is equivalent to using a
thin red line (TRL) as illustrated in Figure 2.6.2. Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge
literature talk about soft facts and their counterparts in the future contingents literature use
the TRL. The former type of Ockhamism also involves the more stringent requirement that
characterizations of God's past or present beliefs about soft facts are themselves soft.

2.7.1 Soft Facts in the Freedom/Foreknowledge Scholarship
Over some decades, Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature struggled to
characterize the hard/soft fact distinction.

Patrick Todd recently provided an insightful

analysis in which he observed that these attempts meet with severe diculties.18

Despite

Todd's concerns, it is possible to explicate the hard/soft fact distinction using entailment,
although no successful analysis is given in the freedom/foreknowledge literature.
Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature emphasize whether or not a given
fact is at least in part about the future. On this characterization, soft facts are in part about
the future while hard facts are not. Such an analysis was endorsed by Marilyn Adams and
came to be the dominant notion of soft factuality in the freedom/foreknowledge literature.
Adams provided the following characterization of what it is for a statement to be about a
time.

Statement

p is at least in part about a time t =def
t

ing, actuality or non-actuality of something at
truth of

The happening or not happenis a necessary condition of the

p.19

Adams proposed that soft facts are those true statements that are at least in part about a
future time while hard facts are not. Adams gave an illustrative example:

18 [Todd(2012)]

19 [Adams(1967)],

p. 493
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Caesar died in 44 B.C. expresses a hard fact about 44 B.C. But the statement
Caesar died 2009 years before Saunders wrote his paper does not, since it is at
least in part about 1965 A.D.20

Notice that Adams spoke of hard facts

Caesar died in 44 B.C.E.
die in 44 B.C.E.
times.

about

at
Caesar will

times, not hard facts about times

expresses a hard fact after 44 B.C.E., but

other

may well be soft before 44 B.C.E. Whether or not a proposition is a soft

fact depends on when (or, more specically, at which moment) it is evaluated.
denition, by which soft facts are about

future

Adams'

times, indicates that she was aware that soft

factuality changes over time. She nevertheless did not incorporate ATC modality, by which
soft factuality changes over time.
The literature contains many criticisms, attempted xes, and analyses of Adams' proposal.

John Fischer introduced an especially illuminating type of counterexample.21

He

pointed out that any hard fact about a past occurrence entails something about the future.
For example,

(2.19) Jones had coee yesterday (hard fact)

entails that

(2.20) Jones will not have coee for the rst time tomorrow.

(2.20) is in part about the future and (2.20) is necessary for (2.19), so (2.19) is a soft fact on
Adams' account. A similar trick can be used to show that on Adams' denition, all facts are
soft facts. The resulting attempts to x Adams' explication of the hard/soft fact distinction
are

ad hoc

and not particularly helpful to this discussion.

The problems facing Adams'

view and its successors led Todd to claim that the notion of entailment is insuciently
discriminating to capture the relevant notion of dependence; that is, the dependence of soft
facts upon the future.22

20 [Adams(1967)],

p. 494
p. 75
22 [Todd(2012)], p. 8.
21 [Fischer(1983)],
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2.7.2 Explicating Soft Facts in a Temporally Sensitive Framework
Meanwhile, logicians advocating TF did not seem particularly concerned about the
hard/soft fact distinction.

Using the temporal logics developed by Prior and others, it

is quite easy to represent Ockham's solution to the freedom/foreknowledge problem.
only was Prior aware of Ockham's position, but he formalized it.23
was developed further by Øhrstrøm.24

Not

Priorian Ockhamism

It is disappointing that many scholars in the free-

dom/foreknowledge literature have and continue to ignore such important developments in
the future contingents literature.
The problem with attempts to explicate hard/soft facts in the freedom/foreknowledge
literature is that such eorts fail to account for ATC-modality. ATC-modality is a prerequisite of the hard/soft fact distinction.

The dependence of the hard/soft fact distinction

on ATC-modality is clear in Ockham's work on theological fatalism.

Recall that propo-

sitions describing events can change modal status over time, so that an event that was
future-contingent (Jones will drink coee) eventually becomes ATC-necessary, part of the
unalterable past (Jones drank coee). It was argued in Section 2.3 that temporally sensitive
possible worlds, here called moments, are crucial to representing ATC-modality.

In fact,

the fundamental structure of branching time is designed to represent ATC-modality. Thus,
scholars working on temporal logics were in the best position to handle this sort of problem.
Armed with a temporal-modal structure representing ATC-modality, one can explicate
the hard/soft fact distinction.

Note that truth is moment-specic since ATC-necessity

changes over time.

soft fact

i
ii

A proposition

φ

is a soft fact at moment

m

( )

φ

is true at

(

φ

entails will:ψ for some proposition

)

if and only if the following hold

m
ψ.

23 See

[Prior(1962)] and, for additional developments, [Prior(1967)].
[Øhrstrøm(1981), Øhrstrøm(1983), Øhrstrøm(1984)].
For a more recent synopsis,
[Øhrstrøm(2009)].
24 See

see
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iii

(

)

hard fact

ψ

is future-contingent (not ATC-necessary, not necessary

A proposition

is not a soft fact at

φ

is a hard fact at moment

m

if and only if

φ

per accidens

is true at

m

)

and

φ

m.

i

ii

( ) accounts for the factuality of soft facts, (

) introduces factual future content, and (

pertains to softness. Observe that ATC-necessity is relevant to (

iii

). It is (

iii

iii

)

) that Adams'

denition is missing. While Adams dened a soft fact as a fact that entails something about
the future, the denition given here adds that a soft fact entails something

contingent

about

the future. Soft facts are soft, and not just any future content can serve to make them so.

2.7.3 Comments on the Denition
This explication of the hard/soft fact distinction has some interesting features. First, the
analysis is immune to the formal criticisms of Adams' view, with or without the epicycles later
appended to her denitions. Second, the analysis partitions the space of facts along dierent
lines than many other attempts. Third, as desired Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge
literature, characterizations of God's past and present beliefs about the future turn out to be
soft facts. Fourth, the explication nudges discussions of Ockhamism back to more relevant
ground.
Recall Fischer's criticism of Adams' denition. Given that Jones had coee yesterday,
it is not future-contingent but inevitable that Jones will not have coee for the rst time
tomorrow. Thus, (

iii

) fails for Fischer-style counterexamples. Todd more recently pointed

out that Adams' account cannot dierentiate between God's foreknowledge and his decrees.
However, if God decrees that Jones will have coee tomorrow, then it is inevitable that Jones
will have coee tomorrow. Again, (

iii

) fails.

There is a prevalent view in the freedom/foreknowledge scholarship that soft facts pertain
to the future while hard facts depend only on the past and present. The denition proposed
here does not carve up facts in this way.

There can be hard facts about the future.

For
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instance, suppose the laws of physics determine that the sun will rise tomorrow. It is not
future-contingent, but inevitable that the sun will rise tomorrow. Thus, that the sun will
rise tomorrow is a hard fact. Hard facts can be about the future only insofar as the events
they pick out, if future events, are already present in their causes, so to speak. Soft facts are
never present in their causesotherwise, they would be inevitable and hence not soft.
Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature insist that characterizations of God's
past and present beliefs about the future are soft facts. Most others nd this view awkward,
at best, on the grounds that past beliefs do not seem future-contingent. On the denition
given here, theistic Ockhamists get their wish. If God knows all and only truths, propositional
characterizations of God's past and present beliefs about the future are soft facts. Unlike
normal past/present beliefs, God's beliefs are infallible, entailing that their content is true.
Thus, statements characterizing God's beliefs about the future satisfy (
fallible beliefs do not.

ii

) while normal,

There is nothing new about this distinction between God's beliefs

and normal beliefs. For instance, Nelson Pike indicated that this dierence is the source of
the incompatibility between freedom and foreknowledge.25 Although the softness of God's
beliefs is what freedom/foreknowledge compatibilist Ockhamists have wanted all along, it
may turn out to work against them, as in Pike's argument.
One could debate about whether or not characterizations of God's beliefs
as soft facts, or if something in the analysis needs to change.

should

count

That issue will come up

later. It will be seen that there are diculties for TF in the context of traditional branching
time semantics. An account of temporal standpoints, standpoint inheritance, is introduced
in Section 3.4 and goes a long way towards helping TF in branching time.

Standpoint

inheritance also brings out nuances in the semantics of soft and hard facts, including those
describing God's and others' beliefs.

God's beliefs must be quite dierent than those of

everyone else if his beliefs are to retain their softness, which is required to truth-track soft
facts.

The demand for handing temporal standpoints thus revitalizes the debate about

25 That

is, under Pike’s assumptions. See [Pike(1965)].

50

whether or not characterizations of God's beliefs should count as soft.

The topic will be

discussed further in Sections 3.4 and 6.3.4.
If successful, this denition of soft facts allows discussions of Ockhamism to return to the
central questions. How can any past or present belief be soft? Why do soft facts pick out
one contingent future over another? What is the mysterious dependence relation of the past
upon some contingent future by which soft facts are true? Does it make sense to hold that
characterizations of God's past and present beliefs are soft facts? What is the relationship
between logical and theological fatalism?

Et cetera

. TF, and with it Ockhamism, is the topic

of Chapter 6. Various sorts of TF are discussed there. Scholars have also provided several
formal representations of TF theories. Some of these systems are illustrated and discussed
formally in Chapter 8.

2.8

Branching Time and Relativity

Some thinkers have voiced concerns to the eect that branching time systems fail to account for relativity.26 These worries may be distracting for this project given the importance
of branching time to the literature on future contingents and freedom/foreknowledge. It is
nevertheless worthwhile to briey clarify the position taken here on relativity.
Some criticisms are not against branching time

per se

, but some associated views. On

the one hand, there is the A-theory, which is the view that relational temporal operators
cannot (or should not) be reduced to atemporal operators. The A-theory may be considered
a semantic thesis. On the other hand, there is the A-theory's metaphysical counterpart, the
view that past, present, and future are fundamental features of reality instead of, say, mere
artifacts of subjective experience.
Here is one way of putting the criticism from relativity against the reality of past, present,
and future.

In the theory of relativity, observers in dierent reference frames may record

the time of a given event in ways that are incompatible with branching time systems. One

26 See,

for instance, [Smart(1963)].
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event may appear to come before another in one reference frame; in a second reference frame,
the events are perceived in reverse order. In one frame, one event may be past while the
other is present; while in the second frame, the order is reversed.
and present at the same time.

No event can be past

So, assuming that pastness, presentness, and futurity are

frame-independent, the result is absurdity. The same event is both present and past, thus
present and not present.
Prior gave a rather strong reply. He concludes that

[W]e may say that the theory of relativity isn't about

real

space and time, in

which the earlier-later relation is dened in terms of pastness, presentness, and futurity; the `time' which enters into the so-called space-time of relativity isn't this,
but is just part of an articial framework which the scientists have constructed to
link together observed facts in the simplest way possible, and from which those
things which are systematically concealed from us are quite reasonably left out.27

Prior argues that genuine temporal relations (those associated with the A-theory) cannot be
reduced to atemporal earlier-later relations (those associated with the B-theory), although
the reduction works in the other direction.28 If the A-theory is indispensable and if, in light
of considerations like ATC modality, the A-theory yields branching time, then branching
time systems are the only viable alternative.

Scientists or their philosophical interpreters

who claim that observations supporting relativity are incompatible with branching time are
mistaken, according to Prior.
Prior's view may be dicult to accept. Fortunately, there are other (perhaps less committed) alternatives supporting branching time analyses. The ocial position taken in this
essay involves a few parts:

(2.21) It is possible to construct a branching space-time system that is compatible
with relativity.

(2.22) Relativistic interpretations conict with ordinary assumptions to the eect

27 [Prior(1996)],

p. 51.
esp. [Prior(1957), Prior(1967)], although he provides a synopsis of the argument in [Prior(1996)].
See [McTaggart(1908)] for McTaggart’s labeling of “A-theory” and “B-theory”.
28 See
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that temporal order is retained between reference frames.

For convenience,

it may be assumed that all reference frames are equivalent under Galilean
transformation. In eect, there is only one reference frame.

(2.23) The branching time system presented here can be transformed into a branching
space-time system compatible with relativity by dropping the assumption that
there is eectively one reference frame and making additions to the theory as
needed.

Even if traditional branching time systems conict with relativity, they can be generalized
to account for relativity. Branching space-time systems allegedly compatible with relativity
have been proposed and defended successfully. The most inuential branching space-time
systems are given in [Belnap(1992), McCall(1994)]. A recent synopsis of the status of branching space-time projects is given in [Müller and Strobach(2012)].
One of the primary desiderata of this essay is to provide a reasonable semantic account
of temporal language. An ordinary assumption, outside of the context of discussions about
relativity, is that there is eectively just one reference frame.

In special relativity, the

distinction between reference frames together with fascinating observations about light's
behavior that yield the result that the temporal order of events is frame-dependent.

The

frame parameter is typically irrelevant to temporal order. There is no good reason to think
that ordinary speakers really mean to parameterize temporal order with respect to reference
frames. The semantics of temporal language do not involve such a parameterization.
Although the systems used here do not account for shifts in reference frame that are
not order-preserving, temporal standpoints may be considered a step towards more general
reference frames.

A theory of temporal standpoints is presented in Section 3.4 and more

formally in Section 8.3.

This theory involves parameterizing the temporal relation in a

way that allows propositions to shift standpoint (or not, as the case may be). The result
is something like a frame-relative system; however, the sort of frame shift inspected here
preserves temporal order unless further generalized.
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What is desirable for this essay is a system that can provide a rened semantic account
in simple termsas simple as the subject matter allows, at least.

This account should

be generalizable to accommodate more nuanced observations that may conict with usual
presumptions about the world.

The system used here should fulll those needs.

Strictly

speaking, branching time systems may be inaccurate, as is Newtonian mechanics.

Like

Newtonian mechanics, it is ne to use simplied branching time systems for many purposes
as long as it is understood that some analyses require dropping the simplifying assumptions.
There is no need for branching

space

-time systems in decision theory or game theory, let

alone accounts of ordinary language, and that is what is relevant here. It may be assumed
that, in all examples given in this essay, Jones is not moving too much faster than Smith.

54

Chapter 3

The Future of English

Linguistic considerations play an important role throughout this project. This chapter
conveys a few observations about the grammatical nature of

will

and, on a somewhat dif-

ferent note, perspectival shifts associated with temporal statements.
a discussion of

will

as grammatically modal. The sense in which

will

Section 3.1 contains
is evaluated in this

project, the bleached sense, is distinguished from other notions associated with the term.
In Section 3.2, various types of excluded middle are enumerated. Aside from the usual law
of excluded middle, there are three kinds involving the future: a weak, a medium, and a
strong future excluded middle. The weak and medium varieties are typically equivalent and
usually innocuous, but the strong type is more contentious. Section 3.3 sets out a method for
distinguishing between corresponding instances of weak and strong future excluded middle.
Finally, Section 3.4 introduces temporal standpoints.

Temporal standpoints are moments

determining perspectives. Traditional branching time logics are unable to account for several important types of statements because, in eect, those systems change standpoints too
frequently.

The theory of standpoint inheritance is introduced in a general form, while

theory-specic and formal accounts are reserved for later chapters. Standpoint inheritance
resolves many linguistic inaccuracies of traditional branching time logics in a way that is
general, simple, and intuitive.
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3.1

Grammatical Modalities and Bleached

Will

In the philosophical literature, tense seems to refer to the manifestation of temporal relations in language. Linguists often use the term dierently, focusing on verb forms. Consider
a simple example.

(3.1) Jones runs.

(3.2) Jones ran.

In (3.1),

runs

is a present tense verb.

Ran

in (3.2) is past tense. There is there no future

tense rendition of the verb in English. In general, English is a two-tense language. The two
tenses are past and present. There is no future tense.

(3.3) Jones will run.

It is tempting to think that (3.3) is in the future tense, but there is no future tense modication of the main verb. So-called future tense in English is not grammatically analogous
to past and present tense. Rather, futurity is expressed with modal auxiliary verbs like

will

.

Compare (3.3) with:

(3.4) Jones should run.

(3.5) Jones can run.

(3.6) Jones must run.

Should can
will
,

cally),

, and

must

are all grammatically modal. Grammatically (if not also philosophi-

is also modal. This simple fact is often ignored, or perhaps swept under the rug,

in most philosophical literature. Indeed, many philosophers use temporal logic and tense
logic interchangeably. It is not tense logic that philosophers and logicians are particularly
concerned with; for they largely focus on how to account for the future using grammatically
modal terms like

will

. Rather, these scholars are interested in a logic of time, preferably one

56

that accords well with natural language usage, avoids disastrous metaphysical consequences,
accounts for scientic and other applications, and so forth.
Acknowledging the grammatical modality of

will

may be an important step towards

resolving philosophical issues surrounding how to represent temporal relations involving the
future.

Will

, although grammatically modal, has some characteristics that dierentiate it

from other grammatical modalities. One such candidate is will-not commutativity, discussed
in Sections 6.3.1 and 7.3.1.
Semantically,

will

has several dimensions and senses.

sense is inspected within this project.

Other content of

Only a rudimentary, bleached

will

is mentioned here for two

reasons. The rst reason is to shed light on the bleached content by way of contrast. The
second goal is to point towards additional criteria of adequacy for the analysis of this essay.
A good analysis of bleached

will

should be compatible with and perhaps generalize to other

senses of the term, if possible.
Often,

will

expresses something like determination or intention.

(3.7) I

In (3.7),

will

will

win the contest although the odds are against me.

expresses (among other things) the speaker's determination or intention to

win the contest. Notice that the speaker's expression of determination runs counter to her
perceived small likelihood that the speaker will in fact win. One might even interpret this

the odds are against me
there are signicant obstacles,
I will not win without great determination and eort, but I am likely to win with enough
determination and eort

use of

as conveying something like

. In that case, the speaker uses (3.7) to proclaim her intention to

put forth the determination and eort necessary for her to win.
Compare (3.7) to:

(3.8) I

will

win the contest although it is impossible for me to do so.

Although (3.7) is acceptable, (3.8) is self-contradictory. The speaker may again be expressing
determination to win the contest, but such intention presupposes the ability, or at least the
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perceived ability, to accomplish the goal. Nothing impossible will ever be. Thus, insofar as

will

is about determination or intention,

will

involves certain assumptions about the future

or possible future. If those assumptions are denied, determination seems absurd.

Will

often has probabilistic content. For instance,

(3.9) The incumbent mayor will win the election.

As the philosophical literature has shown, there are several ways to interpret probabilities:
as frequencies, as subjective estimates, as objective mechanisms, to mention a few inuential
views. That debate is beyond this analysis. One can in any case observe that
probabilistically, is compatible with

might not

, even under open futurism.1

will

, taken

This is not to

say that (3.9) would not become false should the incumbent lose the election, but such issues
can be handled using shifts in context or temporal standpoint, discussed in Section 3.4.
The bleached content of

will

, the sense inspected in this essay, does not immediately

accommodate either determination/intention or probabilities.

Nevertheless, bleached

will

should be both compatible with determination content and generalizable to encompass probabilities. Bleached

will

itself is dicult to isolate without begging the question in favor of

one theory or another. One of the tasks of this project is to analyze dierent ways of explicating bleached

will

. Those theories were briey introduced in Section 2.6 and are given a

more detailed treatment in Part II.

3.2

Future Excluded Middles

The law of excluded middle (LEM) is one of the cornerstones of classical logic. The rule
may be stated as follows.

law of excluded middle (LEM)

For any proposition,

⊧ φ ∨ ¬φ
1 Cf.

Section 7.2.1.

φ, φ ∨ ¬φ

is valid. That is,
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LEM is typically associated with its metatheoretic compatriot, the principle of bivalence,
which asserts that every proposition is either true or false.2 LEM and bivalence are equivalent
in every system presented here except one. LEM is valid in supervaluationism, but bivalence
does not hold in that system.
If LEM is valid and the future is unbounded, then LEM instances

will

hold. (In fact,

they will always hold.)

weak future law of excluded middle (W-FLEM)

For any proposition,

φ, φ ∨ ¬φ

will

be true. With some symbols,

⊧ will:(φ ∨ ¬φ)
For example,

(3.10) Jones will either have coee or not.

or the logically equivalent yet somewhat more pedantic:

(3.11) It will be the case that either Jones has coee or she does not.

W-FLEM is closely related to another principle, also closely linked to LEM.

medium future law of excluded middle (M-FLEM)

For any

φ

representing a propo-

sition,

⊧ (will:φ ∨ ¬will:φ)
where

will

has higher precedence than

∨.

For example:

(3.12) Jones will have coee or it is not the case that she will have coee.

M-FLEM is a particular case of LEM. W-FLEM is nearly always equivalent to M-FLEM.
There is only one system discussed in this essay in which M-FLEM is stronger than W-FLEM,

2 For

a description of LEM and bivalence in the context of temporal logic, see [Lucas(1989)], pp. 72–8.
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a non-bivalent variety of open futurism. Outside of discussing that system, W-FLEM and
M-FLEM are here treated as equivalent principles.
(3.10)(3.12) are relatively innocuous given LEM. True futurists and open futurists who
assent to LEM and bivalence agree on W-FLEM and M-FLEM. There is, however, contention
about a stronger principle:

strong future law of excluded middle (S-FLEM)

For any

φ

representing a proposi-

tion,

⊧ (will:φ ∨
Again,

will

will:¬φ)

is understood with smaller scope that

smaller score than

will

∨.

Notice that in S-FLEM,

in the right disjunct; but in M-FLEM,

¬

¬

has larger scope than

has

will

.

That is the only dierence between M-FLEM and S-FLEM. Here is an instance of S-FLEM.

(3.13) Jones will have coee or she will not have coee.

Typical English usage indicates that the disjuncts of M-FLEM and S-FLEM instances
are about the same time or interval unless otherwise specied. For instance, the disjuncts
of (3.13) are presumably about the same time or interval, where this time or interval can
be designated by the context in which the statement occurs. Speakers do not assume that
the rst disjunct might be about, say, this afternoon, while the second might be about next
Thursday.3
LEM is neither sucient nor necessary for S-FLEM. S-FLEM therefore may not be as
logically evident as W-FLEM and M-FLEM. That said, friends of S-FLEM (true futurists and
supervaluationists) contend that their principle is linguistically accurate and fruitful both
within and outside of philosophy.4 5 According to true futurists and supervaluationists, such
considerations warrant accepting S-FLEM as a logical rule.

3 This

issue is addressed formally in Section 8.1.3.
for instance, [Hasle and Øhrstrøm(2004)].
5 Some reasons for accepting S-FLEM’s validity are given in Section 6.3.1.
4 See,
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English speakers often use instances of W-FLEM, like (3.10) and (3.11), interchangeably
with corresponding instances of S-FLEM, like (3.13). The two types of sentences are nevertheless quite dierent. Disjunction (∨) is the main operator in M-FLEM and S-FLEM, but

will

is the main operator in W-FLEM. The distinction between W-FLEM, M-FLEM, and

S-FLEM is further evidenced by the grammatical modality of

will

and other future desig-

nators in English. Section 3.3 claries the distinction between instances of W-FLEM and
those of S-FLEM for the interested reader.

3.3

Identifying Instances of W-FLEM and S-FLEM

An understanding of grammatical modalities, modal auxiliary verbs, is sucient for distinguishing instances of W-FLEM from those of S-FLEM. Nevertheless, some readers may be
interested in clarifying the dierences between the two types of propositions. In this section,
a method for identifying corresponding instances of W-FLEM and S-FLEM is applied to a
couple of simple examples.
The rst order of business is to show that (3.13) is denitely an instance of S-FLEM,
not W-FLEM. Grammatically, conjunctions and disjunctions are very similar in English.
Indeed, linguists use conjunctions both for what philosophers call conjunctions (linguistic
entities whose main connective maps to
main connective maps to

∨).

∧)

and for disjunctions (linguistic entities whose

The procedure given here for identifying (3.13) and other

instances of W-FLEM as such relies on the assumption that conjunctions and disjunctions
are grammatically analogous.
Dene:

(3.14)

c ∶=

Jones is having coee.

(3.15)

b ∶=

Jones is having biscuits.

Start with a simple, relatively innocuous case. Consider:
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(3.16) Jones will have coee and she will have biscuits.

(3.17) will:c

∧

will:b

(3.18) will:(c ∧ b)

Does (3.16) amount to (3.17) or (3.18)? Additional information may be appended to (3.16),
yielding:

(3.19) Jones will have coee and she will have biscuits, but not at the same time.

Using metric future operators, (3.19) can be represented as:

(3.20) will-in-t1 -units:c

∧

will-in-t2 -units:b

∧ t1 ≠ t2 .

Just as (3.16) is adjusted to yield (3.19), (3.17) can be modied to produce (3.20). (3.19)
requires two future operators in order to represent that Jones' coee-having and her biscuithaving occur at dierent times. (3.18) has just one future operator and implies that Jones
will have coee and biscuits simultaneously. Thus, (3.18) cannot be morphed to represent
(3.19).

In fact, (3.18) is outright inconsistent with (3.19).

Uniformly interpreting (3.16)

therefore requires (3.17), not (3.18).
The next example is a step closer to (3.13).

(3.21) Jones will have coee and she will not have coee.

(3.22) will:c

∧

will:¬c

(3.23) will:(c ∧ ¬c)

Observe that (3.21) is self-contradictory given that the two events in the proposition
Jones' having coee and her doing otherwiseoccur at the same time.
instances of

will

are about the same time.

interpretations, (3.22) and (3.23).
be true.

That is, the two

The absurdity is reected in both candidate

Assuming the law of non-contradiction, (3.23) cannot

(3.22) is also impossible by non-contradiciton, provided that the two temporal
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operators are about the same time. This last supposition, that the two temporal operators
are about the same time, can be derived from something like conversational implicature; but
the assumption is not an essential part of (3.22) itself. Additional information can nullify
the assumption and make distinct times salient. (3.21) can be modied to:

(3.24) Jones will have coee and she will not have coee, but not at the same time.

(3.24) is similar to (3.19). (3.24) can only be represented by a modication of (3.22) like

(3.25) will-in-t1 -units:c

∧

will-in-t2 -units:¬c

(3.23) cannot be adjusted to represent (3.24).

∧ t1 ≠ t2 .

(3.24) requires two temporal operators to

account for the fact that the two events occur at distinct times. As such, a uniform interpretation of (3.19) requires (3.22), not (3.23).
Recall the initial question, Which of the following does (3.13) amount to?

(3.26) will:c

∨

will:¬c [an instance of S-FLEM]

(3.27) will:(c ∨ ¬c) [an instance of W-FLEM]

Conjunctions and disjunctions are grammatically similar. Except that (3.21) is a conjunction
while (3.13) is a disjunction, the two propositions are the same.

Therefore, since (3.21)

amounts to (3.22), (3.13) should be interpreted as (3.26), not (3.27).
Roughly the same procedure can be used to mark instances of W-FLEM, like (3.10) and
(3.11). As above, consider an independent case for clarication.

(3.28) Jones will have coee and biscuits.

(3.29) It will be the case that Jones has coee and she has biscuits.

(3.28) and (3.29) should be represented as (3.18), not (3.17).

To see why, append extra

information to (3.28) and (3.29) as follows.

(3.30) Jones will have coee and biscuits, but not at the same time.
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(3.31) It will be the case that Jones has coee and she has biscuits, but not at the
same time.
(3.30) and (3.31) are self-contradictory,6 for (3.28) and (3.29) imply that there is a time at
which Jones is having both coee and biscuits. Contrast (3.24) with (3.30) and (3.31). Only
(3.24) is consistent.
(3.32) will-in-t-units:(c ∧ b)

∧ t≠t

(3.32) is therefore the correct interpretation of (3.30) and (3.31). As such, (3.18) rather than
(3.17) is the right depiction of (3.28) and (3.29). Moving a step closer to (3.10) and (3.11),
consider:

(3.33) Jones will have coee and not have coee.

(3.34) It will be the case that Jones has coee and she does not.

(3.33) and (3.34) are self-contradictory. These sentences may be appended as follows.

(3.35) Jones will have coee and not have coee, but not at the same time.

(3.36) It will be the case that Jones has coee and she does not, but not at the same
time.

Recall that appending the same information to (3.21), forming (3.24), yields a proposition
that is not self-contradictory.

In that case, the appended information makes salient two

temporal operators picking out distinct times. This is not so for (3.35) and (3.36), which
remain self-contradictory despite the change because there is only one temporal operator.
The correct representation of those sentences is therefore:
(3.37) will-in-t-units:(c ∧ ¬c)

∧ t≠t

6 The result assumes that and is interpreted as the unordered conjunction, ∧, not something like and then.
An example of and representing and then is Jones ate breakfast and left to work, in which case the and then
interpretation makes the most sense.
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Thus, a unied approach requires that (3.33) and (3.34) are represented by (3.23) instead of
(3.22). The grammatical similarity of conjunctions and disjunctions yields that (3.10) and
(3.11) should be represented by (3.27), not (3.26). That is, (3.10) and (3.11) are instances
of W-FLEM rather than S-FLEM.

3.4

Temporal Standpoints and Standpoint Inheritance

This section introduces temporal standpoints and the theory of standpoint inheritance
here used to represent standpoints.

The emphasis at this point is on describing tempo-

ral standpoints, providing a brief history, and explaining the basics of tree-pruning and
standpoint inheritance. What cannot be done in this section is address problems for specic
theories. Those issues are mentioned here but not explained. Without going into more depth
on particular theories, one cannot see how they fail and how exactly standpoint inheritance
is supposed to help.
Suppose that Jones drank coee. Yesterday, Smith claimed that Jones would drink coee.
This arrangement, illustrated in Figure 3.4.1, renders the following true:

(3.38) Smith correctly predicted that Jones would drink coee.

It is also true that:

(3.39) Had Jones not drunk coee, Smith's prediction would have been incorrect.

Theists may also assent to the following:

(3.40) God believed that Jones would drink coee.

(3.41) Had Jones not drunk coee, God would have believed that Jones would not
drink coee.

Traditional theories have diculty with many of the preceding statements.
(3.38), which depends on:

For instance,
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Smith
correct

Figure 3.4.1:

Smith
incorrect

Smith predicts that Jones will drink coee. Given that Jones is drinking coee,

Smith's prediction was correct. Given that Jones has not drunk coee, Smith's prediction
was incorrect.
(3.42) Jones was going to drink coee

coee

(3.43) was:will:

Traditional branching time logics switch perspectives in the middle of (3.43), between
and

will

was

. The mechanics of the change in perspective are given in more detail below. It will

be seen that true futurism renders (3.42) and hence (3.38) true even from the counterfactual
perspective in which Jones did not drink coee, making (3.39) and (3.41) false.7 Traditional
open futurism makes (3.42) and hence (3.38) untrue, although such statements appear true.8
To inspect and account for statements like (3.38)(3.43) in branching time systems, one
can utilize the notion of temporal standpoints. A temporal standpoint is a moment representing perspective in time.
The importance of temporal standpoints is not a new discovery although analyses have
developed only slowly. In 1947, Hans Reichenbach provided an insightful analysis dierentiating between not only the time at which a temporal statement is made (S ) and the time
when the proposition aected by a temporal operator is evaluated (E ), but also a point of
reference (R) that may dier from the other two contexts.9 Consider two examples.

(3.44) Jones drank coee. (simple past)

7 See

Section 6.3.3.
Section 7.3.2.
9 [Reichenbach(1947)]
8 See
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S, R

R, E

E

Time

S

(b)

(a)
Figure 3.4.2:

Reichenbach's standpoints. (a) Jones drank coee. (b) Jones has drunk coee.

(3.45) Jones has drunk coee. (present perfect)
In (3.44), the statement is given now (S ); but both the time of reference (R) and the
time of evaluation (E ) are in the past. In (3.45), both

S

and

R

are present, while only

E

is

in the past. This scenario is depicted in Figure 3.4.2.
Unfortunately, Reichenbach's work has been underutilized by logicians working with temporal systems. Prior says that it is

[...] unnecessary and misleading to make such a sharp distinction between the

rst
some

always

point or points of reference and the point of speech; the point of speech is just the
point of reference. [...] This makes pastness and futurity

relative to

point of referencemaybe the rst one (i.e. the point of speech) or maybe

some other. Because Reichenbach's analysis fell short of this generalization, it
was in some ways a hindrance rather than a help to the construction of a logic of
tenses; at all events, no such logic could get going until this generalization had
been made.10

Even if Reichenbach's analysis is not itself as general as a temporal logic, some of his observations can be integrated into a more general system. Ironically, temporal standpoints are
especially important to Priorian branching time systems.
Temporal standpoints and related notions have made appearances in the literature since
Prior. In his seminal 1970 article introducing supervaluationist temporal logic, Richmond
Thomason developed a little bit of semantics leaning towards a theory of temporal standpoints.11 Ultimately, he utilized his observations to create a temporal rendition of supervaluationism, not accommodate temporal standpoints. Later, in 1989, John Lucas acknowledged

10 [Prior(1967)],

p. 13

11 [Thomason(1970)],

§3–4
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the importance of Reichenbach's proposal and set up some machinery to represent temporal
standpoints, but standpoints were not adequately built into the logic Lucas constructed and
their ramications for other important systems were unmentioned.12 Recent work on relativism acknowledged something like temporal standpoints in the context of two-dimensional
systems.13 These studies typically focused on issues apart from temporal logic, like whether
or not a particular sandwich is tasty and to whom. A theory of temporal standpoints has
yet to be satisfactorily applied to branching time semantics.
This project utilizes Reichenbach's observations and integrates them into the temporal
logics developed here, enabling those systems to better handle statements like (3.38) and
(3.39).

This task is accomplished in more detail for particular views in their respective

chapters and formally in Section 8.3. The remainder of the current section provides a more
general and less technical explanation of the logic of temporal standpoints.
In modal and temporal logics, one (metaphorically) hops from moment to moment (or
world to world) in order to evaluate propositions. For example, in order to evaluate whether
or not (3.44) is true today, one must (metaphorically, in the model) step back to yesterday
to see whether or not Jones drank coee. If she did, the proposition is true; otherwise, it is
false.
Recall that necessity

per accidens

involves changes associated with a certain kind of

modality, here called ATC (all-things-considered) modality. Yesterday, Jones' coee-drinking
may have been contingent; but today it is resolved that she drank coee yesterday. ATC
possibility changes over time.
The term

temporal standpoint

is supposed to conjure images of how someone would view

the world from a particular moment. The past is unalterable from that standpoint, but the
future may be open. A temporal standpoint designates a part of the great tree of possible
moments, the part containing that standpoint's past and possible future.

12 [Lucas(1989)]
13 These

systems have a world parameter and a time parameter.
MacFarlane(2012)].

See [MacFarlane(2008),
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s

s

s

Figure 3.4.3:

Standpoint tree pruning.

The standpoint (s), analogous to Reichenbach's

reference point (R), may occupy various positions in the ATC modality tree. Each standpoint
designates a subtree. The standpoint may be distinction from both the moment at which
truth value is assigned and those at which sub-propositions are evaluated.
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The structure of ATC possibility is tree-like. Over time, options (branches) that were
once accessible are no longer so. Jones might not have drunk coee, but that is no longer
an option given that she drank coee.

A given tree eectively shrinks as time passes, as

depicted in Figure 3.4.3. In typical branching time systems, this pruning only occurs with
respect to points at which propositions are evaluated, for those points function as successive
standpoints.

Standpoint inheritance generalizes this notion, introducing a standpoint pa-

rameter by which a proposition can receive a truth value at one moment but utilize another
moment as a standpoint while a third moment may serve as a point of evaluation, just as
Reichenbach proposed. Notice that from a given standpoint, the past is linear. This fact
ensures that whatever is was going to be.
True futurism (TF) eectively designates timelines, so-called thin red lines, across the
underlying tree structure.

In this case, temporal standpoints pertain to the relationships

between those timelines in addition to the underlying tree structure. Temporal standpoints
are of little help to TF otherwise.
Recall (3.44) and (3.45).

E;

in the second case,

R

In the rst case, the standpoint

is instead contemporaneous with

S.

R

is contemporaneous with

Generally, respective trees

designated by various standpoints might be quite dierent in the context of a branching
time semantics (or any system of representing ATC modality), as indicated in Figure 3.4.3.
A dierence in moment-specic trees occurs whenever the earlier standpoint has access to a
node that the later standpoint does not; that is, whenever future-contingency is involved.
Suppose that Jones drank coee but it was not inevitable that she would drink coee.
Figure 3.4.4 illustrates the scenario for open futurism. Recall (3.42) and (3.43) (was: will:

coee

).

The initial standpoint of (3.42) is this moment, a today-moment in which Jones

drank coee. The corresponding subtree is represented in Figure 3.4.4 (a). The outer

p

was

of (3.42) projects the point of evaluation to a past moment, labeled   in Figure 3.4.4. The
question is, what is the standpoint of the interior temporal statement:

coee

(3.46) will:
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standpoint

standpoint
p

p

p

(b)

(c)

standpoint
(a)
Figure 3.4.4:

Coee with standpoints and open futurism. (a) illustrates the subtree with

the standpoint before Jones drank coee and her coee-drinking is still future-contingent.
That subtree contains the moment at which Jones does not drink coee. (b) illustrates the
subtree from todays standpoint in which Jones is drinking or just drank coee. That subtree
does not contain the node at which Jones did not drink coee.

In (c), the standpoint is

the node in which Jones did not drink coee. The subtree does not include the the node in
which Jones drank coee.

Traditional temporal logics treat (3.46) as if the standpoint were the last point of evaluation,
namely, the past moment before Jones drank coee. The corresponding subtree is depicted
in Figure 3.4.4 (a). Under OF, (3.46) is not true from that earlier standpoint. Thus, (3.42)
is not true from the standpoint shown in Figure 3.4.4 (b).
TF suers from a related diculty. In the counterfactual scenario in which Jones did not

drink coee, (3.42) turns out true although Jones was not going to drink coee given that
she did not. Again, the outer
The standpoint follows.

was

shifts the point of evaluation to before Jones drank coee.

Since Jones actually drank coee, (3.46) is true when evaluated

from the past standpoint.
All traditional branching time logics switch standpoints in the middle of (3.42), yielding
similar issues for of those theories. The theory-specic issues described above and are discussed further once particular theories have been introduced in more detail.14 Suce it to
say for now that all major views miss (3.38), (3.39), or both. Such analyses are untenable.
The right answer is achieved when the standpoint of (3.46) is not (3.43)'s point of evaluation,
node

p

, but (3.43)'s standpoint. The standpoint should remain as in Figure 3.4.4 (b) when

evaluating the sub-proposition (3.46), not switch to node

14 For open futurism,

p

as shown in Figure 3.4.4 (a).

see Section 7.3.2. Generating the problem for TF requires the initial point of utterance
to be counterfactual. See Section 6.3.2
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There is no need to abandon the initial standpoint when moving from the outer statement,
(3.43), to the inner statement, (3.46).

Traditional theories eectively change standpoints

wantonly, leading to mistaken accounts of propositions like (3.43).
English no doubt allows many ways to aect standpoints.
given here may be called standpoint inheritance.

The simplied mechanism

OF uses the ATC possibility tree to

account for temporal statements, so standpoints pertain to that tree. TF employs timelines
overlaying the tree to handle temporal statements.

In that case, standpoints must aect

the relations between those timelines. Standpoint inheritance is fundamentally the same for
both OF and TF despite the fact that those views use dierent temporal relations.
Standpoint inheritance divides operators into two categories. The rst category includes
those operators that use moment-specic accessibility relations.

will was will-always
,

,

, and

was-always

Temporal operators (like

) are standpoint-sensitive. The specic temporal rela-

tion used by an operatora subtree in the case of OF and a timeline in the case of TFis
designated by a standpoint. Operators that are not standpoint-sensitive still transmit standpoints to sub-propositions. The rule for standpoint transfer is:

(3.47) Only change standpoint when absolutely necessarywhen evaluation is only
possible by shifting standpoint.

For example, given that Jones drank coee,

(3.48)

Had Jones not drunk coee

...

requires a standpoint shift. Without changing standpoints, the initial standpoint at which
Jones drank coee combined with the counterfactual clause by which Jones did not drink
coee yields that Jones both did and did not drink coee, which is absurd.

In terms of

Figure 3.4.4, the inconsistency is represented by the fact that the non-coee node is not
on the subtree of Figure 3.4.4 (a). Meaningful evaluation is impossible until this conict is
resolved, which can be accomplished by switching the standpoint to a counterfactual node.15

15 Technically,

there may be a whole collection of such counterfactual nodes.
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The result of the standpoint shift is illustrated in Figure 3.4.4 (c). Of course, counterfactual
clauses serve this kind of node-switching function by default, but there are other ways to
force a standpoint shift. As an example,

(3.49) Jones was inevitably going to drink coee

is not true. The statement is not true because

(3.50) Jones might not have drunk coee.

(3.50) holds because there is a today-momentthe same counterfactual node picked out by
(3.48)in which Jones did not drink coee. As above, evaluations at that node require a
standpoint shift. Granting explosion,16 the following would hold without a standpoint shift:

(3.51) It was inevitably going to be the case that either Jones drank coee coee or
carnivorous elves are attacking Jerusalem.
(was:will-inevitably:(

coee ∨ elfAttack )

)

The assumption that Jones drank coee yields absurdity when considering a node at which
Jones is not drinking coee. So, at the inner points of evaluation (for
Jones drank coee or there is an absurdity.

will-inevitably

), either

The absurdity disappears with a switch in

standpoint, removing the problematic hypothesis that Jones is drinking coee.
In traditional branching time systems, standpoints eectively shift to the point of evaluation. This tactic avoids statements like (3.51), yet it was mentioned at the beginning of this
section that traditional systems fail to accommodate a number of other important results.
The rule (3.47) is general and implements standpoint shifts as needed, but does so more
conservatively than traditional branching time semantics to handle statements like (3.42).
It may also be argued that (3.47) accords with the psychology of ordinary speech. Speakers
do not seem to switch perspectives as long as the one they are using works just ne.

16 Explosion

aside, this is not an appropriate place to find a truth glut.
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Several results of accounting for temporal standpoints are view-specic. Those points are
reserved for Part II. A few elementary results common to all views are given here. Suppose
again that Jones is drinking coee, that she might not have been drinking coee, and that
Smith predicted that she would drink coee. Whether or not this coee-drinking scenario is
counterfactual, standpoint inheritance yields correct results for the following statements.

coee

(3.52) True: Jones was going to drink coee. (was: will:

)

(3.53) False: Jones was inevitably going to drink coee. (was: will-inevitably:

(3.54) True: Jones might not have drunk coee. (was: possibly:

coee

¬

coee

)

)

(3.55) True: Smith correctly predicted that Jones would drink coee.

(3.56) True: Had Jones not drunk coee, Smith's prediction would have been incorrect.

(3.57) True: God believed that Jones was going to drink coee.

It is not entirely clear how to handle (3.41). From the counterfactual standpoint at which
Jones did not drink coee, the following holds:

(3.58) Jones was going to not drink coee. (was: will:

God believes all and only truths.

coee

¬

So the following holds from that same counterfactual

standpoint:

(3.59) God believes that Jones was going to not drink coee.
(God believes: was: will:

coee

¬

)

(3.41) is more like the subtly dierent:

(3.60) God

believed

)

that Jones would not drink coee.

(was: God believes: will:

coee

¬

)
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(3.59) pertains to God's current beliefs. (3.41) and (3.60), meanwhile, has to do with God's
past beliefs taken from the current standpoint. Ockhamists want statements like (3.41) and
(3.60) to be true while open theists may reject those statements.
BeliefsGod's, Smith's, or anyone else'sare formed with respect to a given perspective
or standpoint. This is usually not a diculty. God's beliefs are peculiar because they are
truth-tracking.

Taken simply, omniscience is the characteristic of believing all and only

truths. One can nd out what God believes at this or that node by looking at what is true
at that node. Considerations leading to standpoint inheritance indicate that there is more
going on than

truth at a node

.

There is

truth at a node from a standpoint

.

That is why

(3.46) varies in truth depending on whether or not it is in the context of (3.43). Likewise
from the standpoint at which Jones did not drink coee. (3.58) holds. The inner statement:

(3.61) Jones will not drink coee. (will:

inherits the standpoint of the outer

¬

coee

)

was

, namely, the scenario in which Jones did not drink

coee. (3.61) is true at the past node from the standpoint, so (3.58) is true. Consider the
corresponding interior statement of (3.60):

(3.62) God believes that Jones will not drink coee. (God believes: will:

¬

coee

)

God did not form his belief with respect to the node in which Jones did not drink coee. On
true futurism, that node is counterfactual; so, if anything, he believes that Jones will have
coee. God formed his belief from the perspective of that past node, before Jones skipped
the coee.
Open futurists will be happy with that result.

Those who want God's beliefs to be

properly soft need (3.62) to be true in (3.60) just as (3.61) holds in (3.58).

Thus, open

theists arm while Ockhamists deny:

(3.63) From any standpoint, God's beliefs at a moment are evaluated with that moment as the standpoint.
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(3.63) seems plausible in branching time systems. The topic will be discussed further when
dealing with open- and true futurism in particular.
Even without going into much detail about particular views, it is already evident that
something like temporal standpoints must be considered to account for many temporal statements. The theory of standpoint inheritance proposed here is very general, applying to all
major varieties of branching time systems.

In addition to its generality and fruitfulness,

standpoint inheritance is simple and intuitive. The theory is simple because it can be encapsulated by designating standpoint-sensitive (in this case, just temporal) operators and
stipulating that one should only change standpoints when necessary. Traditional branching
time logics eectively change standpoints too frequently, although these theories do not incorporate a standpoint parameter. Standpoint inheritance intuitively accords with ordinary
speech granting that speakers do not switch perspectives as long as the ones they are using work just ne. Using standpoint inheritance to account for temporal standpoints is an
important part of this project and is developed more rigorously in later chapters.
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Chapter 4

Freedom and Fatalism

One pervasive reason for rejecting logical fatalism is that fatalism should not follow merely
from an analysis of

will

. That is, if an account of

will

is incompatible with future-contingency,

then that account is mistaken. Sometimes, concerns about freedom and responsibility also
motivate scholars to care about fatalism.

There are notions of accountability, especially

those held by many contemporary theists, requiring that actions of persons are neither fated
nor determined.
we should act.

Indeed, freedom is presupposed by formal and informal analyses of how
Even freedom/determinism compatibilists must strive to secure coherent

decision-making procedures although these compatibilists might not worry that fatalism
threatens accountability.
Section 4.1 individuates libertarian freedom and epistemic freedom. Libertarian freedom
requires contingency and is therefore incompatible with fatalism and determinism. Contingency is irrelevant to epistemic freedom. Section 4.2 contains a discussion about how freedom
is important to responsibility and decision-making procedures. While physical determinism
might not worry freedom/determinism compatibilists, logical fatalism still poses signicant
diculties. Compatibilism, if true, grants accountability independently of determinism or
fatalism. Nevertheless, compatibilism requires that there is a consistent process by which
agents may decide what to do, and that consistency is what logical fatalism threatens.
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Two related challenges are the problems of logical and theological fatalism. Indeed, many
scholars think that the two issues are fundamentally the same. The consensus is that logical
fatalism, the position that the semantics of time renders a particular future unavoidable,
does not hold. Even if some sort of determinism or fatalism obtains, the xity of the future
does stem from mere temporal semantics. Not all thinkers, however, reject the position that
God's infallible, comprehensive foreknowledge (or eternal apprehension of all events) leads
to a fatalism similar to the logical variety. A common tactic, and the one used in this essay,
is to argue for a particular solution to logical fatalism, then see whether theological fatalism
is avoidable under the proposal in question. Given the branching framework used here, the
way out of logical fatalism does not escape theological fatalism.
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively inspect logical and theological fatalism in more detail,
sketching out arguments for those positions. The arguments given there are further claried
throughout this essay.

Various ways of addressing those fatalisms are given.

For logical

fatalism, the two responses emphasized here are true futurism and open futurism.
futurists maintain that

will

True

is non-modal while open futurists hold that no particular future

will occur insofar as contingency is involved. Theists may either accept or reject theological
fatalism. Providentialists accept a stronger doctrine than theological fatalism, so the latter
may not be a concern for them. Many contemporary theists deny theological fatalism using
theistic eternalism, Ockhamism, or open theism. Theistic eternalism is the view that God is
outside of time. Ockhamism, in the sense used here (as in the future contingents literature),
draws from true futurism. Finally, open theists hold that God does not have comprehensive
foreknowledge when future contingents are involved.

4.1

Libertarian and Epistemic Freedom

Before discussing logical and theological fatalism, it is important to explain how freedom
comes into the picture. It is enough for this project that the reader understand that there is
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an important notion of freedom, typically dubbed libertarian freedom, entailing that there
are future contingents. Consider two well-known types of freedom. The rst is libertarian
freedom, which may be called freedom of action.

The second is epistemic freedom, also

known as compatibilist1 freedom or freedom of will.

libertarian freedom

a type of freedom by which it is possible for the freely acting agent

to do otherwise, perhaps with some other conditions.

epistemic freedom

a type of freedom by which the freely acting agent does what s/he

elects to do, perhaps with some other conditions

John Locke provides an illustrative example distinguishing between libertarian freedom and
epistemic freedom:

[S]uppose a man be carried, whilst fast asleep, into a room where is a person he
longs to see and speak with; and be there locked fast in, beyond his power to get
out: he awakes, and is glad to nd himself in so desirable company, which he stays
willingly in, i.e. prefers his stay to going away. I ask, is not this stay voluntary?
I think nobody will doubt it: and yet, being locked fast in, it is evident he is not
at liberty not to stay, he has not freedom to be gone. So that liberty is not an
idea belonging to volition, or preferring; but to the person having the power of
doing, or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or direct.2

The man in Locke's example does not have libertarian freedom. It is not possible for him
to leave the room. Since he cannot do otherwise than stay in the room, he lacks libertarian
freedom. The happy prisoner, as Locke points out, stays in the room by his own volition.
The man exercises his free will in the sense that he does what he wants to do.

He has

epistemic freedom, as it is dened above.
Libertarian freedom entails that some eventsin particular, some agents' actionsare
contingent. Recall from Section 2.4 that a future-contingent event is an event that, at some
point before the would-be time of the event, the event can occur and it can fail to occur. It is

1 Compatibilist

freedom is not compatibilist in the primary sense used in this essay, namely, the view
that God’s omniscience is compatible with freedom. Rather, compatibilist freedom is compatible with
determinism.
2 [Locke(1690)], II.XXI.10
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Figure 4.1.1:

Jones wants
coffee

Jones wants
coffee

Jones doesn't
want coffee

(a)

(b)

(c)

Libertarian and epistemic freedom. (a) Jones has libertarian and epistemic

freedom. (b) Jones has epistemic freedom, but not libertarian freedom. (c) Jones has neither
libertarian nor epistemic freedom.

necessary (although not sucient) for libertarian freedom that there are future contingents,
for a freely acting agent can elect to perform the given action and s/he can also decide to
do otherwise. As such, libertarian freedom is at odds with fatalism.
To the contrary, epistemic freedom is independent of contingency and thus fatalism. An
agent with free will can do what s/he wants to do. The agent's actions or volitions might
be, on the one hand, free in the libertarian sense and they could be, on the other hand,
determined or fated. Thus, although libertarian freedom might be sucient for epistemic
freedom (assuming that libertarian freedom requires that agents elect their own actions),
libertarian freedom is not necessary for epistemic freedom.3
The following examples may help illuminate the relationships between contingency, libertarian freedom, and epistemic freedom. The various cases are illustrated in Figure 4.1.1.
Suppose that Jones has libertarian freedom with respect to drinking coee tomorrow.
She can drink coee tomorrow and she can abstain from drinking coee tomorrow; that is,
whether or not she drinks coee tomorrow is a contingent matter depending on what Jones
elects to do. In this case, Jones has both libertarian and epistemic freedom. This situation
is depicted in Figure 4.1.1 (a).

3 Epistemic

freedom may be thought to include or constitute a belief on the part of the agent that s/he
is free, or at least a lack of certain belief regarding what s/he will do. In this case, it would be important
to know whether or not Locke’s prisoner believes he is imprisoned. No argument will be given here for or
against this view of epistemic freedom because the exact nature of freedom and its relationship to moral
responsibility are beyond the scope of this project.
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Next, consider a case in which Jones' coee-drinking is determined independently by a
third party.

In this scenario, Jones does not have libertarian freedom because her coee-

drinking is not contingent. More information is required to determine whether or not Jones
has epistemic freedom.

Jones has epistemic freedom if she wants to drink coee, as in

Figure 4.1.1 (b). She can do what she wants to do in this case. As far as Jones is concerned,
it is as if there were no interfering third party.4 If the third party forces Jones to drink coee
against her will, she lacks epistemic freedom. This case is shown in Figure 4.1.1 (c).

4.2

The Importance of Freedom

Many scholars are concerned with fatalism on account of its challenge to accountability.
Such worries are evident in the writing of many thinkers, like Prior.

Libertarian freedom

requires that there are future contingents and is therefore contrary to fatalism. If fatalism
holds, then either moral responsibility is farcical or it does not require libertarian freedom
in the sense dened here.
Compatibilists about freedom hold that libertarian freedom is not necessary for accountability, that responsibility and either fatalism or determinism are compatible. Accountability
itself need not serve as the primary reason for why logical fatalism, at least, should be avoided.
Even if the future is in fact determined or fated, it is epistemically indeterminate for agents
in that they do not know which future will come to pass. Agents use a decision procedure to
select one of various possible options. Decisions are made presupposing future-contingency
on an epistemic level. Logical fatalism threatens to render this picture incoherent by forcing
there to be only one possible option.

If logical fatalism holds, then future-contingency is

inconsistent on any level, metaphysical or epistemic.

So even freedom/determinism com-

patibilists must be concerned about fatalism for reasons pertaining to morality; if not for
accountability, then at least to ensure that there is a coherent decision-making process.

4 This

explanation is given for the sake of convenient illustration, serving the purpose of this essay. The
statement should not be mistaken for an adequate explication of epistemic freedom.
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The preceding concerns may be instantiated in several important theories. Adequately
representing libertarian freedom is crucial for decision theory, game theory, and mechanism
design.

These systems presuppose indeterministic models in which agents can select one

of various courses of action.

Such tools continue to prove their fruitfulness in individual

decision-making, analysis of social welfare, and other applications. The coherence of these
analyses should not be threatened simply by an inadequate representation of

4.3

will

.

Logical Fatalism

The problem of logical fatalism is one of many philosophical challenges dating back to
antiquity. Aristotle formulated the issue in

On Interpretation

1.9. Here is a similar, more

compact rendition of the problem. Consider the following statements.

(4.1) Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or there will not be a sea battle
tomorrow.

(4.2) Tomorrow's sea battle is future-contingent. That is, it might happen and it
might not.
Suppose that (4.1) is true. Without loss of generality5 , suppose that there will be a sea battle
tomorrow. If there might not be a sea battle tomorrow, then it is false that there will be a
sea battle tomorrow (because should there not be a sea battle tomorrow, it would be false
that there will be one). Hence, it cannot be that the sea battle does not occur given that
it will. It follows that there must be a sea battle tomorrow. It is therefore either necessary
that the sea battle occur or necessary that it not occur. Thus, (4.2) is false.
Aspects of the preceding argument will be explicated and analyzed throughout this essay.
One facet of the argument that can be claried now is the type of modality involved in the

5 Without

loss of generality, WLOG for short, is an expression commonly used in demonstration. When
disjuncts are relevantly symmetric, there is little point in deriving analogous results from each because such
derivation amounts to recreating essentially the same proof multiple times. It is enough to show that a
conclusion follows without loss of generality from one disjunct. This subproof indicates that corresponding
results follow from the other disjuncts using subproofs correlating to the one given.
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argument and in (4.2).

It was seen that all-things-considered (ATC) modality is what is

relevant to future contingency.6 Recall that ATC modality forms the tree structure underlying branching time systems.

The argument for logical fatalism begins with instances of

S-FLEM7 like (4.1) and derives corresponding instances of ATC fatalism.
Below is a semi-formal version of the argument that will be discussed throughout this
essay. This version lacks formalizations of temporal and modal operators, which are included
in Chapter 8, but the formal structure is evident. Let

ArgLF

s

represent

There is sea battle

.

Argument for Logical Fatalism (Generalizable)

(ArgLF.1) will:s

∨

will:¬s [premise, an instance of S-FLEM]

(ArgLF.2) will:s [WLOG assumption from (ArgLF.1)]
(ArgLF.3) If ATC-possibly:¬s, then

(ArgLF.4)

¬ATC-possibly:¬s

¬will:s

[premise]

[by (ArgLF.2) and (ArgLF.3)]

(ArgLF.5) ATC-necessarily:s [by (ArgLF.4), given that

¬possibly:¬s

is equivalent to

necessarily:s]

(ArgLF.6) ATC-necessarily:s

∨

ATC-necessarily:¬s, and whichever is necessary corre-

sponds to what will be. [by (ArgLF.1), (ArgLF.2), and (ArgLF.5)]

If ArgLF or something like it is correct, then everything that will happen must happen.
Given that any given proposition either will be true or will not be true, as in (ArgLF.1),
there are no future contingents. This position is

logical fatalism

.8

An important way in which ArgLF diers from some related arguments is that ArgLF
has no extraneous present-past-future hopping. There are a couple of reasons why one might

6 See

Chapter 2, especially Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.
Section 3.2 for more on S-FLEM.
8 See Section 2.4 for specific definitions of future-contingency and logical fatalism.
7 See
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use present-past-future hops.9

First, the hops might bring out the role of the xedness

of the past. The xedness of the past is to some extent incorporated in ATC modality.10
Temporal standpoints also play a role in explicating the xedness of the past because the
xed past is standpoint-relative. Second, and not independently, past-present-future hops
can be used to substantiate (ArgLF.3). This is how Aristotle seemed to use such hops in

On Interpretation

1.9.

(ArgLF.3), which draws a connection between

will

and ATC necessity, warrants some

explanation and may even be the crux of ArgLF. A common intuition behind (ArgLF.3)
is that should there fail to be a sea battle, then it cannot have been the case that there was
going to be a sea battle. So it is impossible for the sea battle to not occur given that it will;
hence, (ArgLF.3). One of the primary tasks of this essay is to shed light on the relationship
(or lack thereof ) between

will

and ATC necessity.

Aristotle and many others rejected logical fatalism.

This type of response to logical

fatalism goes by various names, including Aristotelian, Peircean, and open futurist.
The latter term, designated by the acronym OF, will be used here. Friends of OF, including
(but hardly limited to) Prior and Belnap11 , reject (ArgLF.1), the statement that either
there will be a sea battle or there will not be one, while arming (ArgLF.3), the premise
connecting

will

to ATC necessity.

(ArgLF.1) is not an instance of the law of excluded

middle (LEM) due to the presence of future temporal operators, nor does (ArgLF.1) follow
from LEM. (ArgLF.1) is rather an instance of a stronger proposed truism, S-FLEM, for

Strong Future Law of Excluded Middle

.12 OF is discussed further in Chapter 7.

S-FLEM does have some intuitive plausibility. Another inuential response accepts SFLEM while rejecting the derivation of (ArgLF.5) from (ArgLF.2) on the grounds that
(ArgLF.3) is false. This true futurist (TF) solution, associated with medieval scholars like

9 For a recent example, see Merricks’ Main Argument on p. 33 of [Merricks(2009)]. Pike’s classic argument
for theological fatalism, found in [Pike(1965)], also involves present-past-future hops. In this essay, see
especially the analysis in Sections 6.3.3.
10 See Section 2.3.1.
11 See [Prior(1967), Belnap and Green(1994), Belnap(2005)].
12 See Section 3.2.
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William of Ockham and Richard of Lavenham, has a number of recent adherents, including
Peter Øhrstrøm and Alvin Plantinga.13 TF is the topic of Chapter 6.
A third response, supervaluationsim (Sup), avoids logical fatalism by rejecting (ArgLF.3),
as does TF. Sup in fact takes TF as a foundation, building a more complex logic from TF.
In this project, a new form of Sup will be developed based on OF.14 This OF-based Sup
opens the door for Sup to use the OF rejection of logical fatalism.

4.4

Theological Fatalism

Suppose that God exists and is omniscient. Since God is omniscient, he infallibly knows
all and only truths.

Assume that God has infallible foreknowledge of all that will occur,

including knowledge of what people will choose to do in the future. God knows whether or
not Jones will drink coee tomorrow, for example. Without loss of generality, suppose that
God knows that Jones will drink coee. It follows that Jones will drink coee tomorrow.

Jones will drink
Jones must drink coee

The next phase of the argument is like the case for logical fatalism. From

coee

, it is derived that

Jones cannot not drink coee

, and hence

.

In general, no future actions are contingent.
Following is a more ocial version of this argument for theological fatalism. Let
sent

Jones has a cup of coee

ArgThF

j

repre-

.

Argument for Theological Fatalism (Generalizable)

(ArgThF.1) For any proposition,

(ArgThF.2) For any proposition,

φ,
φ,

if God believes that

φ,

then

φ.

[premise: infallibility]

either God believes that will:φ or God believes that

will:¬φ. [premise: comprehensive foreknowledge]
(ArgThF.3) Either God believes that will:j or God believes that will:¬j . [by (ArgThF.2)]

13 See

[Øhrstrøm(1984), Plantinga(1986)]. Note that branching time semantics represent Øhrstrøm’s position, but not Plantinga’s.
14 See Section 7.2.3 and Section .
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(ArgThF.4) God believes that will:j . [WLOG assumption from (ArgThF.3)]

(ArgThF.5) will:j [by (ArgThF.1) and (ArgThF.4)]

(ArgThF.6) will:j

∨

will:¬j [by (ArgThF.3), (ArgThF.4), and (ArgThF.5)]

(ArgThF.7) ATC-necessarily:j

∨

ATC-necessarily:¬j , and whichever is necessary corre-

sponds to what God believes will be. [by (ArgThF.6) and ArgLF]

Libertarian freedom requires that some future actions are such that the actors can do
otherwise, and hence those actions are contingent. As with logical fatalism, it follows from
theological fatalism that no one is free in the libertarian sense. Many contemporary theists,
most notably Christians, Jews, and Muslims, insist that libertarian freedom is necessary for
responsibility. Responsibility, in turn, is necessary for Judgment, especially in Islam. For
Christians, that a person may be fated for salvation or damnation prior to existence strikes
many as absurd or unfair.

Fatalism may thus pose a substantial threat to mainstream

theism. Many theists are freedom/foreknowledge incompatibilists, but there are important
exceptions and compatibilism does not directly conict with theism.
Fatalism need not challenge theism generally, but only some now-popular types of theism.
Some Christian reformers, like Luther, reject libertarian freedom.15 Reformers like Luther
hold that belief in libertarian freedom is outright heretical, stemming from deep misunderstandings of the Divine. Sects like traditional Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Presbyterianism
strive to account for predestination or providence, by which all events are determined by
God's Will.

As a comparatively weaker position, theological fatalism arguably poses no

threat to belief systems already incorporating providentialism.
Another position that may render theism compatible with theological fatalism is freedom/determinism compatibilism. Freedom/determinism compatibilists hold that libertarian
freedom is not necessary for moral accountability. Although theists may turn to such an alternative account of responsibility to reconcile fatalism (or determinism) with responsibility,

15 See

especially [Luther(1525)].
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logical fatalism is still a problem.

As discussed in Section 4.2, there are other important

reasons why freedom/determinism compatibilists need to address fatalism, considerations
which hold just as well for theistic compatibilists. On an epistemic level, libertarian freedom
plays a crucial role in decision-making processes, both formally and informally. Although
freedom/determinism compatibilists may not rely on libertarian freedom for an account of
responsibility, they must ensure that libertarian freedom remains intact on an epistemic level
in order to retain formal accounts of decision-making processes.
ArgThF is closer to versions of the argument given by thinkers like Edwards and Prior.16

Philosophers in the freedom/foreknowledge literature (with some exceptions, especially recently) tend to reject logical fatalism as true futurists (TF), denying (ArgLF.3). The inference from (ArgThF.6) to (ArgThF.7), which relies on (ArgLF.3), would be considered
unreasonable by those scholars. Incompatibilists in that tradition provide dierent reasons
for accepting the incompatibility thesis that God's comprehensive, infallible foreknowledge
conicts with libertarian freedom.17 As far as theological fatalism is concerned, the approach
taken here is to bring out concerns associated with ArgLF and show that both ArgLF and
ArgThF ought to be taken seriously. The argument for the thesis that TF still engenders

freedom/foreknowledge incompatibility is beyond this discussion.
There are three popular ways by which scholars reject theological fatalism: theistic eternalism (ThEtrn), Ockhamism, and open theism. ThEtrn is the position that God is somehow outside of time. The eternal God does not have foreknowledge

per se

, so (ArgThF.2) is

false. Many thinkers have argued either that ThEtrn is incoherent or that it fails to avoid
theological fatalism.

Nevertheless, ThEtrn has been around for a long time, has impor-

tant connections to other facets of Western theism, and continues to have worthy advocates.
ThEtrn is the topic of Chapter 5.

Ockhamists may reject theological fatalism for other reasons.
hamism may be seen to have two main ingredients.

For this project, Ock-

The rst is TF. TF is often called

16 [Prior(1967)]
17 See,

for instance, [Pike(1965)] and, more recently, [Hasker(2001), Cowan(2003)].
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Ockhamism in the future contingents literature, although the term is not used so liberally in the freedom/foreknowledge literature. Some freedom/foreknowledge incompatibilists
adhere to TF but no incompatibilist is called an Ockhamist in that literature. TF is a
position by which S-FLEM is valid and a particular future will come to pass. The future is
specied by the thin red line in the future contingents literature and, equivalently, by comprehensive sets of soft facts in the freedom/foreknowledge literature.
and ArgThF by rejecting the connection between
(ArgLF.3).

will

TF defeats ArgLF

and possibility/necessity given in

TF is the topic of Chapter 6 and a critique of TF's response to fatalism is

given in Section 6.4. This project primarily emphasizes the rst tenet of Ockhamism.
The second facet of Ockhamism, the one emphasized in the freedom/foreknowledge literature, is the tenet that characterizations of God's past and present beliefs are themselves
soft facts.

The softness of God's beliefs is required to track the true future.

The second

tenet is required for the following commonly held thesis:

(4.3) For any proposition,

φ,

if

φ,

then God has always believed that

φ.

(4.3), like (ArgThF.2), is a way of specifying comprehensive foreknowledge. (ArgThF.2)
is forwards-looking in the sense that it is about what God now believes about what will be.
(4.3) is backwards-looking since it emphasizes what God believed about what is now the case.
Standpoint inheritance claries what it is for God's beliefs to be soft and what accepting
comprehensive foreknowledge requires. This issues is discussed further in Section 6.3.4.
Another way to avoid theological fatalism is open theism (OT). OT amounts to a
rejection of the view that God has comprehensive foreknowledge of the future; that is,
(ArgThF.2). OT may be associated with true futurism, although it is increasingly popular
to derive OT from open futurism. Open theism is the topic of Section 7.2.4.
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Part II

True Futurism and Open Futurism
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Chapter 5

Theistic Eternalism

Theistic eternalism (ThEtrn) is a cluster of views by which God is outside of time,
eternal. ThEtrn has a long history in the Abrahamic religions and inuences from classical
thought. Western scholarly work near the end of the twentieth century has often emphasized Boethius's contributions, to a point at which ThEtrn has been called Boethianism.
Despite the focus on Boethius, similar views were popular among other medieval scholars,
including Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas.

The interested reader may nd a number of

survey articles discussing ThEtrn in the context of the freedom/foreknowledge problem;
for instance, [Helm(2010), Zagzebski(2011b)].
Section 5.1 describes some basics about temporal and atemporal existence. Only temporal
entities can hold properties with respect to times and only temporal entities can have certain
temporally relational properties. These facts introduce challenges to accounts of atemporal
entities.

Such views must show how atemporal entities can have properties at all, and in

particular how atemporal entities can have properties corresponding to temporally relational
properties. Those issues are addressed by the end of Section 5.1.
Several varieties of ThEtrn have appeared over the centuries in which the view has been
around. Three such accounts are given in Section 5.2. The section concludes with discussions
of various criticisms that have heckled ThEtrn.
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The punchline of the chapter is that ThEtrn entails true futurism, a fact brought out
in Section 5.3.

Ontologically, God's direct apprehension or knowledge of events species

an actual timeline.

Semantically, although the eternal God directly apprehends or knows

about events as either present or atemporal, someone in time can truly say that God apprehends/knows the future.

Thus, since God apprehends/knows all and only truths, true

futurism follows from ThEtrn in both an ontological and a semantic sense.

5.1

Temporal and Atemporal Entities

This section provides a broad description of ThEtrn and how eternity diers from
everlastingness.

Section 5.1.1 points out that only temporal entities can have properties

at times and only those entities can have temporally relational properties.

Section 5.1.2

describes the senses in which atemporal beings can have properties at all, and properties
that have something to do with time (including beliefs about what occurs when).

Some

details of how ThEtrn addresses theological fatalism are covered in Section 5.1.3.

5.1.1 Temporal Existence
Familiar objects like Jones and her cup of coee are in a sense temporal entities. Temporal
existence has both metaphysical implications and logical/linguistic facets. Two important
characteristics of temporal entities are that only temporal entities can hold properties at
times, and that only temporal entities can hold certain temporally relational properties. The
discussion here draws from the accounts of temporality/atemporality proposed by Friedrich
Schleiermacher and Nelson Pike.1
Many objects that exist can in some sense or other change over time, even coming in
and out of existence. For instance, Jones can change by becoming hyper after drinking a

1 See [Schleiermacher(1968), Pike(1970)]. Schleiermacher and Pike emphasize temporal location and duration. See [Schleiermacher(1968)], p. 203–5 and [Pike(1970)], p. 6–8.
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cup of coee.2 Jones and other temporal entities hold properties

with respect to time

. For

any property, it makes sense to ask, When did Jones have that property, if ever?

When

was she hyper? Perhaps this afternoon, perhaps always, perhaps never. The ability to have
properties with respect to times, whether or not those properties change, is characteristic of
temporal entities.
Some properties and relations involve more complex temporality.

Suppose that Smith

believes that Jones will drink coee tomorrow. Smith has a belief today, but the content
of that belief relates to another time, namely, tomorrow. Smith has a temporally relational
property, a characteristic involving a temporal relationship between the property holder and
a time. Tomorrow is the day after today. Smith's belief relates the current time to tomorrow.
Smith's having that belief is temporally relational because the time that the belief is about,
tomorrow, is specied relative to the time at which Smith holds the belief. If Smith holds
the belief on a Tuesday, the belief is about what Jones will do on Wednesday; if he3 holds the
belief on a Friday, the belief is about what Jones will do on Saturday; and so forth. Smith
must have the belief on some day if the belief is to make any sense because having a belief
like Smith's presupposes that Smith is in time. The tomorrow that the belief is about would
be underspecied if no day were given for tomorrow to be after. Such examples show that
only beings in time can have temporally relational properties or relations involving a

now

or

current time.
In slightly more formal terms, philosophers tend to explicate temporal statements using
either the A-theory, preferred in this analysis, or the B-theory, to use McTaggart's nowstandard terminology.4 Either approach may be used for this example. In A-theory terms,
one would use a metric temporal operator to express the content of Smith's belief, yielding:

(5.1) will (in one day): Jones drinks coee.

2 Endurantists

and perdurantists explicate change in different ways, but those ontological differences are
unimportant for this part of the discussion. (Cf. [Rogers(2007)]) The exposition is given in endurantist
terms because that is the approach assumed in this project.
3 Recall that for this project, Jones is female while Smith is male.
4 [McTaggart(1908)]
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Using the B-theory, the belief looks something like:

(5.2) Jones drinks coee one day later than whatever today is.

Both the A-theoretic temporal operator and the B-theoretic

later than

are relational. Thus,

Smith's belief has relational content. The A-theoretic temporal operator,
relational. In this case, the

later than

will

, is inherently

has as one of its relata an indexical term (like

now

)

referring to the time at which Smith holds the belief. The relational content of Smith's belief
cannot be eliminated without changing the belief 's content. For instance, Smith's belief may
be stated in absolute terms by specifying today's date, but that would be a dierent belief
given that Smith does not require any information about the date to have the original belief.
That Smith has such a belief is a temporally relational property.

It only makes sense to

ascribe this property to Smith because he is in time.
Not all temporally relational properties/relations require that all parties involved are in
time.5 The number 2 can be Jones's favorite number today even if 2 is not in time. Similarly,
Jones can love God today even if God is outside of time. That Jones loves God today requires
that Jones is in time, but it is not clear that God must also be in time. So atemporal entities
may play some roles in temporal properties and relations, but not others.6
Thus, two important characteristics of temporal entities are:

(5.3) Only temporal entities can hold properties at or with respect to times.

(5.4) Only temporal entities can hold certain temporally relational properties.

Some beings may come into existence and later cease to exist, but nitude is not necessary
for temporality. In principle, a temporal entity may have always existed or may henceforth
always exist. Its duration or temporal extension, in other words, can be unbounded from below or above. A temporal being whose duration is unbounded in both directions is everlasting

5 If

holding a temporally relational property requires existence in time, then atemporal entities cannot
hold any temporally relational properties. See also the discussion in Section 5.2.2.
6 This observation is related the the distinction between real and apparent change. See [Geach(1969)], p.
71 and [Kenny(1979)], p. 40–4.
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or sempiternal.7 God is everlasting provided that he exists in time.
Another characteristic that is often ascribed to God is immutability. His traits do not
change over time. If God exists in time, he can be immutable in a weaker or stronger sense.
In the rst case, his temporally non-relational traits can remain static while his temporally
relational properties can change as time passes. Today he might believe that Jones will drink
coee tomorrow while two days from now he would believe that Jones drank coee yesterday.
A stronger sense of immutability requires that not even God's substantive temporally
relational traits can change.

That God is everlasting and immutable in the strong sense

entails that he has few, if any, temporally relational properties. Suppose that Jones had a
cup of coee on Wednesday, but not on Thursday.

Jones had a cup of coee yesterday
Jones had a cup of coee
is

true on Thursday, but not on Friday. If, on Thursday, God believes

yesterday
Jones had a cup of coee yesterday

, and God's temporally relational beliefs cannot change, then God would believe
on Friday. God would this have a false belief on Friday,

which is impossible. So God must not have had such a belief in the rst place.
The question of which type of immutability is correct depends on what it means for
God's temporally relational characteristics to change substantively. The point to grasp for
this analysis is that there is a sense of immutability, the stronger sense, that requires a
non-relational account of God's properties. If he has knowledge about events or things that
change in time, that knowledge must be temporally absolute instead of relational. This view
of God and immutability takes him a step away from temporality and towards atemporality.

5.1.2 Atemporal Existence and Two Logical Challenges
An atemporal entity is something that exists outside of time. Something that is eternal
is atemporal, perhaps with some additional traits. This section focuses on two important

7 One

may elect to add life or other criteria to the necessary conditions of everlastingness. Such
a criterion would ensure that abstracta like numbers, if they exist, would not be everlasting. In
their explication of Boethius, Stump and Kretzmann include life and other criteria to eternality. See
[Stump and Kretzmann(1981)].
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logical characteristics8 of atemporality.

Atemporal beings can neither hold properties at

times nor hold temporally relational properties. ThEtrn must account for how atemporal
entities like God can have properties at all, and how such entities can have characteristics
pertaining to times (like beliefs about events that occur in time) without having temporally
relational characteristics.
Spatial metaphors have often been helpfulalthough sometimes misleadingin explaining issues involving time. Like time, space is extended. Time also serves as a parameter in
many formulas, just as space does. Space is therefore a good place to start learning about
time, although one should keep in mind that there are some relevant dierences.
Property attribution tends to be independent of spatial location. One can meaningfully
attribute properties to Jones, as in:

(5.5) Jones is drinking coee.

(5.6) Jones is hungry.

and so forth, regardless of where one makes such assertions or where Jones happens to be.
She would not even need to be anywhere if not for the fact that, presumably, she is the sort
of thing whose existence requires a spatial location (and perhaps being hungry and drinking
coee require having a spatial location). Space is likewise irrelevant to other properties and
relations, except those reducible to forms explicitly bringing space into the picture. Examples
of the latter type include:

(5.7) Jones is at home.

(5.8) Jones is studying at the café.

Temporality is akin to spatiality in some regards, although the two are not perfectly analogous. Human beings can roam about a spatial landscape, but not a temporal one. This
arbitrariness of spatial location encourages, if not necessitates, separating spatial location

8 Here,

logical characteristics are traits pertaining to adequate representation within a formal system.
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from property attribution in the general case. Temporal location is not so arbitrary. Jones
can pace back and forth across a room, but she cannot shift time from today to tomorrow
and back to today again.

It is thus no surprise that languages tend to oer more spatial

versatility then temporal.

Tokens of (5.5) and (5.6) assert something about Jones in the

present time. A particular instance of (5.5) evaluated now indicates that Jones is drinking
coee now, not that she was, is or will be drinking coee.
Whatever the extent to which property attribution is bound to time by standard usage,
one might attempt to create an articial temporally-independent mode of attribution, in
analogy with the spatial case. However, there is a notable obstacle to such endeavors. Jones
does not (wholly) exist at multiple spatial locations at once, enabling her to hold a specic
set of properties at a given time, regardless of her spatial location. The temporal situation
is dierent, for Jones can have dierent characteristics at dierent times. (5.5) is logically
equivalent to:

(5.9) Wherever Jones is (if anywhere) she is drinking coee.

Jones' spatial location is irrelevant to evaluating (5.9). Jones occupies at most one spatial
location at the time of evaluation, so ignoring space does not run the risk of contradiction.
Time cannot be removed from the attribution because Jones has dierent traits at dierent
times, even with respect to a particular spatial location. She may go to the same café every
day and sit in the exact same spot, but one day she drinks coee and on another she drinks
tea.

Time could be the only dierence between the coee-drinking scenario and the tea-

drinking scenario. Thus, time must be specied either as a parameter of the truth function
or as part of the attribution.
Jones is a changeable entity. If Jones were immutable in the strong sense, then she would
either have or not have any given property throughout her existence. Property attribution
for strongly immutable entities is arbitrary with respect to time. As such, space and time
are relevantly similar when it comes to property attribution for strongly immutable entities.
The analogy holds just as well for atemporal entities since, like strongly immutable entities,
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atemporal ones do not change over time. It is therefore possible to attribute properties and
relations independently of time, but it only makes sense to use such attribution for beings
that are either immutable with respect to the properties being attributed or not in time at
all.
One might think that every temporally relational property or statement is logically equivalent to some temporally absolute property or statement. For example, suppose that today
is Tuesday and Smith believes that Jones will have a cup of coee tomorrow. The content
of Smith's belief can be restated as:

.

(5.10) Jones (atemporally) drinks coee on Wednesday

Notice that the content of Smith's new belief does not tie him to a particular time.

The

restatement does change the content of Smith's belief, but the two versions are logically
equivalent: they have the same truth value. Any meaningful temporally relational property
or statement can be transformed in the same way, yielding a temporally absolute property
or statement.
A lingering issue is that the transformation may not successfully eliminate all o the
troublesome temporal content. Prior argues that specifying the times at which events occur
requires a temporally relational verb.9

For instance, (5.10) can only be explicated using

something like:

(5.11) Jones (atemporally) drinks coee and today is Wednesday.

The right conjunct fails to be atemporal, according to Prior. For the purpose of this discussion, it will be assumed that Prior is wrong and that temporally relational properties can
be reduced to temporally absolute properties.

Whether or not the transition works, true

futurism still follows from ThEtrn, as discussed in Section 5.3.
The result that absolute temporal operators are needed to represent eternity has its
adherents in the contemporary literature, most notably Paul Helm and Katherin Rogers.10

9 [Prior(1957),

10 [Helm(1997),

Prior(1967)]
Helm(2010), Rogers(2000), Rogers(2007)]
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These scholars argue that eternity is best represented using a B-series.

Ignoring Prior's

criticism mentioned above, an A-series (which is inherently relational) that is equipped with
a metric and a (somewhat arbitrary) zero point can be transformed into a B-series.
The discussion in this section indicates that two basic logical challenges to representing
atemporality can be met. Beings that are atemporal or immutable in the strong sense can
be attributed properties atemporally.

Although atemporal or strongly immutable entities

cannot have temporally relational properties

per se

, every meaningful temporally relational

property can be transformed into a logically equivalent temporally absolute property, assuming that Prior's challenge can be met.

5.1.3 Theistic Eternalism Against Fatalism
How ThEtrn handles logical and theological fatalism depends to some extent on the
particular variety of ThEtrn in question.

A discussion of thoroughgoing eternalism and

perdurantism is beyond the scope of this project, although some allies of ThEtrn advocate
such views.11 Here, the emphasis is on forms of ThEtrn that acknowledge genuine temporal
existence.
When friends of ThEtrn as such talk about fatalism, they are primarily (if not exclusively) worried about theological fatalism. If God is eternal, then he does not hold beliefs
about events in time

before

God hence does not have

(or after, or at the same time as) those events occur. The eternal

fore

knowledge, at least in some sense. (ArgThF.2) is false, so

ArgThF is unsound.

Many scholars attempt to show that ThEtrn fails to avoid theological fatalism, after
all.

Some of these critiques are discussed further in Section 5.2.

One type of argument

challenges ThEtrn's coherence. If ThEtrn is incoherent, then of course it fails to address
anything whatsoever, including theological fatalism. Two other responses are more directly
relevant to ThEtrn's response to theological fatalism.

11 See

Section 5.2.3.

One popular route is to rephrase
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an argument for theological fatalism in atemporal terms. This method brings the argument
for theological fatalism to ThEtrn. Another tactic, the one emphasized here, is to bring
ThEtrn to the argument for theological fatalism. This is done by showing that there is an

important and relevant sense in which foreknowledge can be attributed to an eternal God.
Details are given in Section 5.3.

5.2

Varieties and Criticisms of Theistic Eternalism

This section outlines three types of eternalism: duration (DurEtrn), point (PtEtrn),
and perdurantist (PrdEtrn).

Some but not all of these views are mutually exclusive.

DurEtrn and PtEtrn are incompatible. Both of those views tend to be given an enduran-

tist reading. Nevertheless, those types of eternalism can be nurtured under perdurantism, as
well. Some criticisms of particular views are mentioned along the way. The section concludes
with a brief overview of general challenges to ThEtrn.

5.2.1 Duration Boethianism
In their landmark analysis, Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann identied two passages in which Boethius described God's eternality.12

What is said of God, [namely, that] he is always, indeed signies a unity, as if
he had been in all the past, is in all the presenthowever that might be[and]
will be in all the future.

That can be said, according to the philosophers, of

always

the heaven and of the imperishable bodies; but it cannot be said of God in the
same way. For he is always in that for him

now

has to do with present time.

And there is this great dierence between the present of our aairs, which is
, and that of the divine: our now makes time and sempiternity, as if it were

semper

running along; but the divine now, remaining, and not moving, and standing
still, makes eternity. If you add `

De trinitate

' to `eternity', you get sempiternity, and

the perpetual running resulting from the owing, tireless now. (
4, 20.6422.77)

, Ch.

That God is eternal, then, is the common judgment of all who live by reason.
Let us therefore consider what eternity is, for this makes plain to us both the

12 [Stump

and Kretzmann(1981)]
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divine nature and knowledge. Eternity, then, is the complete possession all at
once of illimitable life. This becomes clearer by comparison with temporal things.
For whatever lives in time proceeds as something present from the past into the
future, and there is nothing placed in time that can embrace the whole extent
of its life equally. Indeed, on the contrary, it does not yet grasp tomorrow but
yesterday it has already lost; and even in the life of today you live no more fully
than in a mobile, transitory moment.

[...]

Therefore, whatever includes and

possesses the whole fullness of illimitable life at once and is such that nothing
future is absent from it and nothing past has owed away, this is rightly judged
to be eternal, and of this it is necessary both that being in full possession of itself

The Consolation of Philosophy

it be always present to itself and that it have the innity of mobile time present
, Bk. V, Prose 6, 422.5424.31)13

[to it]. (

Using Boethius's description as a foundation, Stump and Kretzmann enumerated four criteria
for eternality.

Life
Illimitibility
.

Numbers, truth, and corpses cannot be eternal.

. The life of an eternal being is either unbounded or unextendable. (Stump and

Kretzmann argued that eternal life is unbounded rather than unextendable.)

Duration
Complete possession of all its life at once

. The life of an eternal being has extension.

. Every portion of an eternal being's life is imme-

diately present to it.

That is how Stump and Kretzmann developed and explicated Boethius' view, which was
also endorsed by Brian Leftow.14

What characterizes this notion of eternity is that it is

not point-like, but has duration and arguably extension. The duration of eternity, however,
cannot be divided into substantively distinct parts.

This type of ThEtrn will be called

duration theistic eternalism (DurEtrn) and the corresponding eternity, duration eternity.
Stump and Kretzmann described eternity as an unbounded line parallel to the universe's
timeline.15

13 The

In the former line, everything is present; in the latter, only a single point is

translation given here is from [Boethius(1973)].
Stump and Kretzmann’s view, see [Stump and Kretzmann(1981), Stump and Kretzmann(1987),
Stump and Kretzmann(1991), Stump and Kretzmann(1992)]. For Leftow’s work, see [Leftow(1991a),
Leftow(1991b)].
15 [Stump and Kretzmann(1987)], p. 219
14 For
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present, as indicated in Figure 5.2.1 (a). The analogy between eternal existence and a line is
weak in some respects (as those authors admit), but the illustration brings out two important
characteristics of Stump and Kretzmann's notion of eternity: duration and ever-presence.
One may capture this eternity's indivisibility by specifying that the line is more like the
intuitionistic continuum than a typical line.

Every non-empty subset of the intuitionistic

Temporal timeline

present

present

Eternity

Temporal timeline

Eternity

continuum is identical to the whole.

(a)
Figure 5.2.1:

(b)

Duration theistic eternalism. (a) Eternity is likened to an innite line parallel

to the temporal timeline. Every point on the eternal line is present, while only one point
on the temporal line is present.

(b) Any point on the temporal line is simultaneous (or

ET-simultaneous, as Stump and Kretzmann would say) with all eternal points. Likewise for
all temporal points, be they past, present, or future from a given temporal perspective.

The logical characteristics of a duration-eternal being are in certain respects like that
of an everlasting, immutable entity. As Rogers pointed out, if eternity has duration, then
eternity can be made to correspond to the temporal timeline.16
be arbitrary in two ways. First, there is no

a priori

The correspondence may

reason to relate the present moment to

one point of eternity over another. Second, there is no

a priori

way to relate eternity's scale

to the actual timeline. The arbitrary character of the bijection is irrelevant since eternity is
eectively immutable. The origin and scale of the correspondence do not make a dierence
because there are no dierences for the eternal or immutable.
Despite some notable similarities, duration eternity is not quite a variety of temporal
immutability. An important dierence is that no more than one moment can be present to

16 [Rogers(1994)].

Note that if the universe did not have a timeline to begin with, one will be designated
by the correspondence.
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a temporal entity, even an immutable one. On the contrary, every moment is present to an
eternal entity. This is the relevant sense in which God is atemporal for DurEtrn.
Historically, ThEtrn has been fueled by the presumption that divisibility is an imperfection (and, similarly, change is bad). God, being perfect, is therefore indivisible. Yet it is
dicult to see how eternity can have a kind of duration, even atemporal duration, without
having extension. Extension is divisible. Thus, divine eternity cannot have duration, and
DurEtrn is incoherent.

One way out for DurEtrn is to reject the premise that eternity is divisible.

It may

be that the duration of eternity does not really have extension, or that eternity has a type
of extension that is not divisible. There is an independent example of such an entity: an
abstract structure with extension but that cannot be separated into dierentiable parts is
the intuitionistic continuum. That there is such an abstractum may be enough to show that
DurEtrn is at least structurally plausible. If divine eternity has a similar structure, then

divine eternity can have duration or extension without being divisible, thus retaining the
perfection of divine simplicity.

5.2.2 Point Theistic Eternalism
Contra Stump, Kretzmann, and Leftow, Rogers argued that DurEtrn is not the correct
interpretation of Boethius.17

According to Rogers, Boethius, Augustine and Aquinas held

that eternity has no duration. Eternity is instead point-like, a view that will henceforth be
called point theistic eternalism (PtEtrn). Rogers cited various analogies used by Boethius,
Augustine, and Aquinas. Perhaps the most famous is Aquinas' comparison between, on one
hand, eternity and its relation to moments in time; and, on the other hand, the center of a
circle and its relation to points on the circumference.

We may see an example of sorts in the case of a circle. Let us consider a determined point on the circumference of a circle. Although it is indivisible, it does

17 [Rogers(1994)]
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not co-exist simultaneously with any other point as to position, since it is the
order of position that produces the continuity of the circumference. On the other
hand, the centre of the circle, which is no part of the circumference, is directly
opposed to any given determinate point on the circumference. Hence, whatever
is found in any part of some other time it be past or future. Something can be
present to what is eternal only by being present to the whole of it, since the eternal does not have the duration of succession. The divine intellect, therefore, sees
in the whole of its eternity, as being present to it, whatever takes place through
the whole course of time.18

PtEtrn is more challenging to formalize than DurEtrn. As discussed in Section 5.2.1,
DurEtrn allows for a correspondence between eternity and the actual timeline.

The bi-

jection makes duration-eternity logically (although not in all other respects) similar to immutable everlastingness. There is no such correspondence in the case of PtEtrn.
One concern about PtEtrn was discussed by Pike.19 Temporal beings should be able to
say that God exists. Suppose that God exists at some actual moment. One might propose
that if God exists at all, He exists necessarily; where the necessity in question is either logical
(a matter of mere consistency) or metaphysical (broad logical necessity, as Plantinga calls
it20 ). Whether or not God's existence is conditionally necessary in either of those senses, at
least he cannot come into existence or cease to exist. Thus, God is conditionally necessary
in any linear or branching chronological structure of momentshis existence is conditionally
ATC-necessary. If he exists at all, he has always existed and will, inevitably, always exist.
God's existence at one moment in a chronological structure or ATC tree entails that he exists
at every moment within that structure.

His existence at a single moment yields that His

existence stretches out across time, giving His existence duration. Either PtEtrn collapses
into DurEtrn or PtEtrn entails atheism.
There are at least two options left for PtEtrn.

First, one might argue that God's

existence does not have duration, regardless of appearances, when his existence is embedded
within a chronological structure. That is, the embedding is somehow misleading on a level

18 Summa

Contra Gentiles I, 66, 7. [Pagis(1997)]
p. 10–4
20 [Plantinga(1974)]
19 [Pike(1970)],
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beyond its representation within a formal system. The burden of proof is on PtEtrn to
explain how the embedding is misleading, describing how one should interpret the apparent
duration of eternity without genuine duration.
Second, friends of PtEtrn might construct a model in which God's existence is not
stretched out in time. God might be outside of time in the sense that he does not exist at
(or in the domain of ) any moment, but in some other way or at some distinct node to which
either all or no times are present.

After all, a circle's center does not exist on the circle,

a surveyor at a distant height does not inspect the landscape below from that landscape
below, and so forth.21

A problem with this approach is the diculty in explaining God's

existence and his various relations to temporal things in a way that is not

ad hoc

. Formally,

whether or not something exists at a node (moment) depends on whether or not the object is
represented in the domain at that node. If God does not exist in any moment, yet it is true
at those moments that he exists,
explain how

God exists

God exists

cannot have a typical meaning. PtEtrn must

can be true at a moment although God is not represented within the

domain of that moment.22

5.2.3 Perdurantist Theistic Eternalism
According to Rogers, Anselm's eternalism has some distinguishing characteristics.23 Other
medieval scholars, like Boethius, take an endurantist (three-dimensionalist) and maybe
even presentist approach.

Anselm's notion of eternity, by contrast, is perdurantist (four-

dimensionalist, with eternity as a fth dimension). Perdurantist theistic eternalism (PrdEtrn) has gained some contemporary adherents, most notably Rogers.24

Although a full

discussion of endurantism/perdurantism is beyond the scope of this paper, some points are

21 The

surveyor analogy is from Boethius’ De Consolatione Philosophaie, Book V, Prose VI, lines 27–8.
advocates of PtEtrn attempt to avoid this criticism by relating time to space. For instance,
Rogers (following Anselm) used this approach for A.4 (see Section 5.2.3) in [Rogers(2007)], p. 29. However,
if nodes are parameterized with respect to spatial location, the problem simply reappears, now in terms of
space instead of time: either God is spatially extended or he does not exist.
23 [Rogers(2006), Rogers(2007)]
24 Cf. [Helm(1997)].
22 Some
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worth mentioning.
One characteristic of perdurantism is that it describes time fundamentally using absolute
time in terms of a B-series (that is, with
temporal operators (

was will
,

at later than earlier than
,

,

).

Instead of using

, and so forth) as a basis for characterizing time, absolute

time is the core of perdurantism.

Time behaves just like another spatial dimension.

The

discussion in Section 5.1.2 shows that absolute time is crucial for any eternalism, perdurantist
or not.

Absolute time is primary whether or not any particular eternalist, like Boethius,

acknowledges its importance in accounting for eternity. That PrdEtrn emphasizes absolute
time is something that this form of eternalism has in common with the others.

At least,

other kinds of ThEtrn must also use absolute time to maintain coherence.
A perdurantist takes all temporal objects as four-dimensional entities. Objects do not
change over time or endure. Rather, they consist of various temporal parts, static sub-objects
that are parameterized with respect to time.

Jones, for instance, has a yesterday part, a

today part, a tomorrow part and so forth, all of which are static entities. The account given
here does not, at least without further reduction, adequately represent perdurantism with
respect to all objects. In particular, ATC-necessity (necessity

per accidens

) is assumed to

be a characteristically endurantist notion.25
Rogers was quite clear about the fact that PrdEtrn entails that there is a unique actual
timeline. That is, PrdEtrn entails true futurism (TF). She also realized that designating a
particular future creates a sort of necessity, which she called consequent necessity. Rogers
held that consequent necessity does not interfere with the sort of contingency required for
libertarian freedom.

The accessibility relation behind consequent necessity appears to be

the TRL, the temporal relation of TF corresponding to soft facts; although friends of TF
are typically at pains to keep from associating the TRL with any sort of necessity. Since

25 See

Section 2.3 for more on ATC-modality. ATC-modality characterizes how some events, things, or
propositions become necessary over time. If events, things, or propositions are four-dimensional, then they
cannot become anything. That said, it may be possible to give a formal account of ATC-modality using
static terms; if not for branching time, then certainly within a two-dimensional system like the one described
in [MacFarlane(2012)]. The tricky part would be giving a philosophical account of ATC-accessibility.
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PrdEtrn is itself beyond the scope of this analysis and consequent necessity seems related

to the TRL, Rogers' particular arguments will not be critiqued here. Some criticisms that
are relevant to her analysis are given discussions of true futurism Section 6.4.26
PrdEtrn may be the most promising variety of ThEtrn.

Unlike DurEtrn and

PtEtrn, PrdEtrn is compatible with a thoroughgoing absolutist approach, including

perdurantism, general eternalism, and the B-theory. Because PrdEtrn takes such a dierent basis from the one used in this essay, PrdEtrn cannot be given an adequate treatment
here. One of the goals of this essay is in fact to push TF to absolutism and theism to either
open theism or PrdEtrn. It would be another project altogether to show that absolutism
is inadequate.

5.2.4 Additional Criticisms
It may (and probably should) seem peculiar that there could be entities that are not
merely changeless, but outside of time itself. Some exploration is required to discover whether
or not eternalism is somehow incoherent.

The literature is not lacking in debate.

Some

challenges to DurEtrn and PtEtrn are mentioned in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, respectively.
More general criticisms of ThEtrn are briey discussed here.
Two logico-linguistic challenges to ThEtrn are discussed in Section 5.1.2. Some scholars
argue that ThEtrn is incoherent on other grounds.27 According to ThEtrn, everything,
all events and entities at all times, are immediately present to God. If God apprehends all
things at once, then he apprehends them simultaneously. Hence Anthony Kenny's infamous
remark about Aquinas's eternalism:

But, on St.

Thomas' view, my typing of this paper is simultaneous with the

whole of eternity.

26 Consequent

Again, on his view, the great re of Rome is simultaneous

necessity seems akin to the formal necessity generated by the TRL. The arguments in
Section 6.4 indicate the necessity of the TRL is either philosophically baseless or has genuinely modal
characteristics that interfere with future-contingency. The discussion in Section 6.4 presupposes dynamic or
branching time; however, Rogers’ position appears closer to thorough absolutism.
27 [Kenny(1969), Kenny(1979), Swinburne(1977)]
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with the whole of eternity. Therefore, while I type these very words, Nero ddles
heartlessly on.28
And Geach:

as
and

both

Misperception is involved if God is supposed to perceive what really is future not
future but as present: at self-contradiction, if what God sees is

future

simultaneously (since in itself it is just as God sees it) also present.29

Two events are simultaneous if and only if they occur at the same time, and God apprehends
all events simultaneously. Simultaneity is an equivalence relation30 . Thus, all events occur
at the same time. This conclusion is unacceptable. There is no sense in which Jones had
breakfast at the same time at which she had lunch. Of all entities, a perfect, eternal observer
should realize that.
There are various replies in the literature.31

Any response must explain how two non-

simultaneous events can be at once present to or directly apprehended by God while avoiding

as
present

conict. God observes events simultaneously, not

simultaneous.32 Helm even argues that

it does not make sense for anything to be

to an eternal God or

simultaneous

for

him.33 What is important, however, is that God does not apprehend the events at dierent
times because there are no dierent times from the eternal perspective. For example, God
may know that
(5.12) Jones is having breakfast

(5.13) Jones is having lunch
or directly apprehend Jones doing those things. How can God dierentiate between contrary
events that occur at distinct times?
One might disentangle events that occur at dierent times by encoding those events
together with some identifying absolute temporal information. For instance,

28 [Kenny(1969)],

p. 264
p. 57
30 Equivalence relations are reflexive, symmetric, and transitive.
31 For instance, [Stump and Kretzmann(1981), Helm(1997)].
32 Kenny is aware of the distinction.
33 [Helm(1997)]
29 [Geach(1977)],
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at 8 AM
at noon

(5.14) Jones has breakfast

(5.15) Jones has lunch

34

God apprehends those events simultaneously (from the standpoint of eternity), or at least
not at distinct times. He knows that Jones had breakfast (not lunch) at 8 AM and lunch
(not breakfast) at noon. There is at least no contradiction in the content of His apprehension/knowledge.
There is still the matter of explaining how God apprehends events like that or how he
comes about such knowledge. Consider:

(5.16) (Smith observes Jones eating breakfast) at 8 AM

(5.17) Smith observes (Jones eating breakfast at 8 AM)

Smith observes Jones eating breakfast. If Jones were to do the exact same thing at noon,
then Smith would observe the exact same thing.

At 8 AM

is an adverb aecting when Smith

makes the observation, not part of what Smith observes. (5.16) captures a familiar type of
observation, but (5.17) does not. If
form

at time t

observes

is to be understood atemporally, adverbs of the

cannot apply to the atemporal verb. So God's apprehension must be more

like (5.17), not (5.16). (5.17), however, is unlike familiar cases and needs some explaining.
A related obstacle for ThEtrn is that it is not clear how to explicate the relation between
an atemporal being and temporal ones.

For instance, how does God perform miracles or

sustain life in dierent ways at distinct times if he is outside of time and everything is
simultaneous for him? (Similar concerns apply to immutability.) Pike gave an often-cited
argument:

Let us suppose that yesterday a mountain, 17,000 feet high, came into existence
on the atlands of Illinois. One of the local theists explains this occurrence by reference to divine creative action. He claims that God produced (created, brought
about) the mountain. Of course, if God is timeless, He could not have produced

34 One

must also address Prior’s claims that there is temporal information hidden within the at operator,
and that an eternal being cannot know temporal information. See Section 5.1.2.
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the mountain

yesterday

. This would require that God's creative-activity and thus

the individual whose activity it is have position in time.35
Pike, elaborating on Schleiermacher,36 maintained that there is a temporal relation between
the creator and the created.

Advocates of ThEtrn rejecting Pike's position must expli-

cate creation dierently, allowing God to atemporally create something in time. The usual
analysis of creative activity amounts to something like:

(5.18) (God created a mountain) yesterday

or the grammatically interchangeable:

(5.19) Yesterday, God created a mountain.

The specication of time applies to the main verb; designating the time at which God created
the mountain. If God is outside of time, this explication of creation is inadequate because it
is impossible that atemporal creation occurs in time. The adverb cannot apply to the main
verb. Additionally, consider the statement without the adverb:

(5.20) God created a mountain.

Mountains are temporal objects. It always makes sense to ask questions like:

(5.21) When did God create the mountain?

(5.22) When did the mountain appear?

The answers may be given in the context in which tokens occur, or someone might need
to ask questions like (5.21) and (5.22). Either way, those questions always have an answer.
There is no answer if creative activity does not occur in time. Pike agreed that the temporal
specication must play a role, but the usual role does not work for ThEtrn. A dierent
account of creative activity is needed.

35 [Pike(1970)],

pp. 104–5. Neither Pike nor Schleiermacher before him reject eternalism due to this type of
argument. Their method is to reduce creation to preservation or sustenance. Contra Pike and Schleiermacher,
preservation/sustenance may require a temporal relation if creation does.
36 [Schleiermacher(1968)]

109

A rst attempt to reevaluate creative activity is to simply change the scope of the temporal specication, moving the adverb into the object so that the verb can be atemporal, as
in:

(5.23) God created (a yesterday-mountain).

This solution is not generally acceptable. There is no such thing as a yesterday-mountain.
Just as (5.16) is natural and (5.17) seems

ad hoc

, (5.18) and (5.19) are the familiar cases

and it is not clear that (5.23) even makes sense.
A second attempt to handle Pike's argument adds another term to creative activity.37
Logically, this analysis makes creative activity into a three-place relation, such as:

(5.24) creates(creator, object created, creation time)

This explication allows the creator to be atemporal.

Here is an analogy to clarify this

notion. Suppose there is a magical creation apparatus. To use the machine, one must input
two pieces of information, the object to be created and the time at which the object will
appear. Similarly, God creates objects by his Word, but he must specify both the object
and when it is to appear. This analysis of creation can be generalized to other atemporal
activity.

However, some argument is required to show that the explication is not

ad hoc

.

Familiar temporal creation (by mutable entities) occurs in time, but time is not a part of
creative acts.38
Some scholars worry that atemporality limits God's knowledge.

If God's knowledge

cannot have temporal content, he cannot really understand what it is like to be in time.
Prior said,

Many reputable philosophers, e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas, have held that God's
knowledge is in some way right outside of time, in which case presumably the

what God

verb `knows' in our translation would have to be thought of as tenseless. I want to
argue against this view, on the ground that its nal eect is to restrict

37 Stump
38 Even

and Kretzmann used a similar approach in [Stump and Kretzmann(1981)], p. 448.
when using a microwave to create unfrozen vegetables, one inputs a duration, not an absolute time.
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knows

to those truths, if any, which are themselves timeless. For example, God

could not, on the view I am considering, know that the 1960 nal examinations
at Manchester are now over; for this isn't something that He or anyone could
know timelessly, because it just isn't true timelessly. It's true now, but it wasn't
true a year ago (I write this on August 29th, 1960) and so far as I can see all

not

that can be said on this subject timelessly is that the nishing-date of the 1960
nal examinations is an earlier one than August 29th, and this is
we know when we know that those examinations are now over.39

the thing

As mentioned in Section 5.1.2, Prior rejected a general reduction of temporal statements/properties to fully atemporal correlates.40 So even if God's knowledge has atemporal
content that is logically equivalent to the relevant temporal statements, there is some missing
content if one takes time seriously. Prior's famous example is

(5.25) Thank goodness that's over!

The speaker is thankful that the event in question was present and is now past, no longer
present. According to Prior, there is no way to explicate this shift using only absolute terms.
One can at best describe how the event occurred at some earlier time than now, not that it is
no longer present. Many scholars have come to disagree with Prior's view that the A-theory
is irreducible to B-theoretic terms.41 The issue will not be pursued further here because it is
beyond the scope of this project. It is nevertheless worth noting that saving ThEtrn from
Prior's criticism seems to necessitate reducing the A-theory to the B-theory.
Conversely, atemporal renditions of temporal statements may require content that the
temporal versions do not. For example, consider:

(5.26) The 1960 nal examinations at Manchester are now over

To start, the following is not the sort of thing that can be known by an eternal God:

(5.27) The nal examinations are (atemporally) occurring at some time earlier than
now and are not now occurring.

39 [Prior(1962)]
40 [Prior(1957),
41 For

Prior(1967)]
a recent challenge to Prior’s view, see [Sider(2003)].
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God cannot know (5.27) because (5.27) takes the current time as a reference point, as
indicated by the use of

now

. There is no current time for an eternal being. To eliminate all

temporal relations, something like the following is required:

(5.28) On August 29 of 1960, the 1960 nal examinations at Manchester are (atemporally) over.

(5.28) is the sort of thing that can be known by God because (5.28) does not require a
reference point in time. Ocially, time is picked out using only the

August 29 of 1960

at

operator; like in

at

. The specication of time given in (5.28) is not contained in the temporal

version, (5.27). Atemporal statements that can be known by an eternal God that are about
mutable temporal events require a time specication, but not all true statements have the
content of a time specication. Thus, an eternal God cannot know all truths. At best, the
content of his knowledge contains a complete description of the universe at all times, and
even that requires that statements like (5.25) are reducible to strictly atemporal terms.
Some authors have criticized ThEtrn on the grounds that it does not avoid theological
fatalism.

There are two ways to propose such an argument.

One route is to rephrase an

argument for theological fatalism in absolute terms. A second strategy is to argue that an
argument for theological fatalism that is in temporal terms still applies to ThEtrn.

If

beings in time can truly say that God knows what will happen, God's eternality makes no
dierence.
Linda Zagzebski emphasized the rst avenue.42 She reformulated an argument for theological fatalism using absolute instead of relative times. The content of the eternal God's
knowledge or apprehension is in the relevant ways just as it is in the temporal case except
expressed in terms of absolute times instead of relative times. Zagzebski switched the terms
in the argument to match the atemporality of God's knowledge, creating a parallel argument.
This project emphasizes the second path.43

42 [Zagzebski(1991),
43 Cf.

[Helm(1997)]

Zagzebski(2011a)]

Section 5.3 shows that TF follows from
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ThEtrn.

Section 6.4 argues that if TF is tenable at all, it is not the best option for

avoiding fatalism given a dynamic view of time. Zagzebski's route may be a little bit more
direct. An upshot is that the account given here does not require a separate argument to
show that ThEtrn entails theological fatalism.

5.3

Theistic Eternalism and True Futurism

An important criticism of ThEtrn is that the view does not avoid theological fatalism.
ThEtrn entails TF, and the latter yields fatalism. This section elaborates on the connec-

tion between ThEtrn and TF. In addition to TF as an ontological position, ThEtrn is
committed to certain statements about future events and God's knowledge of those events.
These statements, associated with TF generally, are what open the door to fatalism. That
TF does not avoid fatalism is discussed in Section 6.4.

5.3.1 The True Future
ThEtrn designates an actual timeline.

This fact can be derived in one of two ways,

using God's direct apprehension of events or his propositional knowledge of events. In the
rst case, the eternal God directly apprehends all events as immediately present. He must
somehow dierentiate between actual events and non-actual ones. Insofar as he apprehends
merely possible circumstances at all, he does not directly perceive, conceive, or will them to
be in the same way as actual happenings; for otherwise those merely possible scenarios would
be actual.

As such, actual events are distinguished from merely possible ones.

Assuming

that there can be only one complete description of the world at a given time, ThEtrn picks
out a timeline of actual events.
For the second case, suppose that God's knowledge has propositional content. Given his
omniscience, comprehensive foreknowledge, and infallibility, the content of God's knowledge
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constitutes a full description of the actual world at every moment in time.44 He may also
know everything about merely possible scenarios.

As is the case for his apprehension, he

must know what is actual as distinct from what is merely possible. He could not know

the

future, otherwise. His knowledge therefore designates a unique timeline of actual events.
Thus, ThEtrn entails TF. Although the eternal God does not apprehend events as past
or future, his direct apprehension or knowledge designates an actual timeline. This variety
true futurism will be called ontological true futurism (OnTF)45 because of its ontological
commitments.

The actual timeline, represented by the TRL, is not just an epistemic or

semantic mechanism.

5.3.2 Temporal Statements about God and the Future
ThEtrn entails OnTF, but it has not been claried how ThEtrn should account

for statements given from temporal perspectives. OnTF involves semantic commitments.46
That there is an actual timeline indicates some kind of semantic true futurism (SmTF). However, ThEtrn is not committed to a particular account of propositions within a temporal
framework involving past or future times. An advocate of ThEtrn could be a semantic absolutist, using one and only one TRL; or a semantic indexicalist, employing moment-specic
TRLm .
For ThEtrn, God apprehends or knows everything about both the past and the future,
but as present or timeless rather than as past or future.47

So a little bit of caution is

required when interpreting statements given at moments in time about God's apprehension
or knowledge. Consider, for instance:

(5.29) God knows that Jones will drink coee.

The content of the eternal God's knowledge cannot be:

44 God’s

knowledge contains a full description of the actual world at every moment even if atemporality
limits his knowledge in the ways mentioned in Section 5.2.4.
45 See Section 6.2.3 for more on OnTF.
46 See Section 6.2.3 for more on OnTF and its semantic commitments.
47 [Helm(1997)] contains more analysis on temporal statements about an eternal God.
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(5.30) Jones will drink coee,

as discussed in Section 5.1.2. Understanding the temporal operator as part of the content of
God's knowledge is not the only way to interpret (5.29). Instead of indicating that the content
of God's knowledge or apprehension is temporal, where his apprehension may not even be
propositional, the statement reports that the

object

of God's apprehension/knowledge is

Jones drinking coee at some time that is future with respect to the standpoint (or context
of utterance) of (5.29).
Consider a spatial analogy.

Suppose that Jones is visiting a distant friend.

The day

that Jones was initially scheduled to return, she decides to stay for a few more days. Jones
renders the following proposition true from her own standpoint:

(5.31)

I

am staying

here

for a few more days.

Jones then calls Smith and says, I'm staying here for a few more days.

From Smith's

standpoint, it is true that:

(5.32) Jones told me that

she

is staying

there

for a few more days.

That (5.32) is true from Smith's standpoint does not imply that Jones's report to Smith or
the proposition that Jones rendered true from her own standpoint, (5.31), are about a place
other than where she is. (5.31) and (5.32) are not about a place that would be
than

here

there

from Jones's standpoint. Moreover, that (5.32) is true from Smith's standpoint

does not imply that someone other than Jones is staying, a person that would be a
than an

I

rather

she

rather

from Jones's standpoint. Similarly, (5.29) does not imply that God's knowledge is

of the future from his own standpoint, for it could be that Jones' act is future with respect
to the time at which the proposition is assigned a truth value.
Three observations can be made at this point.

First, ThEtrn entails S-FLEM48 ev-

erywhere along the actual timeline and that a particular future will be. Second, although
the content of the eternal God's knowledge cannot involve past or future times from his

48 See

Section 3.2 for an introduction to S-FLEM.
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perspective, his apprehension or knowledge can be described using temporal language from
a temporal perspective. Third, that there are such descriptions does not even require that
God's apprehension or knowledge has propositional content, as long as the objects of his
apprehension/knowledge can be described with propositions. These three observations yield
that ThEtrn is a variety of TF, the topic of the next chapter.
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Chapter 6

True Futurism

True futurism (TF) is one of the most popular responses to logical and theological fatalism.

Even many freedom/foreknowledge incompatibilists adhere to the view.1

So TF

warrants a careful analysis along with criticisms. This project inspects TF under the dynamic framework althoughTF can be absolutist, too. One of the primary claims made here
is that TF is incompatible with the dynamic framework.
This chapter describes TF in some detail.

TF's history and rejection of fatalism are

given in Section 6.1. Section 6.2 provides a useful taxonomy of various kinds of TF.
Section 6.3 discusses TF's linguistic facets.

The validity of the strong future law of

excluded middle (S-FLEM) is one of TF's selling points.

TF is the simplest branching

temporal logic (of those that anyone uses nowadays) by which S-FLEM is valid.

There

have been challenges to TF as a semantic view, some of which have never been met in the
literature.

Even the toughest of these problems dissipates when TF is enhanced with an

account of temporal standpoints.
TF cannot avoid a number of philosophical problems, given in Section 6.4. On one hand,

there is a set of arguments by which TF yields fatalism. On the other hand, TF succumbs
to the general grounding problem, by which TF either is

1 Two

ad hoc

or entails fatalism. Theistic

notable examples are Pike and Hasker. [Pike(1965), Hasker(2001)] (Note that Pike is not an
incompatibilist when it comes to an eternal God.)
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considerations add to the grounding problem. When God is involved, TF must explain how
God knows soft facts in addition to soft facts themselves. Ultimately, these challenges are
insurmountable within the framework of this analysis.

6.1

A Brief History of True Futurism and Ockhamism

This section provides a very brief account of TF's history, emphasizing it's contemporary
development from Prior onwards. TF's current form was developed largely by Øhrstrøm,
who furthered branching-time representations of TF. The section concludes with a discussion
of how TF aims to dismantle both ArgLF and ArgThF.

6.1.1 History
TF gained notoriety through some medieval scholarship, like that of William of Ockham

and Richard of Lavenham, although the position can be traced back to antiquity.

These

thinkers hold that there is always a fact of the matter about what the future holds, yet
there are future contingents.

According to this view, there are some things that will be

although they are not necessary. TF seeks to retain, on the one hand, that there are future
contingents, or that agents are free in the libertarian sense; on the other hand, that any
given proposition either will be true or will be false, or (sometimes) that God has infallible
and comprehensive foreknowledge.
TF has found many adherents in the last several decades.

systematic accounts of the view.2

Systems like Prior's are known as Priorian Ockhamist.

Prior describes a system in which, for
follow from will:φ.

Prior gave one of the rst

φ

representing a proposition, necessarily:φ does not

For example, suppose that Jones will have a cup of coee tomorrow.

Jones' coee drinking might still be contingent: she could refrain, but she will not.

2 [Prior(1967)]
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.1.1: Jones will contingently drink coee, as designated by the TRL. (a) Jones will
contingently drink coee. The non-linear branching indicates that Jones' coee-drinking is
contingent. The bold red line indicates the TRL sitting atop the underlying ATC tree. The
bigger picture in (b) shows the linearity of the TRL.

TF aside, Prior holds that if an event will come to pass, then there must be some present

facts that make it so.

Many thinkers since Prior, most notably Øhrstrøm, observe that

Priorian Ockhamism3 fails to capture a central tenet of Ockham's actual view.4 In particular,
Ockham's account leads to a semantics of time quite dierent from Prior's. Øhrstrøm and
other true futurists propose a device called the thin red line (TRL). The TRL consists
of one or more chains of moments. These chains are often called chronicles or histories.
What will be the case is designated by what occurs on the TRL and likewise with what was
the case. Priorian Ockhamism represents only the divorce of time from modality without a
genuinely Ockhamist temporal semantics. The TRL is designed to provide such a semantics.
Consider again the example of Jones and her beloved coee. Figure 6.1.1 illustrates a
branching-time version of the scenario.

The non-linear branching of the tree makes it so

that Jones might drink coee and she might not, where possibility is understood as ATCpossibility.

Thus, whether or not she drinks coee is a contingent matter.

The bold red

line represents the TRL. In this case, the TRL is a single chain along the tree. The TRL
designates what will occur: Jones will drink coee.
Since Prior's exposition, thinkers have proposed several varieties of TF. Some of these

3 Ockhamism

in this context does not necessarily include the view that characterizations of God’s beliefs
about the future are soft facts.
4 [Øhrstrøm(1984), Øhrstrøm(2009)]
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types are discussed in Section 6.2, including distinctions that appear underdeveloped in the
current literature. Formal versions are given in Chapter 8.
As they occur in the literature, the names of these various systems can be confusing. TF
also goes by Ockhamism in the future contingents literature. In the freedom/foreknowledge
literature, Ockhamism picks out a view related to but more specic than TF by which
statements characterizing God's beliefs are soft facts. In some more recent work,5 indexical
systems are called Molinist although that term will not be used here. Specic varieties of
TF are discussed in Section 6.2.

6.1.2 True Futurism Against Fatalism
In an inuential article on Ockhamism, Plantinga makes the following bold claim.

[N]o one, presumably, except for the most obdurate logical fatalist, will hold that
[There is (i.e., is, was or will be) such a time as eighty years ago, and Paul will
mow in 1999] is incompatible with Paul's being free to mow in 1999.67

An argument for logical fatalism, ArgLF, is outlined in Section 4.3. This ArgLF hinges on
the thesis that will:φ entails

¬possibly:¬φ,

put forth in the logically equivalent (ArgLF.3).

Plantinga and other advocates of TF reject this premise of the argument.
TF maintains that the TRL is not a modal relation between moments in time. Indeed, the

TRL does not correspond to a set of principles, setting it apart from familiar propositional
modalities like the physical and metaphysical sorts.8

Recall that ATC-modality captures

future contingency. The TRL accounts for temporal operators like

will

. If the TRL is non-

modal and only modal relations can be meaningfully associated with possibility and necessity,
then temporal operators cannot be associated with possibility and necessity, including ATCpossibility and necessity. (ArgLF.3) is therefore false and ArgLF is unsound.

5 For

instance, [Malpass and Wawer(2012)]
is, no one except perhaps Aristotle, Prior, Belnap, and a host of others who are not logical fatalists.
Plantinga’s decision to use “presumably” is a good one, for the claim is alarmingly presumptuous for such
an otherwise careful thinker.
7 See [Plantinga(1986)], p. 250.
8 See Section 2.2 for more on propositional modalities.
6 That
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Thus, TF rejects logical fatalism. The same maneuver, denying the modality of temporal
operators, may be used to dismantle the argument for theological fatalism represented in
Section 4.4 by ArgThF. It makes no dierence to suppose that God or anyone else infallibly
knows what the future holds.

Such knowledge only shows that there is a particular true

future. TF designates such a future regardless of God's foreknowledge. In terms of ArgThF,
(ArgThF.7) does not hold because it relies on the soundness of ArgLF, which TF denies.
So far, so good; but advocates of TF have some explaining to do. If temporal operators
are non-modal, what exactly do they amount to? If God exists and has complete, infallible
foreknowlege, what is the source of that knowledge? TF must provide reasonable answers to
such questions without opening the door to fatalism. These issues are given further treatment
in Section 6.4.

6.2

Varieties of True Futurism

The future contingents literature is full of many varieties of TF. Only branching types are
given here. The rst division is between absolute and indexical TF, given in Section 6.2.1.
While absolute TF uses a single, unparameterized TRL, indexical TF uses moment-specic
TRLs that are dened for every moment.

The core of TF, semantic TF, is described in

Section 6.2.2. Semantic TF is a view about how to account for temporal language, asserting
that the future will turn out one way over others as captured by soft facts or, equivalently, the
TRL. Semantic TF is typically coupled with ontological TF, by which there is a real or actual
timeline. Ontological TF is described in Section 6.2.3. Instead of ontological TF, semantic
TF may be coupled with epistemic TF. According to epistemic TF, the TRL designates what

a given agent thinks the future holds. Epistemic TF is the topic of Section 6.2.4. The view
is defended against Malpass and Wawer's recent criticisms, although other considerations
may rule it out as a viable alternative to ontological TF.
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(b)

(a)

the

Figure 6.2.1: True futurism: absolute and indexical. (a) Absolute true futurism. There is a
unique, unparameterized (absolute) TRL. This TRL marks

actual timeline. (b) Indexical

true futurism. TRLs are parameterized with respect to moments as TRLm . Note that the
TRLm have no starting point but some TRLm overlap others (they eectively have a priority
ranking).

6.2.1 Absolute and Indexical True Futurisms
In Øhrstrøm's rst TF systems, the TRL is unique.9 This view may be called absolute
true futurism (AbsTF) because there is a single TRL that is unparameterized, and thus in
a sense warrants the title, absolute. See Figure 6.2.1 (a). AbsTF is fueled by ontologies by
which there is one and only one actual worldor, in the case of moments, a unique timeline.
The TRL represents this actual timeline.
One can describe the way temporal statements work in terms of diagrams as in Figure 6.2.1. The truth of future statements involving
following the TRL upwards, forwards in time.

will

and

will-always

is determined by

The TRL serves to distinguish the true

future from merely possible ones. Whatever happens at moments along the red TRL in Figure 6.2.1 (a) designates what will be the case, such as Jones' coee-drinking in Figure 6.1.1.
The same rule holds when there are multiple TRLs, as in Figure 6.2.1 (b). From the blue line,
the future is determined by following the blue line upwards, and likewise for the other lines.
Unlike the contingent future, the past is backwards linearthat is, uniquein branching
systems, eliminating the need for disambiguation. So TRLs make no dierence to evaluations
of past-time statements (those involving operators like

9 [Øhrstrøm(1984)]

was

and

was-always

).
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Most scholars agree that AbsTF is decient, at least as a semantic thesis. As indicated
in Figure 6.2.1 (a), AbsTF does not dene a TRL for counterfactual moments. The TRL
is the temporal relation, crucial for evaluating statements involving

will

and other temporal

operators. The main problem is accounting for temporal statements at counterfactual nodes.
There is no TRL through those moments, so either temporal statements are undened or
another account, like open futurism, must be used for temporal statements at counterfactual
nodes. These criticisms of AbsTF are presented in more detail in Section 6.3.2. On account
of these issues, AbsTF has few contemporary adherents.10
In light of arguably insurmountable criticism against AbsTF, scholars developed indexical true futurism (IdxTF). In IdxTF, TRLs are moment specic, designated TRLm .
Eectively, the TRLm are prioritized so that they overlap, as shown in Figure 6.2.1 (b). The
use of moment-specic TRLm ensures that the temporal relation is dened at all moments,
avoiding problems with AbsTF.

6.2.2 Semantic True Futurism
The heart of TF is semantic true futurism (SmTF). SmTF is a view about how to
explicate the content of temporal language, which may be accompanied by one of various
ontological or epistemological positions. SmTF employs the TRL to account for the meanings of propositions involving temporal relations. The TRL consists of one or more chains
spanning time. As such, SmTF entails that for any
will be the case that

φ

or it will the case that

¬φ.

φ

representing a proposition, either it

This principle is S-FLEM (not to be

confused with W-FLEM or M-FLEM).11 As an example, either it will be the case that Jones
drinks coee or it will be the case that Jones does not drink coee. S-FLEM is also valid
in supervaluationism, but it may turn out that neither disjunct is true. SmTF goes a step
further by designating either will:φ or will:¬φ as true. Thus, SmTF is a view that uses the
TRL to arm the following:

10 Semantic
11 These

absolute true futurism was recently endorsed in [Malpass and Wawer(2012)].
future excluded middles are introduced in Section 3.2 and further disambiguated in Section 3.3.
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(6.1) S-FLEM is valid (along the TRL):

⊧ will:φ ∨

will:¬φ

(6.2) At any moment, either will:φ or will:¬φ is true

SmTF yields that S-FLEM is valid along the TRL. In general, S-FLEM is valid within

and only within temporal structures in which moments are temporally connected in chains,
including deterministic and fatalistic structures. Using the notation of Section 2.4, SmTF
is TRL-fatalistic, although friends of TF would prefer to avoid associating their view with
fatalism.

Indeed, if the TRL is non-modal, then SmTF is fatalistic in a merely formal,

innocuous sense.
At this point in the discussion, the focus has been on accounting for temporal language.
Ontological and epistemological concerns are addressed in the next sections. Note that it is
possible to employ IdxTF as a semantic thesis, then designate a special TRL, perhaps to
distinguish real moments from merely possible ones, an absolutist reality from an semantic
indexical actuality. One may think of this absolutely real TRL as the one with the highest
precedence. More specically, the only one in a given tree such that for any distinct moments

m

and

m′

on the TRL, TRLm is identical to TRLm′ (and both are just the special TRL).

6.2.3 Ontological True Futurism
SmTF is often (although not necessarily) associated with corresponding ontological com-

mitments. Ontological true futurism (OnTF) is the view that, despite contingency, some
course of events is privileged.

In the terms used in the freedom/foreknowledge literature,

OnTF is the view that there is a hard/soft fact distinction and that soft facts pick out a

real or actual future.12
Eternalism is the view that the future exists or is real in some sense or other.

12 For

a description of the hard/soft fact distinction, see Section 2.7.

Being

124

real is one way in which a given course of events can be special. Despite the various uses of
eternalism in the literature, general eternalism should not be confused with theistic eternalism (ThEtrn), discussed in Chapter 5.13

General eternalism is one of several related

absolutist views, along with perdurantism and the B-theory. Unlike ThEtrn, general eternalism does not commit one to the existence of God. Contra Boethius, ThEtrn turns out
to be sucient for general eternalism.

It will be argued later in this chapter that TF is

inadequate under the dynamic, branching view of time. If viable at all, TF requires general
eternalism. Since ThEtrn entails TF, ThEtrn can only make sense with general eternalism. Additionally, several of the criticisms of ThEtrn mentioned in Chapter 5 presuppose
the dynamic approach and can be avoided within a broader eternalist framework.
Recall that ThEtrn entails OnTF, as discussed in Section 5.3. Whether by his direct
apprehension of all events as present or his propositional knowledge of them, the eternal God
shows that there is a real timeline. Such a God does not apprehend or know what will occur
as future; nevertheless, it is true from a temporal perspective that he apprehends/knows
what has occurred, is occurring, and will occur.14
Not all advocates of OnTF are eternalists. Øhrstrøm, for instance, is not an eternalist;
and in general advocates of branching time are not eternalists, true-futurist or not.

The

non-eternalist view of OnTF is that a particular future will come about. The actual future
is not seen as atemporally real. This non-eternalist view is the primary focus of this chapter.
The position is infeasible for reasons discussed later in the chapter.
OnTF may be understood absolutely or indexically. Taken absolutely, OnTF designates

a unique timeline. The term real is sometimes used to pick out this one and only privileged
timeline. Absolute OnTF should probably not be labeled as a type of realism, however, since
realism in other modal contexts is the Lewisian view that all nodes (possible worlds) are

13 Both Boethius and Anselm endorsed ThEtrn. Compare Rogers’ accounts of Boethius’ view in
[Rogers(1994)] and Anselm’s view in [Rogers(2006), Rogers(2007)]. Anselm may have adhered to generic
eternalism, but Boethius did not. So not all advocates of ThEtrn are general-eternalists. That said, Rogers
argued that a more thoroughgoing absolutism like Anselm’s yields a superior variety of ThEtrn.
14 See also [Helm(1997)].
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equally real. Lewisian realism is therefore quite opposed to absolute OnTF, but is instead
similar to the indexical interpretation of OnTF by which actuality is node-dependent. That
is, what counts as the actual timeline is moment-specic. The actual timeline of moment

m

is TRLm .
OnTF is about ontology, not directly about how to represent time as it occurs in lan-

guage. However, given that OnTF designates some actual timeline, SmTF is not far behind.
The actual timelines of OnTF form the TRL, the temporal relation of SmTF. The converse
implication, that SmTF entails OnTF, is false. One might have independent reasons to accept TF as an account of language. Such reasons could, for example, be linguistic or perhaps
derived from the fruitfulness of a TF system in game theory, model checking, or some other
endeavor. One might have other reasons for denying OnTF. In this case, the TRL carries
no ontological commitment, but rather is just a linguistic or epistemic apparatus.

6.2.4 Epistemic True Futurism
John Burgess provided the following description of TF (in terms of branching time).

We

picture

time as a tree. If

the past, and the

x-branches

x

represents the present, its predecessors represent

we think of

our possible futures. The truth-value of a future

tense statement depends on which

x-branch

as representing the course

of events which is actually going to turn out to happen.15

On this view, the TRL is designated by an internal process, as by stipulation, instead of
what will actually be the case. This approach is epistemic true futurism (EpTF). EpTF
provides an alternative counterpart to SmTF, aside from OnTF.
Some scholars maintain that SmTF only makes sense with OnTF. Alex Malpass and
Jacek Wawer recently gave an argument to this eect. In their argument, an Inner Baptist
is an advocate of EpTF.

Samantha and Jonny are in a betting shop. Samantha picks a horse called `Knobbly Knees' which is scheduled to run in the next race, and places a bet. As she

15 [Burgess(1979)],

p. 575, emphasis added.

126

makes the bet, she says to Jonny Knobbly Knees will win, and while she does
so she makes the `internal supposition' to use a history in which he wins as the
value of the history parameter. They sit and watch the race, only to see Knobbly Knees come last. Nevertheless, as a good Inner-Baptist, Sam maintains that
she spoke the truth.  Who cares what actually happened? My prediction was
associated internally with a winning history, so what I said was true. When
she goes to collect her money, the bookie (quite rightly) refuses to pay. This is
because bookies do care about what actually happened, and not about what she
was thinking of at the time of the bet. It is what `actually happens,' and not any
type of inner association, that decides whether the bet would be paid out. Our
rst complaint then, is that it seems odd that bet payouts do not correspond
to the (Inner Baptist's) truth of predictions. We think that if you make a true
prediction, then a bet about the content of the prediction should (perhaps later
on) also pay out. This intuitive idea about the relation between true predictions
and successful bets seems to be just incorrectly handled by Inner-Baptism. In
fact, making true predictions of future contingents is almost as easy as thinking
that your prediction is true.16

In Malpass and Wawer's example, EpTF allows Sam to designate a TRL of her choice before
the race.

will win

She species the TRL in which Knobbly Knees will win.

Thus,

Knobbly Knees

is true. At this point, open futurists object that the statement is not true. OnTF

agrees, adding that

Knobbly Knees will lose

is true. Truth may not be the right criterion to

apply regarding EpTF. That concern can be put o for now. It will be discussed below.
As it turns out, Knobbly Knees loses. Sam is aware of the loss because she watched the
race. After the race, it is false that it was the case that the horse will win. Malpass and
Wawer claimed that EpTF sanctions the contrary: it was the case that Knobbly Knees will
win. Thus, EpTF yields an unacceptable consequence.
Malpass and Wawer missed a great advantage of EpTF: agents' ability (or obligation)
to revise the TRL. Revisions should be made based on temporal standpoints. An explicit
implementation of temporal standpoints like standpoint inheritance is unnecessary for this
purpose. Recall from Section 3.4 that traditional branching time systems eectively switch
standpoints with every new point of evaluation although standpoints play no explicit role in
the semantics of those theories.

16 [Malpass

and Wawer(2012)], p. 7–8
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after the race

KK won

before the race

KK lost

KK won

KK lost
S

KK won

KK lost
S

S
Standpoint:
before the race
(a)

!!! Standpoint not
on TRL !!!
(c)

Standpoint:
after the race
(b)

Figure 6.2.2: The surprising failure of Knobbly Knees. TF structures representing (a) Sam's

S

designation before the race, (b) what her designation should be after the race, and (c) the
designation that Malpass and Wawer ascribed to her. The

nodes represent the standpoints

or contexts of utterance, and the bold red lines represent the TRL.

The TRL at any moment (standpoint) should always contain that moment in the sense
that, with respect that moment, it had always been the case that what holds at that moment
will occur. This stipulation ensures that TRL chains select the correct past since TRL chains
are backwards linear. The future, however, may be open to designation by the agent under
EpTF. (Some future must be specied; otherwise, EpTF would not be true futurism at all.)

Consider the TRL designations presented in Figure 6.2.2. The left structure is attributed
to Sam before the race, for she supposes that Knobbly Knees will win.
Knobbly Knees loses.

As it turns out,

Given that the standpoint must be on the stipulated TRL, Sam

should revise her beliefs. After revision, the TRL should point to the standpoint or context
of utterance, the node in which Knobbly Knees has lostnot that in which the horse won.
Sam maintains that the TRL points to the node at which Knobbly Knees won; and since
the horse lost, the standpoint lies apart from the TRL. Malpass and Wawer charged that
EpTF sanctions Sam's epistemic irresponsibility, but one need not presume any such thing.

Advocates of EpTF need only maintain that the TRL should contain the standpoint or
context of utterance.
There is a delicate issue of scope. Once standpoints enter the scene, it is important to
be clear about which standpoint applies to which temporal operator. In the scenario given
by Malpass and Wawer, all temporal operators should follow the outermost designation of
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context. Consider:

(6.3) Knobbly Knees was going to win,

where the context is after the horse has lost. This statement may be truncated as:

(6.4) was: will:

KK wins

The standpoint of the outermost temporal operator (namely,

was

) is that in which the horse

has already lost. If the standpoint of the innermost operator is the past moment picked out
by

was

, the node before the race, then the proposition is true just as Malpass and Wawer

claimed. That is because from that earlier standpoint, Sam stipulated a TRL in which

(6.5) Knobbly Knees will win

(6.6) will:

is true.

KK wins

To get the truth value of (6.3) and (6.4) right, the inner

context as the outer

was

will

must use the same

. (6.5) and (6.6) are subtely dierent when taken alone on the one

hand and when embedded in (6.3) and (6.4) on the other hand.
The need for temporal standpoints is not limited to EpTF. The idea has independent
support. A variety of branching temporal logics can use temporal standpoints to handle combinations of temporal operators. Temporal standpoints are discussed further in Section 3.4
and formally in Section 8.3. The theory of standpoint inheritance given in those sections is
not necessary to handle Malpass and Wawer's example.

It suces for EpTF to stipulate

that that agents ought to revise their beliefs to include the context of utterance.
Malpass and Wawer provided a second alleged counterexample to EpTF.

Imagine that Jonny countered Sam's prediction by saying  Knobbly Knees will
not win, and that he associated his utterance with a future in which the horse
loses.

Then, he and Sam will both have spoken the truth, even though they

sound very much like they have contradicted each other. We nd this situation
counter-intuitive. Our complaint here is that it seems that only one of Sam or
Jonny could have spoken the truth, and the other falsity.17

17 [Malpass

and Wawer(2012)], p. 8
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This allegation conates standards for EpTF with those for OnTF. It is not the truth of
propositions that is internally baptized, nor does it generally make sense to ask about which
proposition is objectively the right one. A fan of EpTF might reject OnTF. In this case,
there is no objective truth of the matter regarding whether or not Knobbly Knees will win
until the horse either wins or loses.

EpTF associates the content of Sam's and Jonny's

respective assertions with internal states. So it does not make sense to ask whose assertion
is objectively true unless there is an objectively true picture in terms of which to evaluate
the individual pictures of Sam and Jonny. Both of their assertions can be represented and
associated with internal suppositions using separate models, and that may be all a friend of
EpTF is interested in.

Although objective truth may not be an issue, there is still room for discussion about
justication. Sam and Jonny make incompatible assertions and have corresponding incompatible models of the world. One might ask,

is justied?

Who's assertion is justied? Who's picture
or

One could even inquire about who is right by combining OnTF and EpTF.

Despite the virtues of EpTF, true futurists seem uninterested in the position.

One

reason may be that the future can be epistemically indeterminate and agents may withhold
judgment about the future. Such epistemic considerations are often taken to support open
futurism or supervaluationism against TF. Agents do not have to designate a particular
future as the one that is going to happenthat sounds like a lot of pressure. Sometimes,
agents do designate such a future, and perhaps an EpTF understanding would be helpful
for those cases. Even granting that there may be such cases, EpTF does not seem to apply
to most realistic situations.

6.3

True Futurism and Language

SmTF has seen mixed reviews.

In SmTF's favor, many thinkers and other English

speakers acknowledge S-FLEM's validy. SmTF is the simplest theory in which S-FLEM is
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valid.18 Section 6.3.1 discusses S-FLEM's validity, explaining S-FLEM's intuitive character
as a particular type of LEM.
Most scholars hold that AbsTF is implausible. An important reason why is described
in Section 6.3.2.

AbsTF involves only a single TRL. There is no TRL at counterfactual

moments. The TRL is the relation used to evaluate propositions involving temporal operators:

will was
,

, and company. So AbsTF has problems evaluating temporal operators at

counterfactual moments; and there is no appealing way around these issues.
That leaves IdxTF. Section 6.3.3 describes a criticism given by Belnap and Green against
IdxTF. Standard IdxTF logics are incapable of resolving the problem.

Temporal stand-

points, however, allow IdxTF to get the correct result, as shown in Section 6.3.4.

The

resolution brings out the extent to which God's beliefs are standpoint-dependent, unlike
normal beliefs. At least, either God's beliefs depend on standpoints or fatalism wins the day.

6.3.1 For S-FLEM's Plausibility
As far as accounting for natural language goes, two connected reasons favoring S-FLEM's
validity are intuitive plausibility and actual use.

Many scholars nd S-FLEM intuitively

plausible. The vote for S-FLEM may be close to unanimous for other English speakers. Just
as English speakers agree with instances of LEM such as:

(6.7) Jones is either drinking coee or not drinking coee,

they nd corresponding instances of S-FLEM equally obvious:

(6.8) Either Jones will drink coee or she will not.

Thus, intuitive plausibility and actual use

prima facie

favor S-FLEM.

One reason why instances of S-FLEM look like truisms just as much as corresponding
instances of LEM is that

18 S-FLEM

will

and

not

appear to commute. For example:

is also valid under supervaluationism, but supervaluationism has some quirks that many
thinkers are unwilling to accept. Supervaluationism is explained in Section 7.2.3.
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(6.9) Jones will drink coee.

This proposition may be formalized as:

(6.10)

c ∶=

Jones drinks coee

(6.11) will:c

English speakers reject (6.9) with a proposition like:

(6.12) Jones will not drink coee.

This proposition may be symbolized as:
(6.13) will:¬c
That (6.9) is rejected using (6.12) and conversely indicates that the two are logical opposites.
That is:
(6.14) will:c and will:¬c are logical opposites.
Generalizing on this example yields the following result:

(6.15) For any proposition

This is the promised result that

φ, ¬will:φ

will

and

and will:¬φ are logically equivalent.

not

commute.

Given bivalence, it immediately

follows that S-FLEM and M-FLEM are equivalent, and that both are special cases of LEM.
For instance, (6.8) is equivalent to the following instance of M-FLEM:

(6.16) Either Jones will drink coee or it is not the case that Jones will drink coee.

W-FLEM also follows from LEM and is typically equivalent to M-FLEM. It is no wonder
that English speakers nd instances of S-FLEM just as plausible as instances of LEM.
A second argument for S-FLEM is

ex post

in avor and is especially plausible when put

in terms of predictions or bets. This argument aims to show that exactly one disjunct is true
for a given instance of S-FLEM. Suppose that LEM is valid, at least pertaining to atoms.
For instance,
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(6.17) Jones is either drinking coee or she is not.

(6.17) holds at all moments, including right now. Yesterday, Smith and Brown placed bets
on Jones' coee drinking. Smith bet that:

(6.18) Jones will drink coee.

Brown bet that:

(6.19) Jones will not drink coee.

Exactly one of Smith and Brown won the bet because (6.17) holds. As such, exactly one of
(6.18) and (6.19) was true at the time when the bets were placed. Again, S-FLEM appears
to follow from LEM.19

6.3.2 Temporal Operators at Counterfactual Moments
Early versions of TF, the absolute variety, involve a single TRL. This TRL is momentindependent and, more generally, has no parameters at all. It is

the

TRL. Ontologically, the

TRL corresponds to the real timeline. AbsTF encounters severe diculties. As a result,
most advocates of TF now reject AbsTF in favor of its indexical counterpart.
Consider:

(6.20) Had Jones not drunk coee, she would have a headache, although it would
have been possible that she would not have a headache.20

(6.20) shifts the temporal standpoint from an actual moment to a counterfactual moment
in which Jones did not drink coee.21 In Figure 6.3.1, the absolutely actual moment that

19 This

argument is critiqued in Section 7.3.4
some differences in portrayal, this example is designed to emphasize the point made with the
coin example in [Belnap and Green(1994)], p. 379.
21 Although making the right point with the example does not require such pedanticism, (6.20) is perhaps
best understood as shifting the temporal standpoint to a class of counterfactual moments in which Jones
did not drink coffee. From those counterfactual moments, it should be evaluated whether or not Jones will
have a headache.
20 Despite
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real
moment
no
TRL
counterfactual
standpoint

Figure 6.3.1: Absolute true futurism: Jones' counterfactual headache.

Really, Jones had

coee and does not have a headache (left branch). No TRL is dened from the counterfactual
standpoint, creating diculty for evaluating temporal operators there.

serves as the starting point is on the upper-left, featuring a happy illustration of Jones. The
counterfactual standpoint picked out by the antecedent of the conditional is the one in which
Jones did not drink coee. (6.20) requires evaluating whether or not the following is true
from the counterfactual standpoint:

(6.21) Jones will have a headache.

In any sort of true futurism, temporal operators like

was

and

will

are dened along the

TRL. The TRL does not run along counterfactual moments in absolute true futurism. As
such, temporal operators cannot be properly evaluated: they are undened, false, or vacuously true at counterfactuals.

In the example above, (6.21) is false, vacuously true, or

cannot be evaluated from the counterfactual moment at which Jones did not drink coee.
The truth value of (6.20) inherits this problem.

In general, AbsTF does not account for

counterfactuals involving temporal operators. Such examples constitute a signicant class of
propositions, rendering AbsTF just as signicantly decient in its capacity to account for
relevant linguistic data.
Fans of AbsTF may accept the result, modify their theory, or abandon it.

The rst

two options do not appear promising, although that has not stopped a few scholars from
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taking them.22 Those who accept the result must acknowledge that AbsTF is inadequate
as a general account of temporality in English.

Most contemporary scholars agree that

alternative theories are more promising.
It is possible to dene temporal operators with the TRL at actual moments and without
the TRL at counterfactual moments.

The only temporal theory that does not require a

TRL is open futurism (OF). One could thus apply AbsTF at actual moments and OF at
counterfactual nodes. This suggestion, however, is quite unappealing for at least two reasons.
First, the proposed mixed theory is disparate if not inconsistent in its account of natural
language.

The semantics applied to a given proposition may dier, being TF at some

moments and OF at others. The semantics used is selected for non-linguistic reasons, but
instead on account of presumably ontological considerations.
that

will/not

One signicant dierence is

commutativity and S-FLEM hold along the TRL, but not elsewhere. The only

dierence between moments where one account is employed over another is the reality of
moments at which a temporal operator is evaluated, but that distinction is not a linguistic
one. A unied semantic account is desirable, and it is important to ensure that analyses of
propositions are not determined by extra-linguistic or irrelevant factors.
Second, the mixed theory concedes too much to OF. If OF provides a good account
of temporal operators outside of the TRL; and if there is no linguistic dierence between
temporal propositions occurring at actual moments on the one hand and counterfactual
moments on the other hand; then OF provides a good account of temporal operators, period.
There is no need to use AbsTF at all.
Together, these two criticism of the mixed theory indicate that an advocate of the mixed
theory should just adhere to OF. Advocates of TF are better o rejecting absoluteness.
That is exactly what most of them do.

22 For

example, [Malpass and Wawer(2012)].
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6.3.3 Counterfactual Past-Future Combinations
Most contemporary advocates of TF follow the indexical theory (IdxTF) at least on
a semantic level, their ontological and epistemological commitments aside.23 IdxTF easily
handles propositions like (6.20).

Every moment

m

has a TRLm .24

As such, propositions

calling for a switch in temporal standpoint, like counterfactual propositions, and propositions
simply occurring at counterfactual moments can be evaluated uniformly using the TRLm .
Whenever future contingents are involved, some moment

m has at least two incompatible

possible futures. TRLm designates exactly one of those futures as the (indexically) actual
future of

m.

Those possible futures not chosen by TRLm have pasts that do not lead back to

those counterfactual nodes. In general, the criticism is that IdxTF sanctions the following:

(6.22) Had some given counterfactual event occurred, then it would have been the
case that the event was not going to occur.

Belnap and Green provided an example.

A coin was ipped and came up heads.

The

following comes out true from a counterfactual standpoint in which the coin came up tails.

The coin came up tails, but this is not what was going to happen. The coin was
going to come up heads. It's just that it didn't.25

To explain this example, let:

(6.23)

mtails ∶=

a counterfactual moment at which the coin came up tails,

(6.24)

mpast ∶=

a past moment at which the result of the toss is contingent, although

it will be heads, and

(6.25)

mheads ∶=

a moment in which the coin came up heads, and TRL

past

points to

mheads .
23 A

description of IdxTF is in [Øhrstrøm(2009)], p. 29. Recent literature on true futurism seems to take
[Øhrstrøm(2009)] as providing the canonical description.
24 Distinct moments can have the same TRL; that is, TRL
m1 = TRLm2 for m1 ≠ m2 .
25 [Belnap and Green(1994)], p. 380
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counterfactual
standpoint
was: will: ???
heads

heads

tails

tails

heads

tails

??? = heads
dominant
TRL
past

past

(a)

(b)

past

will: ???

will: ???

(c)

Figure 6.3.2: Indexical true futurism: The coin came up tails, but it was going to be heads.

was

past

(a) claries the initial (counterfactual) standpoint and the dominant red TRL = TRL

heads .

TRL

will

To evaluate what was going to be the case, as in (b), the outer

backwards in time. In (c), the inner
the desired result.

follows the dominant TRL to

mheads ,

=

directs one

which is not

The scenario is depicted in Figure 6.3.2 (a). The questionable statement in Belnap and
Green's example is:
(6.26) The coin was going to come up heads.

(6.27) was: will:

heads

Starting from the counterfactual node
operator,

was

, shifting from

(6.28) will:

heads

mtails

This statement is evaluated from

to

mtails , Belnap and Green evaluated the outer temporal

mpast

as in Figure 6.3.2 (b). Doing so leaves:

mpast . mpast

points to

mheads

because

mtails

would not be

counterfactual otherwise. Hence, Belnap and Green's result.

6.3.4 Standpoint Inheritance and God's Beliefs
A true futurist may object to Belnap and Green's example on the grounds that it does not

was will

adequately consider temporal standpoints.26 Temporal operators (

,

, and so forth) are

26 Temporal standpoints are introduced in Section 3.4 and treated formally in Section Temporal Standpoints

and Standpoint Inheritance.
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standpoint-sensitive. In IdxTF, temporal operators are evaluated using the TRLm . That

m

is a standpoint is equivalent to that temporal operators are to be evaluated using TRLm .
Belnap and Green took

operator,

will

.

mpast

to be the appropriate standpoint of the inner temporal

Their interpretation is in accordance with standard practice in temporal

logic, but is nevertheless mistaken. In (6.27), the temporal standpoint of both the outer
and the inner

will

is

mtails .

That is because the inner operator,

standpoint of the outer operator,

was

will

was

, inherits the temporal

. Recall the rule for standpoint inheritance given in

Section 3.4:

(6.29) Only change standpoint when absolutely necessarywhen evaluation is only
possible by shifting standpoint. Evaluation is impossible if what holds at the
standpoint is inconsistent with what holds at the point of evaluation.

This type of shift is required for moving to the counterfactual

mtails

from the factual

mheads

in

the rst place, in the example setup. No such change in standpoint is required for evaluating
the inner future operator. The standpoint for that

tails .

be evaluated using TRL

mtails

as it should be, not

Since TRL

mheads .

tails

will

contains

is

mtails , so the future operator should

mtails ,

the inner

will

is directed back to

IdxTF thereby avoids the awkward result. Had the toss

yielded tails, then it was going to be tails, after all.
Related to Belnap and Green's worries are various statements involving predictions and
God's beliefs. Suppose the following hold:

(6.30) Jones drank coee.

(6.31) Smith predicted that Jones would drink coee.

Thus,

(6.32) Smith correctly predicted that Jones would drink coee.

(6.33) God believed that Jones would drink coee.
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Considering the counterfactual scenario in which Jones did not drink coee, the following
should obtain:

(6.34) Had Jones not drunk coee, then she was going to abstain from drinking coee.

(6.35) Had Jones not drunk coee, then Smith's prediction would have been incorrect.

(6.36) Had Jones not drunk coee, then God would have believed that she was going
to abstain from drinking coee.

The example in Belnap and Green's criticism, given Section 6.3.3, pertains to (6.34). The
same problem applies to (6.35), which relies on (6.34). It was shown above that IdxTF can
handle such propositions using standpoint inheritance. Since (6.34) holds, (6.35) is also true.
(6.36) is the peculiar case.

Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature have

repeatedly endorsed propositions like (6.36).27 Had Jones not drunk coee, then the following
would obtain (entailed by (6.34)):

(6.37) God believes that Jones was going to abstain from drinking coee.
(God believes: was: will:

coee

¬

)

(6.36) requires that a subtly dierent statement obtains at the counterfactual standpoint:

(6.38) God

believed

that Jones would not drink coee.

(was: God believes: will:

coee

¬

)

The dierence between (6.37) and (6.38) is that (6.37) is about what God now believes while
(6.38) is about what he believ

ed

.

The distinction is also indicated in the semi-symbolic

representation in parentheses.
Statements like (6.38) may be generalized to:

(6.39) For any proposition,

27 As

φ,

in the infamous [Plantinga(1986)].

if

φ,

then God has always believed that

φ.
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(6.39) is plausible expression of comprehensive foreknowledge. (6.39) is backwards-looking in
that it emphasizes what God believed about what is now the case. By contrast, (ArgThF.2)
focuses on what God now believes about what will be the case.
Omniscience does not entail (6.39). That God believes all and only truths does not by
itself yield that any proposition,

that φ

, no matter where

φ

φ,

occurs.

can be substituted into just any instance of

God believes

Ockhamists want statements like (6.36) to come out

true, so that kind of unlimited substitutability needs to hold, at least to the extent required
by (6.39).
(6.38).

It is the standpoint-dependence of God's beliefs that enable substitution as in

The softness of God's beliefs is especially pronounced when IdxTF is augmented

with temporal standpoints. His beliefs adapt perfectly to the standpoint and are very supple
as a result. Hence, the following noun phrase is underspecied if taken without qualication:

(6.40) That which God believed

An implicit qualication when no other is specied is

from this standpoint

.

(6.40) is not

incoherent if there is an implicit standpoint. The important observation here is that (6.40)
requires qualication, explicit or implicit, because what God believed changes from one
standpoint to another, indicated in the dierence between (6.33) and (6.36). What Smith
believed, on the other hand, is standpoint-independent. What changes based on standpoint
is whether or not Smith was correct, as in from (6.32) to (6.35). God's beliefs are always
correct. His beliefs are unique, suspiciously so, in that they are standpoint-dependent.
Typical agents believe what they do with respect to the standpoint at which they hold
beliefs.

Yesterday, Smith believed that Jones would drink coee.

Smith held that belief

from yesterday's perspective. If God's beliefs were like normal beliefs, then his belief that
Jones would drink coee would also be from yesterday's perspective. To get (6.38) right in
the counterfactual scenario in which Jones did not drink coee, God's belief cannot be from
today's perspective.
TF is left with a choice between three options.

First, one might follow Ockhamists in

the freedom/foreknowledge literature in maintaining the softness of God's beliefs. Doing so
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requires that God's beliefs are as standpoint-dependent as the facts that those beliefs are
about. That is the only way to ensure that God's beliefs track soft facts. As a result, God's
beliefs are drastically unlike normal beliefs.

The standpoint-dependence of God's beliefs

needs some explaining. Without a viable explanation, this route seems

ad hoc

and is not

compelling.
Another path is to claim that God's beliefs are like everyone else's. That is,

(6.41) From any standpoint, God's beliefs at a moment are evaluated with that moment as the standpoint.

(6.41) ensures that (6.38) is false from the counterfactual standpoint at which Jones did not
drink coee. That is not a problem if God is out of the picture. Otherwise, this is a hard
bullet for TF to bite on the usual understanding of omniscience. The following holds at the
counterfactual standpoint:

(6.42) Jones did not drink coee although God believed that she would.
(was: God believes: will:

coee

)

(6.42) indicates that it is possible for God to hold false beliefs. He is fallible. Of course, God
will in fact not hold any false beliefs. God could be wrong, but he never is.28 Statements
like (6.42) can only obtain at counterfactual moments. So theists could maintain that God's
beliefs are like everyone else's, settling for God's correctness instead of infallibility.
Finally, one could propose that God's beliefs are like everyone else's and sacrice the
typical understanding of omniscience to retain infallibility. On this view, there are truths
that God does not know. Given his infallibility, he cannot consistently know all truths in a
world with future-contingents. Electing to create a world with future contingents, including
free agents, amounts to creating a world in which God does not know all soft facts. So God

28 That

God is never wrong requires that there is a dominant TRL in the IdxTF model. For this to
happen, the ATC tree must have root moment or segment. That is, forking must have a chronological lower
bound. The TRL of the root will dominate other TRLs.
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does not have comprehensive foreknowledge, but only because he chooses not to in favor of
contingency and freedom. This position is where TF and open theism overlap.29

6.4

True Futurism and Fatalism

Critics of TF maintain that it does not successfully avoid fatalism.

These challenges

come in various forms, two of which are emphasized here. First, there is a class of arguments
by which TF entails fatalism. Some arguments along these lines stemming from interpreting

will will-actually
as

are given in Section 6.4.1.

The second type of critique amounts to a general version of the grounding objection
usually stated against Molinism. The general grounding problem may be specied as follows:

grounding objection
To avoid being

ad hoc

TF is either fatalistic or

ad hoc

, arbitrarily designating futures

, TF must provide some meaningful account of the TRL or, equiva-

lently, soft facts. The problem is that any attempt to ground the TRL attaches the TRL to
modality in a way that entails fatalism. The challenge for TF is to provide an account of
the TRL that is neither

ad hoc

nor yields fatalism. The grounding objection is described in

terms of modalities in Section 6.4.2 and soft facts in Section 6.4.3.
Theistic considerations add another diculty to the grounding problem. TF must explain
how God comes to know soft facts in addition to soft facts themselves. This issue is discussed
in Sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.4. The latter section emphasizes considerations specic to Molina's
approach.
The grounding problem seems unavoidable within the dynamic framework used here.
The discussion in Section 6.4.5 indicates that eternalism or a more thorough absolutism is a
natural choice for TF. Eternalism grounds soft facts by given them something to describe. A
dierent set of worries may come along with eternalism, but those concerns are not addressed
here.

29 Open

theism, including this variety, are discussed further in Section 7.2.4.
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6.4.1 Will-Actually
Some advocates of TF maintain that the TRL represents the actual course of history.30
In this case,

will

will

might be interpreted as

will-actually
will actually-will

is used instead of

to interpret

as

will-actually

. (For consistency in notation,

actually-

.) At least a couple of observations make it problematic

.

Some clarication is in order before proceeding.

The notion of actuality used here is

not absolute, but indexical. There is no such thing as
there were a special moment,

α,

the

actual moment simpliciter, as if

specied in each branching time model. Absolute actuality

may be popular in some circles, but it is not ultimately viable for the those who take time
seriously. A full discussion of this issue is beyond this project since the dynamic view is
assumed here, but here is a rough synopsis.

If each model has a unique actual world,

α,

then there is an equivalence class of models representing a given tree structure such that the
models dier only in their assignments of

α

(plus all and only dierences that follow from

that assignment). There is no ow inherent in the equivalence class, which is more like a deck
of cards than a river. At best, time ow is extra metaphysical baggage that Priorians add to
the way they interpret their models; at worse, the non-owing nature of the equivalence class
shows that time does not ow. Hence, it is necessary to reject absolute actuality to avoid
compromising time ow. Indexical actuality is the only viable option.
like

I

now

and

will

works more

in that those indexicals do not universally pick out a particular individual or

time, respectively.
If

Actually

cannot feasibly be interpreted as

actually-will

, then what exactly does

will
will

to under TF? The arguments in this section are designed to show that under TF,
amount to

actually-will

amount
cannot

.

First, the TRL's formal modality enables one to use TRL-specic modal operators.31
Just as

30 For

will

is interpreted as

actually-will

, the modal operators along the TRL may be called

instance, [Malpass and Wawer(2012)], p. 8.
that a formal modality is a relation that can be depicted using an accessibility relation. See
Section 2.2.
31 Recall
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actually-possibly
actually-will
that

and

actually-necessarily
not actually-possibly not

. Actual possibility and actual necessity are such

is equivalent to

. That is,

(6.43) actually-will:φ is logically equivalent to

¬actually-possibly:¬φ

(6.43) holds on account of two facts that obtain in TF systems:

(6.44)

¬actually-will:φ

is equivalent to actually-will:¬φ

(6.45) actually-will:φ is equivalent to actually-possibly:φ

Some preliminary clarication is in order before explaining (6.43) in more semantic detail. In
logics for which the temporal relation is linear, like TF,
There is in general no inconsistency in both
holds for

will

moment and

φ

and

¬φ

will

future-possibly

is like a

being possible at once. This fact also

, but for the wrong reasons. This scenario occurs when

¬φ

operator.

φ is true at some future

is true at some dierent, earlier or later, future moment. The result is that

statements like:

(6.46) Jones will drink coee and she will not drink coee

turn out true, although (6.46) looks absurd.

There is an implicit assumption that the

conjuncts of statements like (6.46) are about the same time.32

Under that supposition,

(6.46) and its ilk are false because they violate the law of non-contradiction. Jones cannot
both drink coee and not drink coee

at the same time

. Section 8.1.3 describes this issue

and how it can be addressed formally. For now, it is enough to assume that token statements
about what will occur are about particular future times. In what follows, suppose for clarity
that (6.47)(6.50) are corresponding tokens pertaining to tomorrow.
Returning to an explanation of (6.43), start with:

(6.47) actually-will:φ

32 See

Section 3.2.
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(6.47) holds at moment

m

just in case

φ

is true tomorrow on some (the one and only)

TRL-accessible branch.33 The negation of (6.47) is:

(6.48)

¬actually-will:φ

holds just in case

φ

is untrue tomorrow on all TRL-accessible branches. Additionally:

(6.49) actually-will:¬φ

is true if and only if

¬φ

holds tomorrow on some TRL-accessible branches. Since there is

only one such branch, (6.49) is equivalent to (6.48).

That is the

will-not

commutativity

result celebrated by TF. The truth conditions for (6.49) are the same as those for:
(6.50) actually-possibly:¬φ

(6.47) and (6.50) are logical opposites. Hence, (6.43).
Even taken alone, (6.43) is problematic for TF.
ator means something like

actualizably

alizable. (6.43) shows that if

φ

Prima facie,

the

actually-possibly

oper-

. If something is genuinely possible, then it is actu-

will hold (at a given time), then

¬φ

is not actualizable (at

that same time) and hence not genuinely possible. (Recall that ATC-possibility, whatever
exactly it amounts to, represents genuine possibility by denition.) To avoid this fatalistic
conclusion, TF must select one of these options:

(6.51) Deny that

(6.52) Deny that

will
actually-will
actually-possibly
actualizably
amounts to

amounts to

(6.53) Deny that actualizability is required for genuine possibility

(6.51) requires TF to explain what exactly

will

means, if not

actually-will

. (6.53) does not

seem viable unless interpreted as (6.53). (6.52) may therefore be the best option. It is left
to TF to show how

33 This

actually-possibly

is relevantly distinct from

actualizably

.34

definition, which uses some rather than all, is equivalent to the one given in [Øhrstrøm(2009)],
p. 29. This equivalence holds because the TRL is linear and unbounded.
34
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actually-possibly
not-actually-possibly-not

An apparent way out for TF is that

actually-will

amounts to

equivocates on

possibly

.

That

takes possibility in a merely formal sense.

actually-possible
will
Jones will drink coee and she will not

It requires a non-formal, genuinely modal sense of possibility to get from

actualizable

. That response is not very convincing. It is the nature of

linearity of the TRL to avoid statements like

out true when about the same future time.

will

source,

to

that requires the
coming

Setting that concern aside and ignoring its

, suppose the TRL has a fork on which Jones drinks coee on one branch and she

does not on the other. (There may still be other ATC branches that are not TRL-accessible,

Jones actually-possibly drinks coee
actually-possibly

so the TRL is not identical to the ATC tree.)

Then

and

are true.

Jones actually-possibly doesn't drink coee

Here,

does not

seem merely formal, but indicates that Jones' coee-drinking and her non-coee-drinking
are

actualizable

.

A second consideration leads to similar worries but does not require interpreting

possibly

as it stands. One might instead drop

What enables this move is that

actually

actually

and obtain a relevant sense of

actuallypossibly
.

tends to be redundant when it comes to truth value.35

For example:

(6.54) It is raining.

(6.55) It is actually raining.

(6.56) Actually, it is raining.

Speakers may utter (6.54)(6.56) under dierent circumstances, perhaps using
emphasis or to highlight a literal interpretation.

actually

for

Taken as propositions and focusing on

truth value, however, (6.54)(6.56) are logically equivalent. At least, (6.55) and (6.56) entail
(6.54). Analogous results hold for the following:

(6.57) It might be raining.

35 See

[Brogaard(2008)].
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(6.58) It might actually be raining.

(6.59) It actually might be raining.

(6.60) Actually, it might be raining.

There is a problem for TF for those who hold that
with (6.43), the eliminability of

actually

actually

is redundant.36

Combined

resuscitates the argument for logical fatalism. The

TRL's formal modality connects temporal operators to modal operators. The redundancy of

actually

shows that those modal operators are not merely formal, but relevant to fatalism.

The supposed disparity between temporal operators and relevant modalities is baseless.

ArgLF-Act

Argument for Logical Fatalism using

Actually-Will

(Generalizable)

(ArgLF-Act.1) Either Jones actually-will have coee or she actually-will not.

[premise, an

instance of S-FLEM]

(ArgLF-Act.2) Jones actually-will have coee. [WLOG assumption from (ArgLF-Act.1)]

(ArgLF-Act.3) If Jones actually-will have coee, that Jones does not have coee is not actuallypossible. [premise37 ]

(ArgLF-Act.4) That Jones does not have coee is not actually-possible. [by (ArgLF-Act.2)
and (ArgLF-Act.3)]

(ArgLF-Act.5)

Actually

is redundant. [premise]

(ArgLF-Act.6) That Jones does not have coee is not possible.

[by (ArgLF-Act.4) and

(ArgLF-Act.5)]

36 The

argument given below, ArgLF-Act, might be reformulated for other notions of actually. A full
discussion of actually and other indexicals like now is beyond this project. Note that the arguments against
TF given elsewhere in this chapter do not hinge on the redundancy of actually.
37 The discussion above explains how TF yields this result. Of course, the result holds in formal settings,
both in the TF systems given in Chapter 8 and in canonical renditions like [Øhrstrøm(2009)].
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(ArgLF-Act.7) That Jones has coee is necessary. [by (ArgLF-Act.6), given that

¬possibly:¬φ

is equivalent to necessarily:φ]

(ArgLF-Act.8) It is either necessary that Jones has coee or necessary that she does not,
and whichever is necessary corresponds to what will be. [by (ArgLF-Act.1),
(ArgLF-Act.2), and (ArgLF-Act.7)]

ArgLF-Act diers substantively from ArgLF only with respect to the two proposals

discussed above. (ArgLF-Act.3) is unavoidable in true-futurist logics. Whatever the TRL
amounts to,

will

is equivalent to

problematic in itself.

Possibly

not-possibly-not

along that relation.

That fact is not

in this case is formally modal, as is the corresponding necessity.

As discussed in Section 2.2, formal modality does not in itself have any bearing on other
senses of modality, like the kinds that might infringe upon contingency. Permissibility, for
instance, is formally modal although what is impermissible or obligatory does not aect
contingency.
(ArgLF-Act.5) makes the TRL modally threatening to contingency. Contingency involves a particular sort of possibility, all-things-considered (ATC) possibility, that is at least
as stringent as physical possibility. The redundancy of

actually

indicates that the term does

not modify the kind of possibility/necessity involved. Something is actually logically possible
if and only if it is logically possible, actually physically possible if and only if it is physically
possible, and so forth. In the arguments for logical fatalism, possibility is understood to be
of the type relevant to contingency. Since actual-possibility reduces to possibility simpliciter,
actual-possibility is of the same type in this context.
The concern may also be expressed by taking the possibility tree metaphorically as a
forking path. Considering the tree sans TRL, contingencies generate forks in the path such
that each branch might be actualized from their respective temporally antecedent moments.
For example, Jones may elect to follow the coee-drinking path tomorrow or the coeedeprived path. Introducing the TRL xes the actualized paths. Perhaps the TRL species
that the coee-drinking path is actual and not its counterpart.

The TRL is static with
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respect to a given model. From the perspective of any given moment in a particular model,
the TRL cannot be altered.

It is not within Jones' power to follow/actualize the coee-

deprived path, thereby changing the path of the TRL. In general, positing an actual future
restricts which futures can be followed/actualized.
One might attempt to counter as follows.

The TRL was dened separately from the

underlying tree structure representing ATC possibility. A

prima facie

reasonable hypothesis

is that ATC possibility is just physical possibility. The TRL does not amount to physical
possibility.

The former is generally stricter than (is extensionally a proper subset of ) the

latter and there are notable modal dierences between the TRL and physical possibility.38
Unlike physical possibility and hence ATC possibility, the TRL is not modal in any sense
that threatens contingency.
By assumption, the TRL is not intensionally the same thing as physical possibility. It is
also agreeable that physical possibility is a good candidate for ATC possibility. The issue,
however, is that ArgLF-Act shows that introducing the TRL makes a dierence.

The

presence of the TRL changes ATC possibility so that, whatever else warrants consideration,
the TRL is also relevant. With the TRL around, ATC possibility cannot just be physical
possibility. ATC possibility is extensionally identical to the TRL.
ArgLF-Act concludes that the TRL is genuinely modal. The TRL is not propositional.

On the one hand, if not all genuine modalities are propositional (perhaps some are ontological), then the TRL is genuinely modal in a non-propositional sense. Linear genuine modality
yields fatalism, in which case TF is fatalistic. On the other hand, if all genuine modalities are
propositional, then the TRL is not genuinely modal because the TRL is not propositional.
So TF is incoherentboth genuinely modal and not. TF must dismantle ArgLF-Act or
choose between fatalism and absurdity.

38 Section

6.4.2 discusses the ways in which the TRL and is not modal.
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6.4.2 The Modality of the Thin Red Line
Advocates of TF claim that

will

is not modal, at least not in any way that aects

future contingency. There are, however, senses in which

will

is modal and the TRL can be

associated with possibility and necessity. Many scholars have criticized TF, claiming that
either the TRL is modal in an interesting sense, in which case true futurism leads to fatalism,
or TF is baseless. (This is a general version of the grounding problem faced by Molinists.)
For instance, Belnap and Green condemned AbsTF and IdxTF:

Let us note also that each of these forms of actualism about the future involves
commitments to facts that do not supervene upon any physical, chemical, biological or psychological states of aairs.
indeterministic moment

m

The fact, if it is one, that at a given

there is some history such that it is the one that will

occur, is not a state of aairs that supervenes upon what is true of particles,
tissues or organisms that exist at

m.

Those of us who do not postulate a Thin

Red Line have no need of such a mysterious realm of fact. (We hope you join us
in regarding as spurious a reassurance having the form, but it's only a logical
fact. That's bad logic.) 39

Section 2.2 enumerates four senses in which something can be modal. These types of modality are grammatical, formal, propositional, and ontological.
grammatically modal, placing
Like

can

and

should will
,

will

will
should

Section 3.1 notes that

into the same grammatical category as

is representable using modal operators.

can

and

is

.

The TRL can be

depicted with an accessibility relation. As such, the TRL is a formal accessibility relation
and

will

is formally modal. Being formally modal is not sucient for having any relation to

genuine possibility and necessity.
The dangerous types of modality, the kinds from which TF wants to steer clear because
of their relevance to contingency, are propositional and ontological modality.

Recall from

Section 2.2 that a propositional modality is one that can be captured using a set of principles
expressed as propositions. The structure and path of an ontological modality is dictated by
some mechanism, physical or otherwise.

39 [Belnap

and Green(1994)], p. 381.
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The TRL is not propositionally modal.

This fact may be part of Belnap and Green's

criticism against TF. The TRL cannot be depicted by a set of laws.

There is no rule or

formula specifying the TRL's path. Granted, one can learn the TRL's path by inspecting
God's beliefs if he has maximally specic, infallible foreknowledge. As emphasized by many
commentators, however, God knows what will happen

because

it will happen, not the other

way around. God's beliefs about the future do not in any sense cause a particular future
to occur. The future does not take God's beliefs as its source, but conversely: that a given
future will be is the source of God's beliefs. A rule like

(6.61) An event will occur if and only if God believes that it will occur,

while logically true, is ultimately circular as an explanation of what will occur (although the
rule is not circular as an explanation of God's beliefs).
Belnap and Green observed that there is no material state of aairs determining what will
be the case in situations of genuine future contingency. Indeed, there is no mechanism of any
sort, no principle in the ontological sense, selecting one timeline over another as designating
the actual future. So the TRL is not ontologically modal, either. (As noted above, God's
beliefs should not be understood as the future's source.) Nevertheless, the TRL follows a
specic path, choosing exactly one future over many.
What, then, is the TRL? Øhrstrøm, a foremost adherent of TF in the future contingents
literature, asked a series of relevant questions:

But what makes the specied branch privileged? Is it merely that it represents
what is going to happen? Is there anything in the present situation [...] which
makes one branch ontologically special as opposed to the other branches?40

Fans of TF tend towards OnTF, but this leaves them in a quandary.

Either there are

principles or mechanisms specifying the true future or there are not. If there are principles
or mechanisms specifying the true future, the TRL would be propositionally or ontologically
modal, respectively.

40 [Øhrstrøm(2009)],

TF would be unable to maintain the supposed divorce of time from

p. 26. Øhrstrøm does not commit to particular answers.
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modality.

Without any principles or mechanisms to specify what the future is, it is not

clear what direct evidence there could be for OnTF. Such ontology an is

ad hoc

, if not

outright baseless; unless there is are independent reasons for accepting OnTF. There must
be a reason why one future will be and others will not.
One way of endorsing OnTF is through SmTF. If SmTF is the best account of temporal
language and if consistency demands that someone who holds SmTF should hold OnTF,
then OnTF is a viable position, other factors being equal.

This route seems popular in

the future contingents literature, but there are obstacles. First, insofar as S-FLEM is intuitively plausible, SmTF must contend with supervaluationism. Second, S-FLEM may not
be as unobjectionable as it seems, given the upcoming considerations in Section 7.3.1 and
Section 7.3.4. So endorsement for SmTF may not be enough to support TF against other
worries.

6.4.3 Grounding Soft Facts
Another point worth mentioning has to do with the ontological modality of the TRL.
Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature insist that God's beliefs about the future
depend on what happens in the future. As Todd pointed out, scholars in that tradition have
not successfully analyzed that dependence relation and there is little reason to think that a
good analysis is forthcoming.41 Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature tend to
classify propositions specifying God's beliefs about the future as soft facts.
For this discussion, it suces that God believes all and only truths, in which case God's
beliefs depend on certain soft facts.

This perspective helpfully distinguishes between two

separate issues:

(6.62) the dependence of soft facts on contingent futures, and

(6.63) the dependence of some of God's beliefs on present soft facts.

41 [Todd(2012)]
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The rst dependence relation is relevant to both logical and theological fatalism, while the
second dependence relation pertains only to the latter. Problems arise in both departments.
TF needs to account for the dependence of soft facts on contingent futures. This depen-

dence relation runs against the ow of time.

Ex hypothesi

, soft facts are facts prior to that

upon which at least some of their facthood depends. Backwards dependence (with respect
to time) seems anomalous, perhaps even inexplicable. TF is challenged to nd independent
examples of relevantly similar dependence relations. The dependence relation must be explicated so as to make sense of why soft facts depend on some possible futures rather than
others. That is, one must account for both why a particular course of events counts as the
true future and others do not, and how the dependence relation works.
It is often ne for beliefs to depend on present facts. For example, Jones might believe
that she is sipping coee since she is. Granted, this simple example involves the dependence
of Jones' belief on a hard fact, not a soft fact. There is no future content essential to the
fact that Jones is sipping coee. Soft facts, which have essential future content, can neither
cause nor justify beliefs in the same way as hard facts. The events specied by corresponding
hard facts are or were observable but soft facts lack such a basis. Future events that are the
source of soft facts cannot be observed by agents in time. Take a paradigmatic soft fact,

(6.64) Smith correctly asserted that Jones will drink coee

Assume once again that whether or not Jones drinks coee is a contingent matter. Jones, who
has yet to decide whether or not she will drink coee, does not know whether or not Smith's
assertion is correct.

That is, Jones does not know the truth value (using a true-futurist

understanding) of:

(6.65) Jones will drink coee.

Jones can, however, know that

(6.66) Smith asserted that Jones will drink coee.
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(6.64) is equivalent to the conjunction of (6.65) and (6.66). (6.66) is known to be true as a
hard fact. The truth value of (6.65), on the other hand, cannot be known in any familiar
way until Jones decides once and for all. Since the truth value of (6.64) depends on not only
(6.66) but also (6.65), the truth value of (6.64) cannot be known in a familiar way, either.
So if God infallibly believes soft facts, he must come about that knowledge in an unfamiliar
way. To make sense of God's mysterious foreknowledge acquisition is to answer what Alfred
Fredosso and Christopher Kosciuk call the source question.42 One such answer, Molinism,
is discussed below in Section 6.4.4.
Theistic eternalists do not need to rely on soft facts to account for God's beliefs about
the future.

Given that all eventspast, present, and futureare present to God, he can

form beliefs about them similarly to the way that Jones forms beliefs about her own coeesipping or other happenings she observes around her. Events corresponding to soft facts are
observable by an eternal God.

6.4.4 Molinism and the Grounding Objection
Molinism has its roots in Luis de Molina's work.43 Molina claims that God has such intimate knowledge of his creation that he knows what would happen in any given circumstance.
He even knows how free agents will freely act.
To clarify middle knowledge and its role, it may be helpful to look at other aspects
of Molina's view about God's knowledge.
moments.

Molina separates God's knowledge into three

These stages have a logical or conceptual order, although the stages are not

temporally ordered.

The rst stage is a precondition of the second, which in turn is a

precondition of the third.
The rst stage of God's knowledge is his natural knowledge, depicted in Figure 6.4.1 (a).
He knows all logical and metaphysical truths. He may not know which physical laws he will
instantiate, but he knows what the options are and how each would play out.

42 [Kosciuk(2010)],
43 [Molina(1988)].

p. 4. See also [Freddoso(1988)].

Such vast
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natural knowledge
(a)

middle knowledge
(b)

free knowledge
(c)

Figure 6.4.1: Molinism: natural, middle, and free knowledge. (a) By God's natural knowledge, he knows all of the possible universes (ATC trees) that he can create; and he knows all
of the possible scenarios that can occur in those universes. The various trees are specied by
dierent creation/interaction options. (b) God's middle knowledge yields what will occur in
each possible scenario. Middle knowledge species the TRL or, equivalently, all soft facts.
(c) God knows which possible universe he will create by his free knowledge.

natural knowledge is enough for an innite intellect to know all possible situations. In terms
of a branching temporal system, he comprehends all possible ATC trees in the rst stage,
but not the TRL. An underlying possibility tree is of course a precondition of the TRL.
The second stage constitutes middle knowledge. Here is Molina's description.

[I]n virtue of the most profound and inscrutable comprehension of each faculty
of free choice, He saw in His own essence what each such faculty would do with
its innate freedom were it to be placed in this or that or, indeed, in innitely
many orders of thingseven though it would really be able, if it so willed, to do
the opposite.44

The result of God's middle knowledge is illustrated in Figure 6.4.1 (b).

Drawing from

Platonism, Molina views creaturely essences as partial or diluted instantiations of the divine
essence.

Since God understands his own essence perfectly, he is intimately familiar with

each of its possible imperfect derivatives. Thus, he knows how free agents will act in any
given situation. God, by way of his middle knowledge, knows the path of the TRL in every
possible circumstance after the moment of creation.
For instance, suppose that it is contingent whether or not Jones will drink coee tomor-

44 [Molina(1988)],

p. 168
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row. God knows Jones quite well, even better than she knows herself. He knows that she
loves coee and that there will be no circumstances tomorrow to dissuade her from drinking
her favorite Guatemalan light roast in the morning. Thus, knowing Jones and the relevant
factors of the circumstances, God knows that Jones will freely decide have a cup of coee,
although she is capable of doing otherwise. God can see himself in Jones' shoes, so to speak,
to forecast what she will do.
The third stage accounts for God's free knowledge. See Figure 6.4.1 (c). He knows which
of all possible universes he will create, which creatures (free and otherwise) will occupy that
world, and how he will be involved in that world's happenings. He will create a world in
which Jones exists, young Jones would grow to like coee, a particular Guatemalan light
roast will be her favorite, and the circumstances will be ripe for her to choose to enjoy a cup
of it tomorrow.
The grounding objection is often considered the most serious threat to Molinism. This
criticism is stated in various ways.

Steven Cowan, for instance, portrayed the issue as

tension between Molinism's commitment to libertarian freedom and true counterfactuals of
freedom.45 The grounding objection in its broadest form applies to all kinds of TF. A general
statement of the grounding objection is that TF is either fatalistic or

ad hoc

.

According to Molinists, God's middle knowledge includes his intimate knowledge of free
agents. God knows with absolute certainty what Jones will do any circumstance by his middle
knowledge and his natural knowledge of possible circumstances in which Jones may nd
herself. On the one hand, Molinism makes it seem that free agents like Jones are constituted
so as to yield absolutely certain output in every circumstance they could possibly be in.
Molinism portrays so-called free agents more like deterministic automata than genuinely
free agents. On the other hand, one might contend that free agents are not determined. It
just so happens that there are soft facts about them. In this case, the criticism is that agents
are not completely predictable and thus middle knowledge has no basis.

45 [Cowan(2003)],

p. 93
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Notice that the determinism horn of the grounding objection does not require that agents
are

physically

determined. Even if agents' characters are relatively independent of the phys-

ical world, agents must still be mechanistic on a mental level.

There must be causes at

work even if those causes are not physical. Middle knowledge is baseless or deteriorates into
natural knowledge.
Molinists sometimes try to skirt the issue by rejecting this mechanistic view of free
agents. There are facts about the contingent future, soft facts, and middle knowledge just
amounts to knowing all of the soft facts about every possible circumstance.

Koscuik, for

instance, used soft facts as examples to show that there can be a fact of the matter even
when contingencies are involved.46 The problem with this approach is that it presupposes
an explanation of soft facts (or, equivalently, the TRL). The general grounding problem for
TF, discussed in Sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3, was seen to be non-trivial. Molinism cannot just

take soft facts for granted. Following Freddoso, Koscuik maintained that Molinism serves as
an explanation of the source of God's knowledge about soft facts.47 If Molinism is to avoid
the general grounding problem, Molinism should also explain soft facts themselves.
Freddoso and Kosciuk claim that middle knowledge includes, for example, knowledge
specifying the indeterministic behavior of subatomic particles.48 When such a particle exhibits indeterministic behavior, God does not know by his natural knowledge alone what will
occur in some circumstances involving the particle. Unlike free agents, there is no person
(like Jones) to know intimately enough to specify how an indeterministic particle will behave.
Given that the particle's behavior is indeterministic, a Molinist would propose that there is
a soft fact of the matter about how the particle will behave. By his middle knowledge, God
comes to know the soft fact by understanding the fact's source. That by which the soft fact
is true is the same as the source of God's knowledge of that soft fact.

In this case, God

knows how the particle will behave since he knows it intimately as part of his own essence.

46 [Kosciuk(2010)],

p. 175/+.
Kosciuk(2010)]
48 [Freddoso(1988)], p. 29; [Kosciuk(2010)], pp. 147–148.
47 [Freddoso(1988),
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Anything about the particle that makes its behavior epistemically determinate would make
that behavior physically determined. Thus, the following entail one another:

(6.67) God knows how the particle will behave.

(6.68) There is a fact of the matter about how the particle will behave.

(6.69) The particle's behavior is determined.

TF is challenged to explain how (6.68) could be true while (6.69) is false. That is an instance

of the general grounding problem.

Since the basis of God's knowledge about soft facts is

the source of their truth, an explanation of how soft facts are grounded would solve the
Molinist grounding problem. Freddoso and Kosciuk shifted the argument away from agents
to indeterministic particles, emphasizing soft facts generally. Their response to the Molinist
grounding problem presupposed a solution to the general grounding problem. That move
begs the question since the two problems are ultimately the same.

6.4.5 True Futurism and General Eternalism
The preceding discussions of the grounding problem, both for Molinism in particular and
for TF generally, pose signicant challenges to TF. There is no basis for assigning the TRL
and soft facts in terms of the dynamic framework used here. Some advocates of TF seem
aware of this fact. Øhrstrøm, for instance, acknowledged the arbitrariness of the TRL.49
Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature do not appear to share Øhrstrøm's
concerns.

They have frequently endorsed the notion that soft facts, not to mention the

content of God's beliefs, describe something. Even incompatibilists like Pike, Hasker, and
Cowan voiced their support for the view that facts about the contingent future will hold,
soft facts, although these scholars reject the Ockhamist view that statements characterizing
God's beliefs are soft.50

49 [Øhrstrøm(2009)]
50 [Pike(1965),

Hasker(2001), Cowan(2003)]. Granted, Pike was a theistic eternalist at the end of the day,
so maybe he is not the best example. [Pike(1970)]
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According to OnTF, the TRL stems only from a description of what will occur as specied
by soft facts. That would be more sensible if the future were real, in which case there would
be something for soft facts to describe. This attempt to ground soft facts connects TF to
(general) eternalism. Øhrstrøm's careful discussions of TF indicate that he understands the
relationship and is wary of its consequences.
If the future is real, it must be so atemporally. What has happened, is happening, and
will happen is captured by a set of atemporal facts. There does not seem to be a need for
fundamentally temporal facts anymore. So eternalism opens the door to the B-theory. On the
B-theory, time loses its dynamic character and is instead more like another spatial dimension.
Without time ow and with static representations of all facts, one might wonder about the
reality of change under its standard, endurantist portrayal. It requires further argument to
demonstrate that the B-theory and especially perdurantism follow from eternalism, but the
slope appears slippery.51 Thus, an eternalist grounding for soft facts and the TRL may lead
to thoroughgoing absolutism.
In conclusion, TF is not the best option in the framework used for this analysis. Eternalism seems like the only way for TF to avoid the grounding problem. Eternalism, however,
may take TF down a very dierent path than the one cleared by Øhrstrøm and others.

51 The important relationships between eternalism, the B-theory, and perdurantism were discussed by Sider
in [Sider(2003)].
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Chapter 7

Open Futurism, Supervaluationism, and
Open Theism

Open futurism (OF) and related views have been around to heckle TF and eternalism at
least since antiquity. This chapter describes OF and company, including supervaluationism
and open theism. Section 7.1 gives a synopsis of OF's recent history, explains the core of OF
semantics, and describes OF's responses to both logical and theological fatalism. Section 7.2
provides additional details about bivalent OF, non-bivalent OF, supervaluationism, and open
theism.
Section 7.3 justies and enhances OF's position on linguistic use and theoretical analysis
thereof. Except for supervaluationism, OF rejects S-FLEM's validity. A host of arguments
are given (admittedly favoring bivalent OF) to show that S-FLEM is not as intuitive as it
might seem. Section 7.3 concludes with a discussion of predictions and temporal standpoints.
Traditional versions of OF do not handle predictions well, but this problem is alleviated with
standpoint inheritance. Standpoint inheritance also has a number of other advantages.
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7.1

The Basics of Open Futurism

This section introduces OF. Section 7.1.1 provides a brief history emphasizing OF's
contemporary philosophical development. Section 7.1.2 contains an important description of
OF semantics. There is a common misconception that at least bivalent OF conates

will-inevitably

will

and

. Granted, those terms are logically equivalent in bivalent OF. That logical

equivalence, however, stems from notably dierent semantics for those terms. Additionally,

will

and

will-inevitably

always dier in truth value in non-bivalent OF and systems that

incorporate temporal standpoints, bivalent or not.
Section 7.1.3 describes epistemological and ontological commitments associated with OF.
If either epistemological or ontological indeterminism hold, corresponding renditions of several other views follow. In particular, OF is closely related to presentism (or the growingblock theory), time ow, the A-theory, and endurantism.
A discussion of OF's response to fatalism is given in Section 7.1.4.

Regarding logical

fatalism, OF avoids fatalism by rejecting the validity of S-FLEM. Open theists hold that
if God has comprehensive foreknowledge, then S-FLEM is valid and fatalism holds.

One

may dismantle arguments for theological fatalism by rejecting that God has comprehensive
foreknowledge.

7.1.1 History
OF is a set of views characterized as Heraclitean, Aristotelian, or Peircean. Storrs McCall

used Heraclitean to describe the thesis that time ows,1 a notion that is required by OF.
Time ow is a popular notion in the future contingents literature and is hardly limited to OF.
Prior quite passionately endorsed the proposal, contra Jack Smart.2 A more recent debate
on the issue occurs between McCall and Graham Nerlich; and Theodore Sider provides
additional illuminating discussion.3 Time ow was discussed in Section 2.5.

1 [McCall(1998)]
2 [Prior(1996),

Smart(1949)]
Nerlich(1998), McCall(1998), Sider(2003)]

3 [McCall(1994),
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Aristotle considered logical fatalism in

On Interpretation

9. Historically, many scholars

among them, notable schoolboys like Lavenham4 thought that Aristotle proposed rejecting
S-FLEM. The standard contemporary view agrees that Aristotle rejected S-FLEM although
this interpretation is not without exception.5
Prior endorsed dierent formulations of OF at various points in his career. On the nonbivalent account, propositions about the contingent future are neither true nor false.

In

his earlier writings, Prior supported a non-bivalent OF he associated with Peter de Rivo's
view.6 The position is not limited to Prior and was taken up by Geach other others, as well.7
Three-valued temporal logics continue to enjoy further developments.8
Prior endorsed a bivalent variety of OF in his later work.9 Prior characterized this view
as Peircean.

Bivalent OF accommodates some intuitively plausible statements, like LEM

and bivalence, while sacricing

will/not

commutativity.

Richmond Thomason proposed that Bas van Fraassen's supervaluationist semantics yields
interesting results for temporal logics.10

Supervaluationism falls somewhere between TF

and OF. Like TF, supervaluationism acknowledges S-FLEM's validity and uses TRLs in its
semantics, at least traditionally. Like OF, supervaluationism rejects strong future bivalence,
that either will:φ is true or will:¬φ is true.

In other words, supervaluationism does not

identify a particular future as the true future.
Some theistic views reminiscent of OF fall under the heading of open theism.

Open

theism is the view that God does not have comprehensive foreknowledge because freedom and
foreknowledge are incompatible. One type of open theism, advocated by William Hasker and
others, accommodates TF but not freedom/foreknowledge compatibility.11 A second variety
of open theism stems from OF. Insofar as there are no facts about what the contingent

4 [Øhrstrøm(1983),

Tuggy(1999)]
[Øhrstrøm(1981)] for commentary.
6 Prior characterized his view as such in [Prior(1967)], p. 128. See also [Prior(1953)].
7 [Geach(1977)]
8 For instance, [Akama et al.(2007)Akama, Nagata, and Yamada, Akama et al.(2008)Akama, Nagata, and Yamada]
9 [Prior(1967)]
10 [Thomason(1970)]
11 [Hasker(2001)]
5 See
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future holds, God cannot have comprehensive foreknowledge simply because there is no such
knowledge to be had.

A number of scholars have recently advocated this combination of

open futurism with theism, including Benjamin Arbour, Gregory Boyd, Alan Rhoda, and
Dale Tuggy.12

7.1.2 Wait and See Semantics
The semantics of OF can be somewhat elusive. OF provides an interesting case in which
formal systems may not adequately characterize the philosophical views they are supposed
to represent. That is, a full understanding of the semantics is not evident from a cursory
inspection of traditional OF logics.
OF uses a

wait and see

approach to evaluate statements about the future. This analysis

applies to statements like the following:

(7.1) Jones will have coee.

(7.2) Smith guesses that Jones will have coee.

(7.3) Smith predicts that Jones will have coee.
and so forth.13 The general rule is that statements about the future have at least one foot
in the future, so to speak. OF need not dier from TF in that statements about the future
depend on how the future turns out.
OF maintains that where future contingents are involved, there is no way to identify a

specic possible future to evaluate.

One might evaluate all possible futures, but none of

those possibilities has precedence over the others. This notion is reected by the fact that
OF does not introduce a mechanism like the TRL, a device used to specify a privileged

future. The ATC tree is as far as the temporal relation goes. So when it comes to future
contingents, what will happen is indeterminate until the contingencies are resolved. That

12 [Arbour(2013),

Boyd(2003), Rhoda et al.(2006)Rhoda, Boyd, and Belt, Rhoda(2003), Tuggy(2007)]
may be a difference between guesses and predictions, as discussed by Lucas in [Lucas(1989)], p. 65.
Such differences do not bear on this discussion.
13 There
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coffee

¬coffee

present

Figure 7.1.1: Open futurist semantics: Jones' coee-drinking. OF does not specify a privileged future.

So to determine what will happen from the present moment, the best one

can do is check all possible futures. From the standpoint of the present node, it is neither
the case that Jones will drink coee nor that she will not. One must wait and see how the
contingency is resolved.

resolution occurs when the standpoint moves to a later node at which one of the previously
contingent options can be uniquely designated. Visually, the standpoint must be past the
fork to determine what will occur. Figure 7.1.1 illustrates and describes this aspect of OF
semantics in terms of Jones' contingent coee-drinking.
Even if there is no particular future to evaluate, there are special propositions about
the future that do have a truth value. There are two ways to view such statements. The
rst perspective emphasizes the fact that

will

follows from

will-inevitably

maker for the future statement, then the statement is true.
physics determine that it will be sunny tomorrow, then

. If there is a truth

For example, if the laws of

it will be sunny tomorrow

When an event is inevitable or ATC-necessary, the event will occur.

is true.

There is no need to

wait and see if it will be sunny because tomorrow's sunniness is not contingent.
A second way to view the matter is to wait and seecheck the future.
OF, there is no such thing as

the

According to

future when contingency is at play, so one must check

all possible futures. Even if there is not a particular designated future, there may be certain statements that turn out true no matter which possible future comes about.

will

appears to be treated once again as

will-inevitably

Thus,

, although there are some important

dierences, mentioned shortly.
These two ways of understanding the special case in which there are true statements
about the future are illuminating. The rst proposal, which focuses on present truth makers
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rather than what will occur, appears to conict with the notion that evaluating future
statements involves looking at the future. What the rst proposal characterizes is not
the general case, but something like

will-inevitably
will-inevitably

will

in

. Nevertheless, if something will inevitably

be the case, then it will be the case:

entailment is characterized by the second proposal.
will bear witness to that which is inevitable.

entails plain

will

. The reason for the

No matter which future turns up, it

ATC possibility trees are eectively linear

with respect to inevitable propositions. It is as if a particular future were designated (by
present truth makers); but when contingents are involved not all aspects of the future are
determinate, only those that are not contingent. For instance, suppose that Jones' coeedrinking is contingent but the sun will inevitably rise tomorrow. Considering only that the
sun will rise, the future is linear. The ATC tree forks when Jones' coee-drinking enters the
scene, but Jones' choice does not aect the sun's behavior.
In simple cases, such as when

p is a literal, will:p holds if and only if will-inevitably:p does,

making it look as if OF maintains that

will

and

will-inevitably

amount to the same thing.

In bivalent branching time systems that do not account for temporal standpoints,

will-inevitably

will

and

do not have the same meaning.

standpoints,

and

always have the same truth value. Despite some appearances, even bivalent

OF does not confuse

wait and see

will

semantics.

will

and

will-inevitably
Will-inevitably
.

The terms are logically equivalent yet they
focuses on present causes and

will

employs

In non-bivalent systems and systems that account for temporal

will-inevitably

dier in truth value. The distinction is brought out by

the presence of future contingents.

Will-inevitably
Will

to speak.

yields truth based on whether or not the future is present in its causes, so

, on the other hand, involves inspecting the future by waiting to see what hap-

will
will-inevitably

pens. Insofar as what will be is now indeterminable, corresponding statements involving
lack a determinate truth value under non-bivalent OF. Statements involving

are just false. Bivalence and the lack thereof are discussed further in Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2,
respectively.
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Will

not only requires inspecting the future, but also exhibits standpoint inheritance

with similar temporal operators.

Will-inevitably

involves evaluating whether or not an event

is present in its causes; that is, determined. When temporal standpoints are properly taken
into account, the contrast between

will

and

will-inevitably

yields a dierence in truth value

for important statements with temporal operators. The signicance of temporal standpoints
for OF is discussed more in Section 7.3.3 through Section 7.3.5.

7.1.3 Epistemology and Ontology
Most scholars agree that OF and supervaluationism are compelling when interpreted
epistemically.

The future is not observable, so the only way to tell what will occur is to

search for existing evidence.
in its causes.

Such evidence is available only when the future is present

Those causes are observable (in principle) although the future is never is.

Thus, statements about the future are only justiable when their present causes make them
inevitable (or likely).
Many adherents of OF understand their view ontologically, as well. This is not to say
that they are indeterministsthey may or may not bebut they hold that OF is the best
way to represent an indeterministic system. Indeterminism requires several related tenets,
according to OF: presentism (or the growing-block theory), time ow, the A-theory, and
perhaps also endurantism. OF views any designation of the future as an infringement on
genuine contingency. No particular future will occur, no particular future or future objects
exist atemporally or otherwise, and there is no timeline already spread out like a tapestry.
All true futurists hold that a particular future will occur, and OF rejects that view. Some
true futurists, like Øhrstrøm and Trenton Merricks, have agreed with OF up to that point.14
Eternalists, perdurantists, and B-theorists have less in common with OF. This disparity has
led to rather separate approaches to future contingents and related issues, making dialog
challenging on account of the lack of the common ground.

14 [Øhrstrøm(1983),

Merricks(2009)]
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7.1.4 Against Fatalism
Given that the only cases in which simple propositions about the future are true are those

will

scenarios in which

will-inevitably

meets

, instances of S-FLEM yield inevitability. Recall

Jones' future-contingent coee-drinking.

coee ∨

(7.4) will:

will:¬

coee

is true if and only if

coee ∨

(7.5) will-inevitably:

coee

will-inevitably:¬

holds. Depending on which disjunct of (7.5) holds, it is either unavoidable that Jones will
drink coee or unavoidable that she will not. Thus, it is not surprising that OF focuses its
attention on S-FLEM to dismantle arguments for logical fatalism. In terms of the version
of the argument given in this essay, OF avoids logical fatalism by rejecting (ArgLF.1) in
ArgLF. According to OF, S-FLEM is not valid, and in particular S-FLEM does not hold

for future contingents, so ArgLF is unsound.
OF endorses incompatibilism when it comes to theological fatalism. That is, OF main-

tains that libertarian freedom is incompatible with infallible, maximally specic foreknowledge. Such foreknowledge yields instances of S-FLEM, as shown in ArgThF. By ArgLF,
S-FLEM is incompatible with contingency which, in turn, is necessary for libertarian freedom.
Detractors tend to interpret OF's incompatibility thesis as an unwarranted restriction of
God's omniscience, if not an outright assault on his divinity.15 An omniscient God, according
to them, knows every detail about what the future holds. OFin this case, open theism
does not propose a limitation or attack on omniscience.

Omniscience is just believing all

and only truths. Opponents who think that, in order for God to be properly omniscient, he
must know everything about the future just beg the question against OF by assuming that
there is always something to know. If it is neither true that Jones will have coee nor that

15 [Ware(2000)]

is a case in point.
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she will not, then to believe one way or the other is to believe that which is not true. An
omniscient being cannot believe that which is not true. Open theism is discussed further in
Section 7.2.4.

7.2

Varieties of Open Futurism

Several types of OF and related views have been mentioned throughout this essay: bivalent OF, non-bivalent OF, supervaluationism, and open theism. These positions are discussed in more detail in this section. Bivalent OF retains classical validities like LEM at the
cost of

will/not

commutativity. Non-bivalent OF respects

LEM. Supervaluationism manages to keep

will/not

will/not

commutativity, but not

commutativity, LEM, and even S-FLEM

without designating a privileged future. However, supervaluationism compromises bivalence
and symmetry between object- and meta- language. This section concludes with a discussion
of open theism, its motivations and variations.

7.2.1 Bivalent Open Futurism
The simplest OF system is bivalent (BivOF). That is, every statement is either true
or false in BivOF. Prior endorsed this approach, which he called Peircean, in his later
work.16

Familiar validities are respected by BivOF, such as LEM and non-contradiction.

The system and its characteristics are described more formally in Section 8.2.1. The price
of this relatively simple approach which keeps familiar results is that

will

and

will-inevitably

have the same truth conditions in traditional systems that do not account for standpoints.
Notice that

will-inevitably

does not commute with

not

. That holds for any contemporary

temporal logic, not just BivOF. The following are not equivalent:

(7.6) It is not the case that Jones will inevitably drink coee.

¬(will-inevitably:
16 [Prior(1967)]

coee )
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(7.7) Jones will inevitably not drink coee.

(will-inevitably:¬

coee )

Perhaps Jones' future coee-drinking is contingent, as in Figure 7.1.1. In this case, (7.6) is
true while (7.7) is false, demonstrating the inequivalence. Since

will

and

will-inevitably

have

the same truth conditions in BivOF,
(7.8) It is not the case that Jones will drink coee

(7.9) Jones will not drink coee
are not equivalent in BivOF. In other words,

will/not

commutativity is invalid in BivOF.

If Jones' coee-drinking is contingent, then (7.8) is true while (7.9) is false.
M-FLEM and W-FLEM are valid in BivOF. Thus, statements like the following hold:
(7.10) It either is or is not the case that Jones will drink coee. (M-FLEM)

(7.11) Jones will either drink coee or not drink coee. (W-FLEM)
S-FLEM, however, is not valid. The following may not hold:
(7.12) Jones will drink coee or she will not.
Likewise, strong future bivalence does not hold. Both of the following may be false:
(7.13) Jones will drink coee.

(7.14) Jones will not drink coee.
Since BivOF denies the validity of

will/not

commutativity and S-FLEM, supporters of

BivOF may try to dismantle intuitions favoring those rules. Such arguments are inspected

in Section 7.3.1 and Section 7.3.4.

7.2.2 Non-Bivalent Open Futurism
A slightly more complicated OF view allows partial truth functions or, similarly, a third
truth value. Prior endorsed this kind of position in some of his earlier writings and others have
recently furthered his developments.17 That said, Prior later came to reject this approach

17 [Prior(1953), Akama

et al.(2007)Akama, Nagata, and Yamada, Akama et al.(2008)Akama, Nagata, and Yamada]
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in favor of BivOF.18 Even if non-bivalent open futurism (NBivOF) is ultimately not worth
it, the view is interesting and exhibits potential for additional development.
Recall that BivOF does not accommodate
to bear, it is possible to obtain

will
inevitably-not
NBivOF,

will/not
will-inevitably
will-not not-will

commutativity. If this is too much

commutativity at the cost of LEM and bivalence. In

is true if and only if
is true.19 Thus,

will/not

is, and

and

not-will

is true if and only if

will-

have the same truth conditions (as long

as corresponding statements are about the same time). In cases of future-contingency, both

will not-will
Will will-inevitably
and

have no truth value or are assigned a third value representing indeterminacy.

and

turn out to have dierent truth conditions. The distinction is

apparent when future contingents come into play.

Suppose once again that Jones' future

coee-drinking is contingent. Then the following are plain false:

(7.15) Jones will inevitably drink coee.

(7.16) Jones will inevitably not drink coee.

The negations of (7.15) and (7.16) are true. Statements corresponding to (7.15) and (7.16)
that involve

will

instead of

will-inevitably

have no truth value. In particular, the following

have no truth value.

(7.17) Jones will drink coee.

(7.18) Jones will not drink coee.

(7.19) It is not the case that Jones will drink coee.

(7.20) It is not the case that Jones will not drink coee.

18 [Prior(1967)]
19 To

handle non-metric operators, it is necessary to stipulate that not-will can only be true if will-inevitably
does not hold. This requirement avoids a truth glut in situations like one in which Jones will inevitably
drink coffee tomorrow and she will inevitably not drink coffee two days hence. The truth conditions are
given formally in Section 8.2.5. As long as corresponding instances of not-will and will-not are about the
same time, will-not commutativity holds.
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As such, NBivOF respects the distinction between
might accuse BivOF of ignoring that dierence.
that separating

will

and

will-inevitably

will

and

will-inevitably

although one

Some thinkers, like Tuggy, proposed

is important enough to rule out BivOF in favor

of NBivOF.20 Standpoint inheritance, however, ensures that

will

and

will-inevitably

have

dierent truth conditions in BivOF as well as NBivOF.

7.2.3 Supervaluationism
Supervaluationism is a type of system developed by van Fraassen.21 Thomason proposed
a supervaluationist temporal logic (Sup) which continues to enjoy discussion.22 Sup is an
attempt to capture the virtues of both TF and OF.
When considering a theory like Sup, one must be careful to dierentiate between operators in the object language and their metatheoretic correlates. Material implication diers
from semantic consequence, LEM diers from bivalence, and so forth.
Here is a rough description of how Sup semantics works.

Figure 7.2.1 illustrates the

semantics using the example of Jones' coee-drinking. Sup dierentiates between two kinds
of truth functions. The rst type of truth function pertains to incidental truth in particular
models, here called inner models, which are IdxTF models. This variety of truth is the
familiar kind dened for semantic IdxTF, a system described in Section 6.2.1.
The second and primary type of truth function is dened using the rst. To help with
clarity, true/false is used for truth determined by the second function and true/false for
the rst. There is an equivalence class of inner models corresponding to a given branching
structure of moments and a particular assignment of true/false to propositional literals.
Members of the equivalence class have the same ATC structure and dier only in TRL
assignment. The equivalence classes may be called outer models. The second truth function
maps a sentence to true/false if and only if it is corrospondingly true/false in every inner

20 [Tuggy(2007)],

pp. 35/+.
Fraassen(1968)]
22 [Thomason(1970), MacFarlane(2003), MacFarlane(2008)]
21 [van
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outer model
will:coffee or will:¬coffee
inner models

will:coffee
will:coffee or will:¬coffee

will:¬coffee
will:coffee or will:¬coffee

Figure 7.2.1: Supervaluationism: Jones' coee-drinking (indexical true futurist basis). Both
inner models respect S-FLEM, so S-FLEM holds in the outer model. The inner models dier
on whether Jones will drink coee or she will not, so no particular course of action is assigned
to Jones in the outer modelstrong future bivalence fails.

model; otherwise, the sentence is neither true nor false. Validity is dened in the typical
way using truth/falseness.
S-FLEM is valid under Sup. On Thomason's account, inner models amount to IdxTF
models. S-FLEM is valid in IdxTF and thus Sup, too. S-FLEM's metatheoric comrade,
strong future bivalence, fails in Sup. If the inner models in question involve a future contingent, if they are non-linear, or if there is more than one element in the equivalence
class (all three of those conditions amount to the same thing), then there is a
will:φ holds in some inner models while will:¬φ holds in others.

φ

such that

Due to the stipulation

that truth/falseness requires truth/falseness for every member of the equivalence class,
neither will:φ nor will:¬φ is true.
While Sup is designed to combine the advantages of both TF and OF, one may object
that some of their aws are also inherited. TF's allies may object that the primary type
of truth, the second type described above, generally fails to pick out true futures.

That

is, strong future bivalence does not hold in Sup. So although S-FLEM is valid under Sup,
an important aspect of TF is left by the wayside. TF may thus view Sup as ultimately a
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ternary kind of OF that just manages to include S-FLEM.
While Sup could use TF arguments against fatalism, other routes are available.

One

option is to block the elimination of S-FLEM disjuncts, the move from (ArgLF.1) to
(ArgLF.2). After all, S-FLEM is valid but when future contingents are involved, neither
disjunct is true.
OF fans may not be happy with Sup, at least given Thomason's semantics. Underlying

the second type of truth is the rst type, applied to inner models of IdxTF. OF may object
to the fact that the TRL still plays a role, for the TRL is questionable in its own right.
Someone with OF inclinations who nds Sup attractive might nd another way to generate
a Sup semantics. Here is one suggestion. From the perspective of OF, Sup emphasizes that
which shall be resolved. The past and present are resolved from the present standpoint. The
contingent future is unresolved. Sup looks at future standpoints to see what will later be
resolved. A Sup semantics can be given as follows:

(7.21) A proposition is true just in case it will inevitably be resolved as true, sooner
or later.

(7.22) A proposition is false just in case it will inevitably be resolved as false, sooner
or later.

Future-contingent propositions will inevitably be resolved, but not the same way in all possible futures. In one possible future, it will be resolved that Jones drinks coee tomorrow; in
another, she does not. Hence, Sup assigns no truth value to future-contingents. Bivalence
fails.

No matter how things turn out, Jones coee-drinking will be resolved one way or

another. LEM is valid, as is

will/not

commutativity, S-FLEM, M-FLEM, and W-FLEM.

Standpoint inheritance allows Sup to be formalized using this notion of resolution from
future standpoints.

In OF, the temporal relation, ATC accessibility, is tree-like.

ATC

accessibility is backwards linear although it is not forwards linear. From a given temporal
standpoint, propositions with temporal operators relegating the context of evaluation to the
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standpoint's past involve the linear part of ATC accessibility from the standpoint.

This

linear portion represents that which is resolved. In Sup, truth/faseness may be dened
in terms of what will inevitably hold from future standpoints. For instance, it will inevitably
be the case that either Jones was going to have coee or she was not.

The matter may

be put in terms of predictions. Given that Smith predicted that Jones will have coee and
Brown predicted that she will not, it will inevitably be the case that either Smith or Brown
was correct. This method uses temporal standpoints and the backwards linearity of ATC
trees to capture resolution, eliminating the need for a TRL. The technique is implemented
formally in Section 8.3.5.
Sup introduces new concerns, as well. One worry pertains not to the fact that Sup is

ternary, but rather that Sup accepts certain theses at the object level while rejecting their
metatheoretic correlates.

Not all non-classical systems take this disparate approach.

For

example, intuitionists hold that the non-classical interpretation of operators extends to the
metalanguage. In the case of Sup, the division between theses on the object and meta- levels
may lead to an absurdity when combined with the thesis that Sup adequately represents
certain portions of natural language.
In Sup, LEM is valid yet bivalence fails. S-FLEM is valid although strong future bivalence
does not hold. Sup is supposed to do good job of representing certain aspects of natural
language, like standard operators and temporal language.

Perhaps Sup succeeds in this

goalat least that may be assumed for the sake of argument. So the validity of LEM and
S-FLEM reect actual usage. To keep this argument simple, consider just LEM. In Sup, it
is generally (for any model of the system and any values assigned to the parameters of the
truth function) accepted that:

(7.23) For any proposition

φ, ⌜φ ∨ ¬φ⌝

is true.

At the same time, the following is not accepted:

(7.24) For any proposition

φ,

either

⌜φ⌝

is true or

⌜φ⌝

is false.
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Metatheory is a special part of natural language, and it was supposed that Sup does a good
job of representing natural language. Granting that

⌜φ⌝

and

⌜¬φ⌝

corresponding specic propositions from natural language and that
with

⌜∨⌝

can be replaced by any

or

may be interchanged

in natural-to-object language mappings, Sup appears to come across an absurdity.

Despite these concerns, Sup temporal logic remains an interesting combination of TF
and OF, an attempt to retain S-FLEM without xing a particular true future. As such, it
has signicant appeal given that the view accounts for some basic linguistic intuitions.

7.2.4 Open Theism
Many theists are under the impression that arguments for theological fatalism like ArgThF
are somehow anti-theistic.23 ArgThF does not aim to show that God does not exist, that
he is not omniscient, or some other obviously anti-theistic conclusion. It is therefore important to see what bearing theological fatalism really does have upon theism. Many reputable
theists hold that some argument for theological fatalism successfully demonstrates that infallible, comprehensive foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom.
There are many arguments for theological fatalism.

Practically every student of the

subject has a favorite rendition. Some of these arguments, like the version presented here,
associate theological fatalism with logical fatalism. Others take theological fatalism to be a
separate problem, perhaps distinguished by the accidental necessity of God's past beliefs or
his essential omniscience.24

One way or another, those who nd the argument convincing

maintain that the following are incompatible:

(7.25) Infallible, comprehensive foreknowledge (necessarily certain knowledge of the
future's every detail)

(7.26) Libertarian freedom (the sort that involves the ability to do otherwise)

23 For
24 For

instance, [Plantinga(1975)]
instance, [Hasker(2001), Pike(1965)]
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Some theists reject libertarian freedom. Traditional providentialists like Luther and Calvin
held that it is outright heretical, symptomatic of misunderstanding the divine in important
ways, to maintain that agents other than God are free in the libertarian sense.25 Regarding
theological fatalism, if comprehensive foreknowledge is incompatible with libertarian freedom, then providence certainly is.

Thus, providentialists have nothing to gain (regarding

theological fatalism) by rejecting the foreknowledge end of the incompatibility.
Some theists deny that God has comprehensive foreknowledge, foreknowledge of the
future's every detail.

This position open theism (OT). OT may be seen as the theistic

analog to OF. According to OT, God does not know every detail about the future. That
he does not have such knowledge is not due to a lack of omniscience, but rather because it
would be absurd for him to have it. The nature of this absurdity depends on just how one
understands OT.
OF combined with theism yields OT, but OT does not entail OF. Scholars like Hasker,

Lucas, Richard Swinburne, and Peter van Inwagen separate logical and theological fatalism.26
Hasker stated the matter boldly:

The argument for logical fatalism claims, in eect, that

all

propositions that are

true at a given time are accidentally necessary at that timea claim that is quite
implausible and is fairly easily refuted.27

It is a shame to dismiss logical fatalism so quickly, but at least it enables one to spend time
addressing other important issues.
OT is just the view that God does not have comprehensive foreknowledge. For instance,

if Jones is free to drink coee tomorrow, then:

(7.27) God does not believe that Jones will drink coee tomorrow, and God does not
believe that Jones will not drink coee.
For Hasker and company, one of the following is still true.28

25 [Luther(1525)]

26 [Hasker(2001),

Lucas(1970), Swinburne(1994), van Inwagen(2008)].
p. 100
28 See esp. [Hasker(1989), Hasker(2001)].
27 [Hasker(2001)],
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(7.28) Jones will drink coee.

(7.29) Jones will not drink coee.

Thus, there are true propositions that God does not know. He could know (7.28) or (7.29),
but he elects to not know either or them, as Lucas indicated.29

God might thus refrain

because he cannot know either of the following:

(7.30) Jones will

(7.31) Jones will

freely
freely

drink coee.

not drink coee.

On this view, there are facts that God cannot know since knowing them yields inconsistency.
One of (7.28) and (7.29) is true, as is the corresponding one of (7.30) and (7.31); but
(7.30) and (7.31) have some peculiar characteristics.

If God were to believe one of those

propositions, that proposition would be false because freedom and divine foreknowledge are
incompatible. Since God knows that Jones is free, he cannot believe either (7.28) or (7.29),
for otherwise he would believe (7.30) or (7.31), which is absurd. As a result, for God to have
comprehensive foreknowledge while permitting human freedom is akin to creating a rock so
heavy that he cannot lift it.
Some friends of OT, like Arbour, Boyd, Rhoda, and Tuggy, arrived at OT through OF.30
This is not to say that these thinkers advocated the same notion of OF. Boyd, for instance,
recommended BivOF while Tuggy endorsed NBivOF.31 Scholars in the future contingents
literature tend to associate logical and theological fatalism, but this approach has been
less popular with the freedom/foreknowledge crowd. Nevertheless, recent work by thinkers
like those just mentioned is likely to strengthen this position in the freedom/foreknowledge
literature.
On this type of OT, there are no true propositions that God does not believe.
God knows all and only true propositions, period. There is no allegedly

29 [Lucas(1970),

ad hoc

Lucas(1989)]. For a reply, see [Kenny(1979)].
Boyd(2010), Rhoda et al.(2006)Rhoda, Boyd, and Belt, Tuggy(2007)]
31 [Boyd(2003)], p. 5; [Tuggy(2007)], §5
30 [Arbour(2013),

Thus,

caveat that
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God knows all and only those true propositions that he can consistently know, as Hasker
claimed.32 Even if Hasker's denition is not

ad hoc

, it still generates a signicant class of

propositions about the future that God cannot know. Such propositions include soft facts
involving free actions, and perhaps soft facts more generally.

According to OF, however,

there are no soft facts. If Jones' actions are genuinely free or if there are future contingents,
then there is no particular outcome that is designated beforehand, no fact of the matter,
for anyone to know. Neither (7.28) nor (7.29) is true. God only knows truths, so he knows
neither (7.28) nor (7.29)not because there are truths that he does not know, but because
there are no such facts to be known.
Boyd proposed an interesting rendition of OT which he called neo-Molinism. Roughly,
Boyd's position combines BivOF with Molinism. Traditional Molinists hold that God knows
what would happen in every possible circumstance.

In situations involving future contin-

gency, like Jones' coee-drinking, there is no fact to know about what Jones
one scenario or another. Rather, Jones

might

drink coee and she

might

would

do in

not. Therefore,

according to Boyd, God knows what Jones might do instead of what she would do, for God
knows all and only truths.
As far as theism is concerned, the approach taken in this essay is closer to that of Boyd,
Tuggy, and other advocates of OT who base their view on OF. TF is untenable independently
of theism. Thus, the only viable theistic position is an OT that accommodates OF (or Sup).
Such OT does not infringe upon God's omniscience, but merely follows from his infallibility
given OF.

7.3

Open Futurism and Language

Linguistically, the primary concern with OF is that it does not accommodate S-FLEM's
validity. BivOF rejects the validity of

will/not

commutativity, as well. Section 6.3.1 argued

that S-FLEM ultimately stems from LEM. Section 7.3.1 aims to show that S-FLEM is not as

32 See

[Hasker(1989)] for this definition and [Tuggy(2007)] for criticisms.
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intuitively plausible as it may seem. There are also theoretical reasons for rejecting

will/not

commutativity and S-FLEM.
OF has diculty accounting for predictions and guesses, not to mention wait-and-see

semantics more broadly.

These problems are described in Section 7.3.2.

OF has not re-

ceived much scholarly criticism about its handling of predictions, presumably because OF's
primary contender, TF, experiences similar diculties.

It was seen in Section 6.3.4 that

TF can address its problems using standpoint inheritance. OF can do likewise, as shown in

Section 7.3.3. Standpoint inheritance grants other benets to OF, too. A notable advantage is that standpoint inheritance shows how a powerful type argument for S-FLEM fails,
instead supporting a weaker principle that is compatible with OF. Section 7.3.5 adds some
clarication of how standpoint inheritance works (and does not work) with God's beliefs.

7.3.1 Against S-FLEM's Plausibility
Sup aside, OF rejects S-FLEM's validity. The principle is not easy to debunk given its

prima facie

obviousness. One can show that S-FLEM is not quite as evident as it at rst

seems, but doing so is not enough to demonstrate that S-FLEM should be rejected. Such
arguments may be combined with others showing that S-FLEM, under TF or Sup, involves
unsavory commitments. This section introduces arguments of the rst type, aiming to jostle
S-FLEM's foundation. Four arguments are discussed, three descriptive/explanatory and one
normative. Note that these arguments tend to favor BivOF. A stronger argument against
S-FLEM's validity uses temporal standpoints and is presented in Section 7.3.4.
The rst argument is an attempt to explain the apparent validity of S-FLEM in terms
that do not ultimately indicate S-FLEM's validity.

The argument points out that most

English speakers may confuse S-FLEM with M-FLEM (or W-FLEM, which is equivalent to
M-FLEM in most systems) on the ground that

will/not

Consider and example.

(7.32) The incumbent will win the election.

commutativity stems from error.
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(7.33)

w ∶=

The incumbent wins the election

.

(7.34) will:w

Someone might reject (7.32) with:

(7.35) No, the incumbent might lose.
(7.36) possibly:¬w

Possibility is understood as ATC possibility.
(7.35).

Conversely, (7.32) might be used to reject

This example supports the BivOF thesis that will:φ and possibly:¬φ are logical

opposites.

By associating temporal operators with possibility and necessity, the example

directly challenges TF.
The example taken alone is not enough to establish that

will/not

commutativity fails. A

brief tangent is in order to get the latter result. The thesis that possibly:¬φ is opposed to
will:φ does not exclude the proposal that will:φ and will:¬φ are also opposed. It may be that
will:¬φ and possibly:¬φ are equivalent. Given some rules of classical logic, this last equivalence amounts to the equivalence of will:φ and possibly:φ, again in terms of ATC possibility.
In the nascent stages of temporal logic's development, temporal logic was developed from
modal logic in a way that related

will possibly
to

. Scholars considered the proposal that, in

branching or similar systems, will:φ holds just in case there is some future in which

φ is true;

that is, will:φ is analogous to possibly:φ.
When the temporal relation is tree-like, as in OF (but not TF since the temporal relation,
the TRL, is linear), will:φ cannot be equivalent to possibly:φ To see why, consider any future
contingent, such as the now-familiar coee-drinking of Jones.
tomorrow and she might not. If will:φ holds whenever

Jones might drink coee

φ is true in some possible future, then

Jones will drink coee and she will not. All parties agree that this result is unacceptable.
Whether will:φ and will:¬φ are opposites, as in TF, or maybe will:φ is opposed to possibly:¬φ,
as in OF; will:¬φ is not logically equivalent to possibly:¬φ if the temporal relation is tree-like.
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So BivOF maintains that possibly:¬φ, not will:¬φ, is a logical opposite of will:φ.

To

rebut, TF may claim that the speaker of (7.35) engages in a parlor trick by negating (7.32)
with (7.35).

(7.35) serves only to make the possibility of losing salient.

Many English

speakers, at least those untrained in philosophy, tend to confuse a possibility's psychological
salience with high probability or actual occurrence.
Here is an example illustrating TF's counterpoint. Jones and Smith have an appointment
to meet at a specic coee shop and at a designated time. Jones arrives on time but Smith
is late.

Jones, sitting at a table and waiting for Smith, begins to wonder why Smith is

late. Perhaps he was hit by a car. Maybe he's in the hospital.

Et cetera

. Considering the

details of these concerns, Jones becomes worried. Fortunately, her training in logic enables
her to identify that there is a low probability that any such thing happened to Smith. He is
only ten minutes late, after all. Recognizing the phenomenon may not completely alleviate
Jones' unhappy psychological state, but at least she would avoid confusing her worry with
high probability or actual occurrence. Many English speakers do not have Jones' fortunate
training.

They often conate the salience of upsetting or joyous possibilities with high

probability or actual occurrence. Thus, will:φ and possibly:¬φ are not genuine opposites.
The next descriptive argument also targets

will/not

commutativity, indirectly challenging

S-FLEM. OF contends that will:φ holds at a given moment just in case
on

every

φ is true somewhere

future branch from that moment (perhaps with some restrictions about when

must hold in order to count).

Note the universal quantication in this portrayal of

φ

will

.

Unfortunately, as instructors of introductory logic courses know all too well, typical English speakers are notorious for rejecting positive/negative universals with negative/positive
universals, respectively, instead of the appropriate existentials. For instance, consider the
following propositions.

(7.37) All zombies eat esh.

(7.38) No zombies eat esh.
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(7.39) Some zombies do not eat esh.

Many typical English speakers claim that the negation of (7.37) is (7.38) rather than (7.39).
According to OF,

will

involves an even more subtle universal quantication. OF may claim

that English speakers make the same mistake when they conate will:¬φ with
OF account of

will

¬will:φ.

On the

, the errors are indeed the samemistaking the contrary of a proposition

for its contradictory.
These descriptive arguments are not likely to convince a logician who favors S-FLEM and
the commutativity of

will

and

not

. Logicians tend to have specic ideas of the systems they

endorse and presumably know how to negate statements properly. Regarding the rst two
arguments, even if typical English speakers commit the errors in question, that hardly addresses logicians' arguments supporting S-FLEM and

will/not

commutativity. The problem

is that logicians do not tend to give such arguments, instead claiming that

will/not

commu-

tativity and S-FLEM are obvious. An argument that may support S-FLEM is the

ex post

argument given at the end of Section 6.3.1. This argument is challenged in Section 7.3.4.
Another argument pertains not to confusion on behalf of English speakers, but peculiarities of English grammar. Consider the dierence between

cannot

and

can not

.

(7.40) Jones cannot have coee.

(7.41) Jones can not have coee.

These propositions may be respectfully symbolized as:

(7.42)

¬possibly:c

(7.43) possibly:¬c

cannot
not-can

Instead of being a straightforward compound word,
the scope of

possibly
can

modal, just like

33 See

Section 3.1.

. That is,

cannot

amounts to

moves the negation outside of

. Recall that

will

is grammatically

.33 Perhaps there is a similar ambiguity in the case of

will

. Although
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won't
not-will
can-not

willnot is not a word, the contraction
to

cannot

won't
not-can

. It may be that

be represented as

can

is analogous to

amounts to

instead of

can't
will-not

, and the latter is equivalent

rather than

. Notice that the claim is not that

won't
not-should

, but that it might be. One could just as easily say that

than

can't Shouldn't
.

amounts to

should-not

as opposed to

First, it would be presumptuous to assume that

will
Can

rather than another without independent support.
with

not

is like

is like
rather

is like one other grammatical modality
is not well-behaved when combined

obnoxious.
Although they do not serve to debunk S-FLEM and

will/not

scriptive arguments given above may serve lesser purposes.

will/not

should

. The point is twofold.

. It would not be surprising if other grammatical modalities, like

help OF explain its view that S-FLEM and

can't
will
shouldn't

, just as

will

, are similarly

commutativity, the de-

On one hand, the arguments

commutativity are implausible, despite

appearances to the contrary. On the other hand, although not strong enough to show that
S-FLEM and

will/not

commutativity should be rejected, the arguments cast some doubt on

those principles' intuitiveness. The arguments might be used to bolster others for OF.
Another type of argument against S-FLEM and

will/not

commutativity is normative.

Many such arguments aim to challenge particular theories supporting S-FLEMTF and
Sup. Those arguments are discussed elsewhere. There is at least one normative argument for

the thesis that

will

and

not

do not commute, independently of particular theories supporting

S-FLEM.

Will

is grammatically modal.

Consider other grammatical modalities without direct

temporal import, for they may serve as independent test cases.

Should

and

can

are helpful

paradigm cases, the former being normative and the latter being modal in the propositional
or ontological sense.

(7.44) Jones should drink coee.

(7.45) Jones can drink coee.
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Neither

should

nor

can

commute with

not

should

. Focusing on the

, the following are not

equivalent:
(7.46) It is not the case that Jones should drink coee. (¬should:c)
(7.47) Jones should not drink coee. (should:¬c)

The form corresponding to S-FLEM does not hold for

(7.48) should:φ

∨

should

should:¬φ

Nevertheless, the form corresponding to M-FLEM holds for

(7.49) should:φ

should

modalities,

and

will

should

:

∨ ¬should:φ

The situation is analogous for
like

:

can

can

. Thus,

not

fails to commute with grammatical modalities

. In the interest of securing a general and unied analysis of grammatical

should not be represented as commuting with

not

, either, other things being

equal.
Again, this argument is normative, not descriptive. The goal is not to describe actual use

of

will

or explain away

will/not

commutativity as a mistake. For theoretical reasons,

should not be represented as commuting with

not

will

even if almost every English speaker uses

the language otherwise. So if two leading representations of time and temporal language are
otherwise equally good, but one theory involves

will/not

commutativity and the other does

not, the second should be chosen over the rst for the sake of having a unied analysis of
grammatical modalities.

7.3.2 Predictions
Suppose that Jones' future coee-drinking is contingent and Smith asserts that Jones
will drink coee. Depending on the particular rendition of OF employed, the following are
either false or have no truth value.
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(7.50) Jones will drink coee.

(7.51) Smith's assertion that Jones will drink coee is correct.

Further assume that time has passed and Jones did in fact drink coee. The following seem
correct.

(7.52) Jones was going to drink coee.

(was:will:c)

(7.53) Smith correctly asserted that Jones would drink coee.

(7.53) especially seems true. If Smith had bet that Jones would drink coee, he would have
won the bet. To account for (7.53), traditional OF can use statements like:

(7.54) Jones drank coee and Smith asserted that she would drink coee.

(7.54), however, does not admit that Smith's assertion was correct. His assertion's content
was validated in terms of the wait-and-see approach. (7.53) requires (7.52). To account for
predictions (and guesses), then, OF must show how propositions like (7.52) can be true even
though (7.50) was untrue from an earlier perspective.
Before moving on, note that (7.52) follows from a more general principle:

(7.55) When anything is the case, it has always been the case that it will be the case.
That is how Prior put it in 1954.34

He was proposing a reasonable assumption behind

Diodorus' Master Argument. The systems that Prior himself endorsed do not support (7.55),
but something like (7.55) appears necessary to account for (7.53).

Even if (7.52) can be

explained away when taken alone, (7.53) is a thorn in the side of OF.
This issue with handling predictions and guesses is symptomatic of a deeper problem.
Traditional OF fails to accurately represent for wait-and-see semantics.

The reason why

Smith's assertion was correct and Jones was going to drink coee is that the passage of
time validated Jones' coee-drinking.

34 [Prior(1955)],

p. 210

From a standpoint before Jones drank coee, OF
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maintains that there is no legitimate way to privilege the coee-drinking future from the
alternative.

From a later standpoint in which Jones drank coee, it is clear which past's

future to evaluate: this one, the standpoint. Traditional OF semantics cannot represent this
important dierence in standpoint.

7.3.3 Temporal Standpoints for Open Futurism
(7.50) and (7.52) dier in standpoint. The standpoint of (7.50) is prior to Jones' coeedrinking while the standpoint of (7.52) is later. This variation in standpoint is relevant given
OF's wait-and-see approach to the semantics of

will

. When the standpoint is earlier than

Jones' coee drinking, there is no particular future that will occur. Thus, (7.50) should not
turn out true. If the standpoint is after Jones' coee drinking, then there is a way to pick out
the future insofar as is necessary to determine that (7.52) is true. From the later standpoint,
but not the earlier, the waiting and seeing has already been done.
There are several ways to manipulate temporal standpoints in English. Here, a simplied
mechanism is employed to handle the aforementioned observations, ultimately incorporating
(7.55).

The technique accounts for cases like (7.53), provides a systematic way to treat

temporal operators, and retains a lot of old results. This method can be called

inheritance

standpoint

. An introduction to standpoint inheritance was given in Section 3.4 and a formal

account is provided in Section 8.3. A less technical exposition specic to OF is given here.
A preliminary requirement of standpoint inheritance is that the underlying system accounts for the fact that possibility/accessibility changes depending on where one is in the
ATC tree. It may have been possible for Jones to skip coee yesterday, but that is no longer
possible now that her coee-drinking is said and done. Opportunities are lost to time, so
to speak, as they become necessary

per accidens

or ATC-necessary. Formally, dierences in

standpoint can be represented using moment-specic subtrees of the more general ATC tree,
as in Figure 3.4.3. These trees should capture the notion of what is possible from a given
moment.

Intuitively, a moment's tree consists of all ATC-accessible paths leading to and
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standpoint

standpoint
p

p

p

(b)

(c)

standpoint
(a)

Figure 7.3.1: Open futurism with temporal standpoints. Dierent standpoints have dierent
ATC subtrees. (a) depicts a standpoint before Jones decides whether or not to drink coee.
(b) illustrates a standpoint during or after Jones'-coee drinking. The standpoint in (c) is a
moment at which Jones does not drink coee.

from that moment.
Notice that dierent standpoints sometimes have dierent accessibility relations corresponding to dierent subtrees. The truth values of modal/temporal statements are based on
accessibility structure. This is how changes in standpoint aect modal/temporal statements
in the context of branching time logics.
Standpoint inheritance has two primary tenets. The rst divides modal/temporal operators into two classes. Standpoint-sensitive operators are completely restricted to a standpoint, which they pass on to all internal propositions. The purely temporal operators

was will-always
,

, and

was-always

, and various kinds of

,

are standpoint-sensitive. Other operators are not restricted

by standpoints, but may pass standpoints on. Such operators include

inevitably

will

necessarily

and

possibly

.

will-inevitably was,

The second tenet proposes that

standpoints should not be changed unless absolutely necessary.

Thus, standpoint inheri-

tance for OF is roughly captured by the following:

(7.56)

Will was will-always
,

,

, and

was-always

are the only standpoint-sensitive oper-

ators.

(7.57) Only switch standpoints when doing so is necessary to make sense of an evaluation.

Regarding Jones' contingent coee-drinking, various standpoints are illustrated in Fig-
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ure 7.3.1. From a standpoint in which Jones drank coee, as in Figure 7.3.1 (b), one cannot
sensibly evaluate a circumstance in which Jones did not drink coee. The conict in presuppositions yields absurdity.

Visually, the contradiction in assumptions is illustrated by

the fact that the standpoint in which Jones did not drink coee is not on the subtree of the
standpoint in which Jones drank coee. The presupposition that Jones drank coee must be
dropped, which requires shifting standpoints. One must switch standpoints to a counterfactual scenario in which Jones did not drink coee, as in Figure 7.3.1 (c). The counterfactual
standpoint is sometimes designated using expressions like:

(7.58) Had Jones not drunk coee...

(7.59) If Jones had not drunk coee...

and so forth. A standpoint is inadequate when inspecting a situation that is not on the standpoint's subtree. Operators that are not standpoint-sensitive may require such evaluations.
In other words,

will-inevitably was-inevitably necessarily
,

,

, and

possibly

may require shifting

standpoint to a moment that is counterfactual with respect to the current standpoint. Operators that are standpoint-sensitive are restricted to a given standpoint or subtree, so those
operators cannot by themselves generate changes in standpoint.
Standpoint inheritance does not aect the evaluation of (7.50) from the earlier standpoint.
That statement remains untrue on an OF reading. From that earlier standpoint, the future
is still unsettled, as in as in Figure 7.3.1 (a).
(7.52) is true under standpoint inheritance.

That scenario is illustrated in as in Fig-

ure 7.3.1 (b). The initial standpoint, that of the outer operator,

was

, is the circumstance

after Jones has had coee. That initial standpoint is inherited by the inner temporal operator,

will

. From that standpoint, it is no longer possible for Jones to not drink coee. Time

has already veried her coee-drinking.
That (7.52) turns out true does not render the following true.

(7.60) It was the case that Jones will inevitably have coee.

(was:will-inevitably:

coee )
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Will-inevitably

is not standpoint-sensitive. Therefore,

will-inevitably

is not restricted to

the initial standpoint. (7.60) is false just as:

(7.61) Jones will inevitably drink coee

is false when (7.61) is evaluated from the earlier standpoint, shown in Figure 7.3.1 (a), before
the Jones' coee-drinking became necessary

per accidens

. For the same reason, (7.60) is false

when evaluated from the later standpoint.
Standpoint inheritance enables the simplication of many expressions involving temporal
operators. Any string of consecutive

was

's and

will

's can be reduced to at most two. Under

OF without standpoint inheritance, the reduction does not work for all combinations of

those operators.35 The reduction is discussed further in Section 8.3.4.
Thus, standpoint inheritance enriches OF in at least four ways. First, it allows the theory
to account for predictions and guesses. Second, standpoint inheritance does a better job of
representing the wait-and-see approach endorsed by OF. Third, it further emphasizes the
semantic dierences between

will

and

will-inevitably

.

For BivOF, that may be the only

distinction in truth value between those operators, making it all the more important to
emphasize.

Traditional BivOF semantics hides the distinction between between

will-inevitably

, making

will

appear identical to

be simplied under standpoint inheritance.

will-inevitably

will

and

. Fourth, many expressions can

Any string of consecutive

reducible to at most two.
Two objections to standpoint inheritance might be that it is

ad hoc

was

's and

will

's is

and that it is too

complicated. Regarding the rst objection, standpoint inheritance is generalizable to and
useful for all major branching time systems. The theory of standpoint inheritance for OF
described above is the same as standpoint inheritance for TF, given the dierence in tem-

35 Without

standpoint inheritance, the reduction works only for non-metric temporal operators, and even
then only because of density. Some operator may involve shifting an arbitrarily small distance, which is
sketchy as a representation of natural language. Additionally, the reduction fails for metric operators without
standpoint inheritance, which are closer than relational operators to English use provided context-determined
restrictions on distances. With standpoint inheritance, the reduction is possible for both non-metric and
metric operators.
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poral relation between OF and TF. Standpoint inheritance is useful for all branching time
systems and a general formal account is provided in Section 8.3.2. In addition to the theory's generality, standpoint inheritance is well-motivated by use of natural language.

For

OF, some of the most pointed cases are like those given above: the requirement of accounting

for predictions, the distinction between (7.50) and (7.52), the plausibility of (7.55), and the
distinction between (7.52) and (7.60). Standpoint inheritance addresses those issues for OF,
but within a general framework that helps other branching time systems handle their own
challenges.
Standpoint inheritance does introduce an extra explicit factor, the standpoint, that must
be considered. In that sense, a system with standpoint inheritance is more complicated than
one without.

That is not much of a criticism, though.

It is important for systems to be

simple and elegant, but only insofar as a proper analysis can accommodate.

Standpoint

inheritance is well-motivated by examples and intuitions that should be addressed.

The

theory is simple and elegant insofar as it handles those problems within a very general
framework. Additionally, standpoint inheritance grants additional simplications, including
the reduction of all

will/was

strings to at most two, not aorded by the traditional theories.

Besides, as Prior noted, traditional theories without an explicit standpoint parameter still
change standpoint implicitly.36 The dierence is that traditional systems change standpoint
with every new point of evaluation while logics with standpoint inheritance only change
standpoint when absolutely necessary.

The relatively conservative approach endorsed by

standpoint inheritance requires making the standpoint explicit.

7.3.4

Ex Post S-FLEM

Section 6.3.1 contained several arguments for S-FLEM and
last argument given in that section was an
for literals,

36 [Prior(1967)],

p. 13

ex post

will/not

commutativity. The

argument. Supposing that LEM holds
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(7.62) Jones is either drinking coee or she is not.

Yesterday, Smith and Brown placed bets on whether or not Jones would have coee. Smith
and Brown's respective bets are that:

(7.63) Jones will drink coee.

(7.64) Jones will not have coee.

Since exactly one disjunct of (7.62) obtains, exactly one of Smith and Brown won the bet.
Thus, exactly one of (7.63) and (7.64) was true. (7.63) and (7.64) are corresponding S-FLEM
disjuncts, so that instance of S-FLEM was true yesterday (not to mention the corresponding
instance of strong future bivalence, contra Sup). This generalizable result appears to show
that S-FLEM should be valid, but in fact such a general conclusion does not follow.
Any standpoint's subtree has only a branchless trunk leading back from that standpoint.
This fact is illustrated well in Figure 3.4.3.

The linguistic result of this structure is that

whatever was the case, is now the case, or will be the case at a given standpoint is such that
it was always going to be the casefrom that standpoint. So whatever was, is, or will be is
such that it was going to be, and thus either it was going to be or it was going to not be.
With some symbols:

(7.65)

(was:φ) ∨ φ ∨ (will:φ) ⊧

This principle may be called
left hand side holds, then

post

.

The

ex post

φ's

ex post

was:(will:φ ∨ will:¬φ)

S-FLEM (ExP-S-FLEM). If one of the disjuncts on the

truth-makers either did or do now obtain. Hence the name,

ex

argument for S-FLEM only shows an instance of ExP-S-FLEM. The argument

fails to demonstrate a generalizable instance of S-FLEM. The conclusion is compatible with
the thesis that from yesterday's standpoint, before Jones had resolved to drink coee today,
neither Smith nor Brown had won the bet. That is, the target instance of S-FLEM is not
true.
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A standpoint's future may still fork if there are contingencies that are future with respect
to the standpoint. As such, S-FLEM is not valid. The past (including the present), however,
is branchless. This linearity grants ExP-S-FLEM. Advocates of S-FLEM are challenged to
nd support for S-FLEM that does not really support ExP-S-FLEM or some other principle
in the neighborhood, like W-FLEM or M-FLEM.
Ultimately, S-FLEM is too strong for the evidence granted by the

ex post

does not require a linear future. Standpoint inheritance accounts for the
exactly without the extra baggage of a linear future.
inheritance commandeers the

ex post

argument, which

ex post

scenario

Given this observation, standpoint

argument as its own evidence. The

ex post

argument

supports standpoint inheritance with OF, not S-FLEM or TF. TF may have lost its greatest
advocate.

7.3.5 What God did not Believe
A nal point requires clarication. Suppose that Jones' coee-drinking was contingent
and that she drank coee. Using standpoint inheritance as discussed in Section 7.3.3, (7.52)
is true. God believes all and only truths, so:

(7.66) God believes that Jones was going to drink coee. (God believes: was: will:

coee

What does not follow is that:

(7.67) God

believed

that Jones would drink coee. (was: God believes: will:

coee

)

(7.67) involves replacing a sub-proposition of (7.52) with a statement that God believes
that sub-proposition. This type of substitution is illegitimate, as (7.67) shows. Standpoint
inheritance does not sanction (7.67). God held no such belief since Jones' coee-drinking
was contingent.
What would enable the unwanted substitution is allowing God's beliefs to be standpointdependent. The beliefs of agents in time are not standpoint-dependent. God is no exception.
(7.66) is true because (7.52) is true. God is aware that the passage of time has veried Jones'

)
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coee-drinking. The latter holds because the
standpoint of the outer

was

.

will

in the sub-proposition, (7.50), inherits the

Again, that standpoint is the relatively future moment in

which she drank coee. God does not evaluate (7.50) from that standpoint, but from the
standpoint at which he holds the belief. From that past standpoint, (7.50) is untrue, so God
did not believe it. (7.67) is therefore false.
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Part III

Formalities and Conclusions
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Chapter 8

Formalities

Much has been said thus far about various temporal logics and standpoint inheritance.
This chapter introduces a logic called MMBT (for Multi-Modal Branching Time) that
serves as a general framework through which to represent the views discussed in preceding
chapters. Section 8.1 provides a generic setup for MMBT, which is like a prime matter from
which particular systems can be individuated. To keep things simple, MMBT is left with
a propositional basis.

Section 8.2 gives the main logics discussed throughout this project

(without standpoint inheritance):

bivalent and non-bivalent open futurism, absolute and

indexical true futurism, and supervaluationism. Finally, Section 8.3 modies MMBT with
standpoint inheritance and discusses some results mentioned in other chapters.

8.1

Generic Setup

The goal of this section is to specify a generic multi-modal system incorporating branching time structures, MMBT. For simplicity, MMBT is developed in terms of propositions,
not properties and relations. Models and validity are dened in Section 8.1.1 and accessibility relations (including ATC accessibility) in Section 8.1.2. Truth conditions for operators
are given in Section 8.1.3. In addition to the usual sentential operators, generalized modal
and temporal operators are also dened. Such operators are later used with certain accessi-
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bility relations to represent specic varieties of open futurism (OF) and true futurism (TF).
Standpoint inheritance is not introduced until Section 8.3.

8.1.1 Models and Validity
Dene the simplest sort of model as an ordered quadruple,

(8.1)

where

ν

nu

(

M

⟨M, τ, R, ν⟩,

is a set of moments,

, not

vee

τ

is a time function,

R

is a set of accessibility relations, and

) is a truth function. This quadruple will do for now. Later, models require

functions to pick out moment-specic accessibility relations.
Intuitively, moments are temporally sensitive possible worlds, or snapshots of possible
worlds.

For this purpose, not much hinges on how exactly one thinks of moments.

They

may be points or sets of propositions characterizing states of aairs. Note that this set of
propositions is maximally specic if and only if bivalence holds.1
The continuum,

R,

is used as a set of times. Ocially, times might not be real numbers;

but it is plausible to stipulate that the set of times is isomorphic to

R

R.

For simplicity, then,

is used as the set of times.
Since moments are temporally sensitive, each moment has exactly one time such that

it is that time at the moment. The set of times must have enough structure to allow the
development of all-things-considered (ATC) accessibility and metric temporal operators.

R,

ordered as usual, lends itself to this task quite nicely.
The time function,

1 If

τ,

assigns a time (real number) to each moment.

moments are identified with sets of propositions, care must be taken to specify propositions that are
sufficient to individuate nodes without unnecessarily restricting possibilities. For instance, if moments are
consistent, maximally specific sets of literals, then there cannot be distinct, indiscernible moments (ignoring
modal/temporal statements true at those nodes); and if moments are consistent, maximally specific sets
of all propositions without qualification, then non-bivalent systems are ruled out (assuming that the set of
propositions identifying a moment are those propositions that are true at that moment). So the best option
is to identify moments with sets of propositions characterizing states of affairs; that is, those propositions
mapped to true at respective moments. These sets of propositions are maximally specific if and only if
bivalence holds.
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(8.2)

τ ∶ M Ð→ R.

It is assumed that

τ

is a total function. That is, every moment has exactly one time. The

time of a moment will be designated

τm . τ

is convenient to have around for describing metric

operations.
The system is multi-modal, so instead of being limited to just one accessibility relation,
there may be several. Thus,
(8.3)

R ⊆ P(M × M ).

The accessibility relations in
whatever else one wishes.

R

may include logical accessibility, physical accessibility, or

Of course, ATC accessibility and the thin red line (TRL) are

relevant here.
The truth function,

ν,

maps propositions to truth values with respect to moments.

ν

is

dened by
(8.4)

Φ

ν ∶ M × Φ Ð→ {1, 0}.

is an implicationally complete2 set of propositions for the language used here, which

is roughly the propositional calculus augmented with modal and temporal operators, as
described below in Section 8.1.3. The values 1 and 0 represent true and false, respectively.
No third truth value is used here, although

m∈M

and

Since

Σ⊆Φ

ν

and

φ ∈ Φ, νm (φ)

is used henceforth in place of

ν(m, φ).
Let

φ ∈ Φ.
Σ ⊧ φ

i there is no model with a moment

νm (ψ) = 1
Σ

shall be partial for non-bivalent systems. For

is partial, it is appropriate to dierentiate between two types of validity.

(8.5)

If

ν

is satised and

never untrue.

⊧

φ

but

m

such that for each

ψ ∈ Σ,

νm (φ) ≠ 1

has no truth value, then

Σ ⊭ φ.

For logical truths,

⊧φ

as long as

φ

is

may be too restrictive under some circumstances. A weaker notion may be

appropriate:

2 That

is,
implicationally
complete
[Boolos et al.(2007)Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey].

in

the

sense

used

on

p.

147

of
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(8.6)

Σ∣≈φ i there is no model with a moment m such that for each ψ ∈ Σ, νm (ψ) = 1
and

In the case of ∣≈,

∣≈ φ just in case

νm (φ) = 0

Σ

φ

may be satised while

φ

has no truth value. As far as logical truths go,

is never false.

The terms associated with validity used here are as follows:

(8.7)

validity: Σ ⊧ φ

(8.8)

semi-validity: Σ ∣≈ φ

(8.9)

∣≈ φ
invalidity: Σ 

Note that invalidity is not the opposite of validity. Rather, both validity and invalidity pick
out extrema that are intended to approximate their classical counterparts.

8.1.2 Accessibility Relations
Although one can designate any number of accessibility relations in this system, only a
few are useful here. For good measure, logical accessibility may be dened as

(8.10)

logical accessibility:

a relation

RL = M × M .

A very important relation is the tree structure generated by ATC accessibility. ATC accessibility may be characterized as follows.

(8.11)

all-things-considered (ATC) accessibility:

a relation

<ATC

that is a con-

tinuous, unbounded ordering of one or more trees of moments3 such that every
moment is part of some tree and

<

is used instead of

The criteria provided ensure that

3 Moments

<ATC
<

m <ATC m′

only if

τm <R τm′ .

(For readability,

unless disambiguation is necessary.)

has some desirable properties:

are nodes and trees are backwards-linear partial orderings. Recall that partial orderings are
irreflexive and transitive. For this purpose, trees need not have root nodes.
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<-related

(8.12)

moments are ordered chronologically.

(8.13) There are no gaps due to continuity, enabled by the fact that the set of times
is continuous.

<

(8.14)

forms trees. That is,

<

is backwards linear, irreexive, and transitive.4

(8.15) Trees are unboundedthey have no beginning and no end.

(8.16) That

R

represents the set of times makes it easy to establish rulers for metric

temporal operators.

< is used by every system here, but other relations are best dened when particular views are
discussed. One can look forward to the TRL, moment-specic TRLs, and moment-specic
ATC sub-trees.

8.1.3 Truth Conditions
This section provides truth conditions for propositions, connectives, and various important operators. These truth conditions are designed to be general, applicable to the particular
theories developed in later sections.
A full property calculus is not developed here since quantication is not used.

Some

special propositions, here called timestamps, prove to be useful in dening some operations.5

timestamp

a proposition denoted

σt

representing

the time is t

, for time

t.

Propositional connectives are dened in the standard way, although extra specicity is given
to ensure that these denitions still work if

m

be a moment and both

4 Transitivity

φ

and

ψ,

ν

is partial and the system is non-bivalent. Let

propositions.

does not interfere with statements like It is not yet possible to create a machine that passes
the Turing test, but it might become possible in the future. That is, no one can create such a machine with
the current technology, but there is a possible later technological state under which someone could create
such a machine. The instances of possible indicate an extra-things-considered modality, as in Section 2.5,
that looks like ATC-modality plus a set of propositions specifying technological capacities.
5 Cf. Prior’s U operator as in [Prior(1957)]. U is an at operator so that U tφ represents φ holds at t.
Timestamps are designed to represent the temporal content of the at operator.
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(8.17)

(8.18)

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪1
νm (¬φ) = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
0
⎪
⎩

i

νm (φ) = 0

i

νm (φ) = 1

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪1
νm (φ ∧ ψ) = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
0
⎪
⎩

i

νm (φ) = νm (ψ) = 1

i

νm (φ) = 0

(8.19)

νm (φ ∨ ψ) ∶= ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)

(8.20)

φ ⊃ ψ ∶= ¬φ ∨ ψ

(8.21)

φ ≡ ψ ∶= (φ ∧ ψ) ∨ (¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)

or

νm (ψ) = 0

Below are some familiar tables depicting the truth-functional connectives.  i is used for the
case in which

¬

φ

νm

is undened.

∧

1

0

i

i

0

1

φ

∨

ψ
1

i

0

1

1

i

0

i

i

i

0

0

0

0

0

φ

⊃

ψ
1

i

0

1

1

1

1

i

1

i

i

0

1

i

0

φ

≡

ψ
1

i

0

1

1

i

0

i

1

i

i

0

1

1

1

ψ
1

i

0

1

1

i

0

i

i

i

i

0

0

i

1

φ

Even in those cases in which the system is non-bivalent, it may be desirable to impose a
limited bivalence. The following stipulation serves this purpose.

(8.22)

νm (A) ∈ {0, 1}

for all moments

m

and atomic propositions

A.

There is nothing unusual about modal operators here except that their truth conditions
depend on which accessibility relations the operators respectively designate.

Recall that

accessibility relations may vary greatly in what they represent, like logical possibility and
permissibility, so modal operators are only associated with modality in the formal sense
dened in Section 2.2. Let

m be a moment, φ a proposition, and Rx

an accessibility relation.
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(8.23)

(8.24)

If

RL

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪1
νm (◻x φ) = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
0
⎪
⎩

i for every

m′ ∈ M

such that

mRx m′ , νm′ (φ) = 1

i for some

m′ ∈ M

such that

mRx m′ , νm′ (φ) = 0

◇x ∶= ¬ ◻x ¬

represents logical accessibility, then

bility, respectively; given that

RAT C

◻L

and

◇L

pertain to logical necessity and possi-

represents ATC accessibility,

◻AT C

and

◇AT C

represent

ATC necessity and possibility, respectively; and so forth.
It is also possible to designate operators using inverse relations, like past as opposed to
future. Operations along an inverse relation,
Non-metric temporal operators represent
Instead of the usual

F

operators, respectively.
relations.

and

P, △

Like

◻

and

and

▽

Rx−1 ,

are designated by

it will be the case that

et cetera
it was the case that

◻−x , ◇−x ,

and

.

.

are used for generalized future and past temporal

◇, △

and

▽

are indexed with respect to accessibility

The triangle notation, although not standard, is relatively intuitive and more

appropriate for multi-modal systems like this one. Analogs to temporal operators exist for
all accessibility relations. There are many
which

△x

△x ,

but only one

F.

Indeed, it is controversial

(if any) is the real future operator, and perhaps even more controversial which

△x

should be the real future operator.
For the sake of illustration, the following will not do as a denition of a generalized

(8.25)

6 Recall

implausible!

temporal operator:6

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
1
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
νm (△x φ) = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
0
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩

i for every path
is such that

mRx m′

i for some path
is such that

Px

Px

mRx m′

on

Rx

and
on

m,

some

m′

on

Px

m,

some

m′

on

Px

νm′ (φ) = 1

Rx

and

starting at

starting at

νm′ (φ) = 0

that a path is just a linearly ordered set of nodes (which may contain repeats). Paths may be
converted into a set of edges. For this project (in which only transitive relations are used), it suffices that if
m′ occurs later on a path P than m, then the edge ⟨m, m′ ⟩ is on P . P is said to be on a relation R just in
case every edge in P is in R. A node is on a path iff the node is a vertex of one of the path’s edges.
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3 A↦0

2 A↦1
▵ ↦1
1 ▵A
A↦0
Figure 8.1.1:

1

and

Counterexample to a bad denition of

ν1 (△A) = 0

ν

ν1 (△A) =

ν may be partial.

(8.25), however, yields truth glutscircumstances

maps some proposition to both 1 and 0 for a given moment. Consider a model

with moments

m1 , m2 ,

truth function

ν

ν1 (△A) = 0.
△

. In the model illustrated,

under the implausible denition (8.25).

Truth gaps are allowed since
in which

will

and

such that

m3 ;

accessibility relation

ν2 (A) = 1

and

R

ν3 (A) = 0.

such that

m1 Rm2

m2 Rm3 ;

and

ν1 (△A) = 1

and

and

The result is that

This model is depicted in Figure 8.1.1. Some other denitions for non-metric

are similarly problematic.
A time parameter may be built into the truth function

ν

to avoid inconsistency, but

that will not be done here.7 One way to characterize the issue is that non-metric temporal
operators do not provide ways of specifying how far in the past or future a given event will
occur. Metric temporal operators can represent specic temporal dierences. For instance,

two days from now, there will be a sea battle

and

ve minutes ago, Jones ate a sandwich

.

Such statements specify a dierence in time between the current node and a set of target
nodes above (future) or below (past) the current node.
Some non-metric temporal operators may be obnoxious, but generic

-inevitably

operators

avoid truth gluts. It will later be important to distinguish between temporal operators and
their
and

-inevitably

◽
▽

counterparts.

are used for (generic)

later be dened using
Let
paths

7 An

◽
△

and

will-inevitably

and

on

Rx

and

was

, respectively.

, respectively.

△

and

▽

◽
△
will

◽ .
▽

m be a moment, φ a proposition, and Rx

Px

will
was-inevitably

△ and ▽ are used for (generic)

be an accessibility relation. In what follows,

are assumed to be simple and forwards-maximal. A simple path does not

example in which a time parameter is build into the truth function is given in [Øhrstrøm(2009)],
p. 29. Note that the truth function takes both a time parameter and a chronicle (TRL) parameter.
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contain cycles (repeat nodes). A forwards-maximal path continues unless it reaches a node

m

such that there is no

(8.26)

(8.27)

m′

for which

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
1
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
◽
νm (△x φ) = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
0
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩

mRx m′ .

i for every path
is such that

on

Rx

starting at

m,

some

m′

on

Px

Rx

starting at

m,

every

m′

on

Px

νm′ (φ) = 1

i for some path
is such that

Px

Px

on

νm′ (φ) = 0

◽ x ∶= △
◽ −x
▽

Under this denition,

◽ x φ) = 1
νm (△

moment is represented on
undened when

Rx

Rx ,

if

Rx

does not contain or terminates at

it might be desirable to specify that

does not contain or terminates at

m.

m.

If not every

◽ x φ)
νm (△

is false or

Troublesome scenarios are not a

problem in this analysis. The situation only crops up for AbsTF, discussed in Section 8.2.2.
It can be shown that:

(8.28) consistent:

◽ x φ, △
◽ x ¬φ}
{△

(8.28) is to be expected since the operator
(8.28), let
that

m1 , m2 , and m3

◽
△

is non-metric. As an example demonstrating

be nodes in a model such that

◽ A) = ν1 (△
◽ ¬A) = 1.
ν1 (△

ν2 (A) = 1 and ν3 (A) = 0.

It follows

See Figure 8.1.2 (a).

Additionally,

(8.29)

◽ xφ 
◽ x ¬φ
∣≈ △
¬△

◽ xφ ∨ △
◽ x ¬φ
∣≈ △
(8.30) 

Here is a model illustrating the invalidities given in (8.29) and (8.30).

m3

be moments;

R

function such that
So

an accessibility relation such that

ν2 (A) = 1

◽ A∨△
◽ ¬A) = 0.
ν1 (△

while

m1 Rm2

◽ A) = 1
ν3 (A) = 0. ν1 (¬△

and

but

This model is shown in Figure 8.1.2 (b).

Let

m1 Rm3 ;

m1 , m2 ,

and

ν

and

a truth

◽ A) = ν1 (△
◽ ¬A) = 0.
ν1 (△
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3 A↦0

2 A↦1
△
▫A↦1
1 △
▫ ¬A ↦ 1
(a)
Figure 8.1.2:

A↦1
2

A↦0
3

1
¬△
▫A↦1
△
▫ ¬A ↦ 0
△
▫ A↦0
△
▫ A∨¬ △
▫A↦0
(b)

Models demonstrating facts about generalized

will-inevitably

. (a) shows that

◽ A and △
◽ ¬A are consistent. (b) shows that △
◽ does not commute with ¬ and that S-FLEM
△
◽ .
does not generally hold for △

It is good that (8.29) and (8.30) do not hold.

MMBT needs to be able to represent

various forms of OF as well as TF and Sup. Without (8.29) and (8.30), MMBT could not
accommodate OF.
Although S-FLEM is invalid,

◽
△

is dened so that LEM, M-FLEM, and W-FLEM are

valid for this operator. That is:

(8.31)

⊧ φ ∨ ¬φ

(8.32)

◽ x φ ∨ ¬△
◽ xφ
⊧△

(8.33)

◽ x (φ ∨ ¬φ)
⊧△

◽ , M-FLEM and W-FLEM follow from LEM. There are a few reasons
Given the denition of △
why LEM is valid.

First, all of the operators dened so far are such that the criteria for

truth and falsity are mutually exclusive. So the only way to obtain a truth glut is from a
truth glut. (A truth glut would entail an instance of

φ ∧ ¬φ,

entailing an instance of

φ ∨ ¬φ

mapping to 0, in which case LEM would be invalid based on the denition of invalidity given
in Section 8.1.1.) Second, it was stipulated that

ν

is dened for all atoms. Third, the truth

conditions for the current set of operators ensure that

ν

only yields truth gaps from truth

gaps. The rst fact is enough to for LEM to be semi-valid (given that

ν

is a function). The

three facts combined yield that LEM is valid, not just semi-valid.
LEM, M-FLEM and W-FLEM are merely semi-valid in NBivOF. Semi-validity comes
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with the introduction of operators that are consistent, but allow for truth gaps even if
is dened for all of their sub-propositions.

ν

Past and future operators will be dened for

NBivOF so as to yield gaps when future contingents are involved.

These truth gaps will

propagate to M-FLEM and W-FLEM, and thus LEM.
Generic

will-inevitably

and

was-inevitably

dened so far, and they will remain as such.

inevitably

and

was-inevitably

are the only non-metric temporal operators
One might dene

will

and

was

with

will-

, respectively. (Doing so does not hurt TF in any way.) Metric

operators will be considered shortly. For now, the important point is that there are some nonmetric temporal operators. Consider just non-metric versions of
and

◽
▽ ∶= ▽

and

▽;

for the sake of discussion until specic views are implemented.

Two other common temporal operators are

the case that

△

, while

generalize to

◻x

H

and

corresponds to

◻−x ,

G

and

H. G

represents the

it has always been the case that

letting

◽
△ ∶= △

it will always be

. In MMBT,

G

and

H

respectively.

Non-metric temporal operators as given here are too weak to adequately represent temporal language. It seems outright absurd that

(8.34) Jones will drink coee and she will not.

(8.34) is an instance of (8.28). Figure 8.1.2 (a) provides a model illustrating (8.34) provided
that

A ∶=

Jones drinks coee

.

The fact that non-metric operators leave time underspecied does not accord with standard English usage. English speakers typically assume that the conjuncts of (8.34) are about
the same time, and surely Jones cannot both drink coee and not drink coee at once. Nonmetric temporal operators do not specify when they about. Perhaps Jones will drink coee
tomorrow and not two days hence.
In English, one can typically rely on conversational implicature to indicate that the disjuncts of M-FLEM and S-FLEM are about the same time.8 Conversational implicature does
not clarify the formal representations of English sentences, so those formal representations

8 See

Section 3.2.
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would require explicit qualication on every use. To skirt that annoyance, metric operators
will be used to represent English sentences. Metric operators make it convenient to show
when the disjuncts of M-FLEM and S-FLEM are about the same time and when those disjuncts are about dierent times. Note that the analyses in the rest of this chapter do not
hinge on the absence of non-metric operators. One is free to use non-metric operators as
long as it is understood how they do (and do not) correspond to English correlates.
Non-metric operators need only a relation between nodes.

Metric operators require a

system of measurement. As such, metric operators do not make sense for relations without a
metric. ATC and TRL accessibilities are both constrained by the temporal metric, given that
times are isomorphic to the continuum. The subscript
accessibility relation with a metric,

Rµ .

P (t),

is used to designate an arbitrary

Distance in metric operations is designated by

superscripts (with positive values), such as
and

µ

△tµ

and

▽tµ ,

corresponding to the Priorian

F (t)

respectively.

Metric temporal operators can be dened using their non-metric correlates together
with timestamps.

is date/time x

Timestamps are special atoms representing propositions of the form

. The timestamp

σx

is true at

m

if and only if

x = τm .

It

One can think of a

timestamp as a statement giving a very specic report of the date/time on a calendar/clock.
To dene metric temporal operators using timestamps, the idea is to explicate proposi-

Jones will drink coee tomorrow It will be the case that Jones drink coee and it
is date/time x
x
τ
x = τ +1
it is x-o'clock

tions like

as

. Here,

a day; so

is whatever time it is when the original sentence is uttered,

day in the example. More generally,

m

using timestamps as something like

(8.35)

στm ±t .

For

m , plus

can be represented

t ∈ R+ ,

◽ φ) ∶= νm (△
◽ µ (φ ∧ στ +t ))
νm (△
µ
m
t

As desired,

(8.36)

The operators

◽ φ=▽
◽ µ (φ ∧ στ −t )
▽
µ
m
t

◽
△
µ
t

and

◽
▽
µ
t

are suitable for

will

and

was

for each of the systems considered
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here (although some modication is necessary in the case of NBivOF).

(8.37)

◽
△tµ ∶= △
µ

(8.38)

◽
▽tµ φ ∶= ▽
µ

t

t

Like their non-metric correlates, W-FLEM and M-FLEM are valid for metric operators,
while S-FLEM and

will/not

commutativity are invalid.

It may appear suspicious to associate

will

and

was

with their

-inevitably

counterparts. So

far, MMBT is very general. Particular systems will be faithfully represented by specifying
additional information, such as about
explicated along ATC accessibility but

Rµ .

TF uses that tactic.

will/was

Will-/was-inevitably

are

are presented in terms of TRLs.

Time-specic necessity and possibility may be dened similarly.

(8.39)

◻tµ φ ∶= ◻µ (στm +t ⊃ φ)

(8.40)

◇tµ ∶= ¬ ◻tµ ¬

As expected,

(8.41)

◇tµ φ â⊧ ◇µ (φ ∧ στm +t ).

It is assumed that temporal operators in natural language should translate to metric operators in this system rather than non-metric operators. This rule ensures that (8.34) and
similar statements are false. Granted, it is not always clear what
may be more appropriate rather than particular times.

t

should be and intervals

Regarding the over-specicity of

metric operators, one might consider examples like

(8.42) Jones will have coee tomorrow,

noting that it does not matter exactly when Jones has coee. The statement turns out true
as long as Jones has coee

sometime

tomorrow. To address this issue, one could specify a

range of times in which Jones' coee drinking or lack thereof determine the truth value of the
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statement. In the case of the example, the interval would span tomorrow. The complication
is unnecessary for this project, however, and nothing important to this analysis hinges on the
simplifying move to use specic times rather than intervals. Furthermore, a context function
may be used to specify the value of

t,

detail. It is henceforth assumed that

although this presentation does not go into so much

t

is given by context. The system may of course be

expanded to more directly account for intervals as well as operators like

Rµ

Suppose that

(8.43)

since

and

until

.

is transitive. A result that was important in preceding chapters is:9

t
t
◽
△
µ = ◻µ = ¬ ◇µ ¬
t

(8.43) requires that both operators pertain to the same accessibility relation. One cannot
equate

◽
△
TRL
t

to either

◻tATC

or

t
t
◽
¬ ◇tATC ¬. △
TRL = ◻TRL = ¬ ◇TRL ¬,
t

but

◻tTRL

and

◇tTRL

have nothing to do with contingency unless the TRL is relevantly modal, not just formally
modal. Recall that permissibility is an example of a formally modal relation that does not
impose on contingency.

8.2

Particular Branching Time Systems

This section briey outlines specic traditional branching time logics using MMBT. Recall that MMBT has the usual sentential connectives, plus generalized modal and temporal
operators of both the non-metric and metric varieties. The modal operators are
The temporal operators are

◽
△

and

◽ .
▽

The dierences in these logics pertain to

will/was

△/▽

◇.

△/▽.

Only

are given for the reasons discussed in Section 8.1.3. In transitioning

from natural language, it is assumed that a temporal dierence,
or implicitly.

9 See

and

(△/▽). As such, the strategy used to

develop particular traditional systems from MMBT is to provide denitions for
metric versions of

◻

especially Section 6.4.1.

t ∈ R+ , is specied explicitly
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8.2.1 Bivalent Open Futurism
BivOF is characterized by making the following stipulations:

(8.44)

Will

is represented by

(8.45) A proposition

φ's

◽
△
AT C ;
t

that is,

◽
△t ∶= △
ATC .
t

future contingency is represented by

◇tAT C φ ∧ ◇tAT C ¬φ.

For readability, modications on temporal/modal operators are left out for the remainder of
this section. Metric operators are used although time is not written. The relation is
otherwise noted and it is assumed that there is a specic
Since

<

t ∈ R+

< unless

given by context.

is transitive, (8.43) entails:

(8.46)

△φ â⊧ ◻φ â⊧ ¬ ◇ ¬φ.

As such,

(8.47)

△φ ∨ △¬φ â⊧ ◻φ ∨ ◻¬φ.

That is, S-FLEM amounts to ATC-fatalism. Whatever will be is necessary under BivOF.
ArgLF is valid. It readily follows that:

(8.48)

◇φ ∧ ◇¬φ â⊧ ¬(△φ ∨ △¬φ)

That is, when and only when

φ

is future-contingent, corresponding instances of S-FLEM

fail.

8.2.2 Absolute True Futurism
AbsTF requires a single TRL, which may be interpreted as something like an actual

timeline. The TRL is represented by an accessibility relation,

TRL ⊆<

such that

TRL

is a

maximal chain10 . AbsTF is specied by:11

10 Recall

that a chain is a totally ordered subset of a partial ordering and that a maximal chain is not a
proper subset of another chain. The TRL is a linear portion of an ATC tree.
11 See also [Øhrstrøm(1983), Malpass and Wawer(2012)] for formal accounts of AbsTF.
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(8.49)

(8.50)

Will
Will-inevitably

(8.51) A proposition
For clarity,

t

◽
△
TRL ;
t

is represented by

that is,

is represented by

φ's

◽
△t ∶= △
TRL .
t

◽
△
AT C .
t

future-contingency is represented by

is left out for the remainder of this section.

◇tAT C φ ∧ ◇tAT C ¬φ.

The subscripts

TRL

and

AT C

remain because both relations are important and they have dierent characteristics.
The linearity of the TRL grants

will/not

S-FLEM also holds in those cases. If
(8.52)

νm (△¬φ) = νm (¬ △ φ)

(8.53)

νm (△φ ∨ △¬φ) = 1

m

is on

commutativity for moments on the TRL, and

TRL

, then

With respect to a given accessibility relation, S-FLEM is still contrary to merely formal
contingency. So the following hold.
(8.54)

◽ TRL φ ∨ △
◽ TRL ¬φ â⊧ ¬(◇TRL φ ∧ ◇TRL ¬φ)
△

(8.55)

◽ AT C φ ∨ △
◽ AT C ¬φ â⊧ ¬(◇AT C φ ∧ ◇AT C ¬φ)
△

For TF,

<

is relevant to genuine future contingency, not

contingents entails that

<

is non-linear, unlike

TRL

.

TRL

.

The presence of future-

By distinguishing the relations used

to account for future-contingency, on the one hand, and the future operator, on the other
hand; TF maintains
contingency.
In AbsTF,
of the TRL. If
which uses

will/not

Will/not
m

commutativity and S-FLEM without interfering with future

commutativity and S-FLEM and do not function properly outside

is not on the TRL, then

< and not

TRL

◽ TRL φ
△

is vacuously true even if

-path in (8.26) is satised vacuously. Since

are always true.

,

-paths

◽ TRL φ turns out true because for every
△

◽ TRL φ is true for all φ, S-FLEM instances
△

In fact, both disjuncts of S-FLEM instances are true.

outside of the TRL,

will-inevitably
TRL

, is false. That vacuity stems from the fact there are no

for counterfactual moments under AbsTF. As such,

TRL

φ

For moments

m
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(8.56)

νm (△φ) = νm (△¬φ) = 1

(8.57)

νm (¬ △ φ) = 0 ≠ νm (△¬φ)

For instance,

(8.58)

(8.59)

Jones will have coee Jones will not have coee
∴ It's false that Jones will have coee
Jones will not have coee
and

are both true.

is false while

is true.

Additionally, since

(8.60)

That is,

△φ

△φ

always holds o of the TRL, even if

◽ AT C ¬φ
△

is true,

∣≈ ◇AT C φ
△φ 

might be true even when

for AbsTF. One could easily redene

φ

is impossible. There is no way to x this problem

◽ TRL
△

so that

△φ

is always false (by stipulating that

there is a path from the moment at which truth is assigned), in which case S-FLEM would
always be false o of the TRL and

will/not

commutativity would still fail. Other options

for AbsTF, none of which are appealing, are discussed in Section 6.3.2.

8.2.3 Indexical True Futurism
In IdxTF, every moment
sibility relation, denoted
a (total) function
relations,

(8.61)

(8.62)

TRL(m)

m or

, whatever is most convenient. One can include

in the denition of a model instead of many accessibility

. The function

TRL

is subject to the following constraints:12

m is a maximal chain for all

m

(8.63) If

12 See

TRL

has a TRLm . Each TRLm can be represented by an acces-

TRL ∶ M Ð→ R

TRL ∈ R
TRL
m

m

is on

TRL

m ∈ M.

m.

m <AT C m′

and

m′

is on

TRL

m , then

TRL = TRL
m

m′ .

also [Øhrstrøm(2009)], pp. 27–29; and [Braüner et al.(2000)Braüner, Hasle, and Øhrstrøm] for expositions.
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Given this notion of

TRL

m , traditional IdxTF may be characterized by the following:

(8.64) When evaluated at moment

will

m,

is represented by

◽
△
TRLm ;
t

that is,

△t ∶=

◽
△
TRLm .
t

(8.65)

Will-inevitably

(8.66) A proposition

is represented by

φ's

◽
△
AT C .
t

future-contingency is represented by

Again, metric operators are used although

t

◇tAT C φ ∧ ◇tAT C ¬φ.

is left out for readability.

The notation also

hides the moment-dependence of the future operator, clarifying some formulas.
IdxTF has all of the characteristics of AbsTF without the problems outside of the TRL.

Both

will/not

commutativity and S-FLEM are generally valid:

(8.67)

△¬φ â⊧ ¬ △ φ

(8.68)

⊧ △¬φ ≡ ¬ △ φ

(8.69)

⊧ △φ ∨ △¬φ

IdxTF is therefore able to handle propositions about the future uniformly, even at relatively

counterfactual moments, unlike AbsTF.

8.2.4 Supervaluationism
Sup can be developed by building o of IdxTF. The technique used here is similar to

the one used by Thomason.13 Dene:

(8.70)

TRLm ∶=

the set of all possible

TRL

m (meeting the criteria of

TRL

m for

IdxTF).

There is a possible

TRL

m for each

<-path from m.

There is a dierent IdxTF model for each

possible TRL structure. These models only dier in TRL structure and, correspondingly,

13 [Thomason(1970)],

esp. p. 274

ν.
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The models are identical in other respects. One can dene a Sup truth function

nu

N

(capital

) as follows.14

(8.71)

Nm (φ) = 1

if and only if for all

and only if for all

TRL

m

TRL

m

∈ TRLm , νm (φ) = 1;

and

Nm (φ) = 0

if

∈ TRLm , νm (φ) = 0.

This rendition of Sup has all of the same tenets as IdxTF except that

N

is used instead of

ν.
(8.72) When evaluated at moment

m,

will

is represented by

◽
△
TRLm ;
t

that is,

△t ∶=

◽
△
TRLm .
t

(8.73)

Will-inevitably

(8.74) A proposition

(8.75)

N

is represented by

φ's

◽
△
AT C .
t

future contingency is represented by

is the primary evaluation function, not

truth value of a proposition, look to

N

ν.

◇tAT C φ ∧ ◇tAT C ¬φ.

(That is, if one wants to know the

instead of

ν. ν

is just an intermediate

step.)

Sup has all validities that hold in IdxTF. If a proposition is valid in IdxTF, then it is true

at all moments under all possible TRL assignments. As such,
valid, too. It can be shown that LEM, W-FLEM, M-FLEM,

N

renders these propositions

will-not

commutativity, and

S-FLEM are valid.
Bivalence, however, fails.

Suppose that Jones' might and might not drink coee to-

morrow. Then there are two possible TRLs, one by which she will drink coee tomorrow
(△1 day C ) and one by which she will not (△1 day ¬C ). It is neither true under all possible TRL
assignments that
neither

14 It

△1 day C

△1 day C

nor

nor that in all possible TRL assignments that

△1 day ¬C

is true by

△1 day ¬C .

Thus,

N.

is not necessary to define a new truth function. One could also modify the truth conditions for each
connective and operator to account for all possible arbitrary assignments—in this case, all possible TRL
mappings. Revising all of the truth conditions would be cumbersome. It is easier for this purpose to just
define a new truth function so as to build off of what has already been established.
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8.2.5 Non-Bivalent Open Futurism
OF does not represent temporal operators using a fundamentally dierent relation than

ATC accessibility, like the TRL. As such, OF must employ other mechanisms to bring out
any dierences between

will

dening temporal operators

(8.76)

(8.77)

and

△

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪1
νm (△x φ) = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
0
⎪
⎩

will-inevitably

and

▽

.

One technique serving this end involves

for which bivalence fails:

i

◽ x φ) = 1
νm (△

i

◽ x ¬φ) = 1
νm (△

and

◽ x φ) ≠ 1
νm (△

▽x ∶= △−x

Equipped with (8.76) and (8.77), a NBivOF system is captured by the following.

(8.78) The truth function,

(8.79)

(8.80)

Will
Will-inevitably

ν,

is represented by

(8.81) A proposition

maps each atom to 1 or 0.

△tAT C .

is represented by

φ's

◽
△
AT C .
t

future contingency is represented by

◇tAT C φ ∧ ◇tAT C ¬φ.

As usual, subscripts and superscripts are left out for the remainder of this section, unless
such notation is necessary for clarication.
It can be shown that LEM and is valid for propositions not involving

△.15

In general,

however, LEM is just semi-valid in NBivOF.
(8.82) ∣≈

φ ∨ ¬φ

LEM instances are not true when and only when future contingents are involved. For example, suppose it is contingent that Jones will drink coee tomorrow (△1 day C ). She turns
out to drink coee on some ATC-path from today, and she does not drink coee on another

the general case where △ and ▽ pertain to other metric accessibility relations, LEM and bivalence may
fail for propositions that have △ or ▽. The properties of RAT C —most importantly, backwards linearity—
ensure that LEM and bivalence hold when only ▽ is involved.
15 In
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ATC-path from today. Thus, she does not turn out to drink coee on all ATC-paths from
today, so

νtoday (△1 day C) ≠ 1;

from today, so

nor does she turn out to not drink coee on all ATC-paths

νtoday (△1 day C) ≠ 0.

The statements

△1 day C

indeterminate that Jones will drink coee. Additionally,
the corresponding instance of M-FLEM,

has no truth value, just as it is

¬ △1 day C

△1 day C ∨ ¬ △1 day C ,

has no truth value. So

has no truth value. Hence,

M-FLEM is only semi-valid.
(8.83) ∣≈

△φ∨¬△φ

Instances of M-FLEM are instances of LEM, showing why LEM is also only semivalid. Just
as LEM and M-FLEM are merely semi-valid, W-FLEM is also only semi-valid.
(8.84) ∣≈

△ (φ ∨ ¬φ)

W-FLEM is not valid since

νm (△(φ ∨ ¬φ))

is undened if

requisite points. That situation only occurs when
truth cannot be evaluated. For instance,

¬ △1 day C ,

then

νyesterday (△1 day (φ ∨ ¬φ))

Familiar results involving

0

φ

νtoday (△1 day (C ∨ ¬C)) = 1,

but if

φ ∶= △1 day C ∨

is undened.

will-inevitably
ν
will-inevitably

is taken as the accessibility relation,

1 day

◽
today (△

still hold.

future contingents enter the scene.

<

cannot be evaluated at the

involves some future operator for which

in the preceding scenario. In NBivOF,

When

φ

will-not

and

will

1 day

◽
C) = νtoday (△

¬C) =

dier in truth value when

commutativity is valid.16 In other

words,
(8.85)

¬ △ φ â⊧ △¬φ,

although the following is only semi-valid:
(8.86) ∣≈
since

≡

¬ △ φ ≡ △¬φ

is not assigned a truth value if its relata are not assigned truth values. (This result

could be changed by altering the truth conditions of

≡

so that it turns out true when both

relata are indeterminate.)

16 It

is important that the accessibility relation does not have dead ends.
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Just as bivalence fails in cases of future contingency, neither S-FLEM and M-FLEM are
not valid. In the example of Jones and her coee mentioned above, both

△1 day ¬C)

and

νtoday (△1 day C ∨ ¬ △1 day C),

are undened. Since

will/not

νtoday (△1 day C ∨

commutativity is

valid, corresponding instances of S-FLEM and M-FLEM are logically equivalent.

(8.87)

⊭ △φ ∨ △¬φ

although ∣≈

(8.88)

⊭ △φ ∨ ¬ △ φ

although ∣≈

△ φ ∨ △¬φ
△φ∨¬△φ

Given that S-FLEM and M-FLEM are equivalent, that an instance of S-FLEM is outright
false entails that a corresponding instance of M-FLEM is false. M-FLEM is a special case
of LEM. So if an instance of S-FLEM were false, an instance of LEM would be false, and
that is undesirable. Thus, S-FLEM/M-FLEM should not be invalid, but at least semi-valid.
NBivOF achieves this result.

8.3

Temporal Standpoints and Standpoint Inheritance

Standpoint inheritance is incorporated into MMBT in this section.

Section 8.3.1 re-

hearses the importance of standpoint inheritance. More in-depth coverage is given in Sections 3.4, 6.3.3, and 7.3.2. Section 8.3.2 describes a general theory of standpoint inheritance
for MMBT that can be used for TF and OF alike. The general theory shows that standpoint inheritance is not tailored to a particular view, but to branching time systems more
broadly. More details about standpoint inheritance for TF and OF are given in Sections 8.3.3
and 8.3.4, respectively. Finally, Section 8.3.5 delivers the promised result that traditional
Sup can be dened using BivOF with temporal standpoints, eliminating Sup's apparent

dependence on a TRL.
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8.3.1 The Importance of Temporal Standpoints
All of the theories presented so far have encountered diculties with combinations of
temporal operators.

Suppose, for instance, that Jones drank coee yesterday, but could

have done otherwise.

(8.89) If Jones had not drunk coee, then God would have known that Jones would
not drink coee.

(8.90) If Jones had not drunk coee, then it would have been the case that Jones
would not drink coee.

Since God knows only truths, (8.89) implies (8.90).
These statements should turn out true on an Ockhamist account.17 Ockhamists in the
freedom/foreknowledge literature, however, never managed to propose a convincing explication of the hard/soft fact distinction.18 Meanwhile, advocates of TF have yet to answer
Belnap and Green's criticism that statements like (8.90) and hence (8.89) turn out false
under TF.19
OF and Sup do not as obviously get the wrong answer for (8.89) and (8.90).

BivOF

yields that (8.89) and (8.90) are both false due to the contingency of Jones action, while
NBivOF and Sup yield that (8.89) and (8.90) have no truth value. One could argue that

this is the correct response, according to those views; but perhaps OF and Sup would only
satisfy their compatriots. Consider, for example, a case in which Smith predicted that Jones
would drink coee. Given that Jones drank coee,

(8.91) Smith correctly asserted that Jones would drink coee

should turn out true. For that reason,

17 In

[Plantinga(1986)], p. 251, Plantinga indicates that Ockhamists hold such statements to be true.
Also, see Section 2.7
19 [Belnap and Green(1994)], p. 380.
See [Øhrstrøm(2009)] for a recent portrayal of Ockhamism.
Øhrstrøm’s TF system does not address Belnap and Green’s criticism. Belnap and Green’s criticism is
discussed in Section 6.3.3.
18 [Todd(2012)].
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(8.92) Jones was going to drink coee
seems true, as well. OF and Sup need to account for these statements.20
Reichenbach distinguished between three kinds of nodes relevant to evaluating statements.21

First is the moment at which a temporal statement is assigned a truth value

(Reichenbach's

S ).

Second is the moment at which the proposition aected by a temporal

operator is evaluated (Reichenbach's

E ).

Potential moments of evaluation from

spect to a given accessibility relation) are those moments accessible from
of reference (Reichenbach's

R)

m.

m

(with re-

Third is a point

that may dier from the other two moments.22 The systems

proposed thus far only explicitly account for moments of the rst two types. The third, here
called temporal standpoints (following Lucas), can aect factors like accessibility relations.
For instance,

(8.93) From yesterday's standpoint, Jones may and may not drink coee.

(8.94) From today's standpoint (one in which Jones drank coee), that Jones drank
coee is now unalterablenecessary

per accidens

.

(8.95) From a counterfactual-today standpoint (one in which Jones did not drink
coee), that Jones did not drink coee is now unalterable.

Standpoints aect the structure of moment-specic accessibility relations. A moment-relative
temporal accessibility relation is already available for IdxTF. Such relations might also be
utilized for Sup. OF still needs a moment-specic temporal relation. Since ATC accessibility
serves as the temporal relation in OF, ATC trees must be divided into node-specic parts.
A simplied technique is here used to account for temporal standpoints:

standpoint

inheritance. The details of standpoint inheritance in general and for TF and OF in particular
systems are provided in the following sections.

20 The

issue is given in slightly more detail in Section 7.3.2.

21 [Reichenbach(1947)]
22 See

Section 3.4 for more on Reichenbach’s analysis.
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8.3.2 A General Theory of Standpoint Inheritance
This section gives a general of standpoint inheritance. Specic examples are reserved for
later sections in where there are particular temporal relations to work with.
First, some denitions are in order to clarify talk of standpoints. In terms of the systems
given here, Reichenbach's

S , R,

truth-assessment point
standpoint

a moment

s

and

E

a moment

are designated as follows.

m

at which

a moment

accessibility relation
respect to moment

is being assessed

used to designate moment-specic accessibility relations; or the

moment-specic relation designated by

evaluation point

νm (φ)

R

m

m′

s

is an evaluation point with respect to moment

just in case

mRm′ ;

a moment

and modal/temporal operator

m′

◯R

m

and

is an evaluation point with

if and only if

mRm′

Additional denitions pertaining to standpoints:

standpoint relation

a relation or type of relation,

cessibility relations

Ss .

relative counterfactual
point

s

i

m

designating standpoint-specic ac-

It is assumed that there is only one standpoint relation.

a moment

is not on

S,

m

is relatively counterfactual with respect to stand-

Ss

Some operators appear to handle standpoints dierently than others. The following term
helps to dierentiate between two types of operators.

standpoint-sensitive operator

an operator that uses the standpoint relation to determine

points of evaluation

23

With those terms in mind, a general theory of standpoint inheritance may be stated informally as follows.
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(8.96) Some operators are standpoint-sensitive while others are not.

(8.97) One should only change standpoint when the point of evaluation is counterfactual with respect to the standpoint.

Implementing this theory in more detail requires a mechanism to keep track of standpoints.
To this end, a standpoint parameter may be added to the truth function. For proposition

m

and moments

(8.98)

and

νm∣s (φ)
given

φ

s,
may be read as the truth of

φ

at

m

from

s

or the truth of

φ

at

m

s.

It is assumed that the truth function is total with respect to atomic propositions:

(8.99) For all

m, s ∈ M

and atom

A, νm∣s (A) ∈ {0, 1}.

Standpoints are unnecessary for evaluating atomic propositions:

(8.100) For all

m, s ∈ M

and atoms

A, νm∣s (A) = νm∣m (A).

Truth-functional operators require no substantial modication:

(8.101)

(8.102)

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪1
νm∣s (¬φ) = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
0
⎪
⎩

i

νm∣s (φ) = 0

i

νm∣s (φ) = 1

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪1
νm∣s (φ ∧ ψ) = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
0
⎪
⎩

i

νm∣s (φ) = νm∣s (ψ) = 1

i

νm∣s (φ) = 0

or

νm∣s (ψ) = 0

The other truth-functional operators can be dened in terms of

¬

and

∧,

as usual.

To assess modal and temporal operators, standpoint inheritance uses a standpoint relation, which is a moment-specic accessibility relation. IdxTF is equipped with a suitable
type of relation for standpoint-sensitive temporal operators, the type
are specic relations
notation

TRL

TRL TRL
m.

TRL

, for which there

is a function from moments to maximal chains.

s is used to indicate that

s

is a standpoint.

individuating standpoint-specic relations from any relation

The

A more general technique for

S

is as follows:
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(8.103)

Ss ∶= ⋃{P ∣P

is an

S -path

containing

s}

One specic instance of this technique will be important for this project. Standpoint-specic

<,

subtrees of

(8.104)

ATC accessibility, can be dened as:

<s ∶= ⋃{P ∣P

is a

< -path

containing

s}

The idea to create subtrees is not new. Lucas, for example, has employed subtrees.24 Intuitively, the subtree

<s

<s

is the portion of

< that contains all paths to and from s.

are important for both OF and TF. OF uses

to ensure that

will-inevitably

and

was-inevitably

<s

The subtrees

as the temporal relation. TF requires

<s

pass on the correct standpoint.

All of the systems employed use only temporal standpoints. There are no other types of
standpoints. The temporal relation
specic

TRL

Ss (

s for TF and

S

(

TRL

for TF and

< for OF) designates the standpoint-

<s for OF). There is exactly one standpoint relation per system.

The theory presented here would require further generalization to accommodate multiple
kinds of standpoints.
Some operators are standpoint-sensitive. For this purpose, the only standpoint-sensitive

will was will-always

operators are temporal operators representing

,

two operators required to dene all others are
those operators may be dened as follows. Let

◻

S

and

,

◽ .
△

, and

was-always

Standpoint sensitive versions of

be the standpoint relation and assume that

paths are simple and forwards-maximal.

Standpoint-sensitive operators:

(8.105)

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪1
νm∣s (◻S φ) = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
0
⎪
⎩

24 [Lucas(1989)]

. The

i for every

m′ ∈ M

such that

mSs m′ , νm′ ∣s (φ) = 1

i for some

m′ ∈ M

such that

mSs m′ , νm′ ∣s (φ) = 0
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(8.106)

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
1
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
◽
νm∣s (△S φ) = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
0
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩

Ps

i for every path
some

m′ ≠ m

such that

i for some path
on

Ps

on

Ps

is such that

on

Ss

starting at

m, Ps

contains

νm′ ∣s (φ) = 1
Ss

starting at

m,

every

m′ ≠ m

νm′ ∣s (φ) = 0
m1 ,

Consider an example. An illustration is given in Figure 8.3.1. There are three nodes,

m2 ,

m3

and

and a relation

S,

m1 Sm2

where

Particular standpoint-specic subsets of

S -paths

containing

mi .

That yields

since only that path contains

m1 S3 m3 .

In this model,

m1 Sm3 . S

is the standpoint relation.

are derived using (8.103), by which the

S1 = S

m2 . S2

ν2∣2 (A) = 1

S

and

since both elements of

S

involve

Si

are

m1 . m1 S2 m2

is depicted in Figure 8.3.1 (b). For the same reasons,

and

ν3∣3 (A) = 0.

This simple abstract example is more like OF than TF. Examples directly relevant to
TF and OF are given in later sections.

Let

△

represent the standpoint-sensitive

S1 ,

relevant standpoint-specic relation is
path starting at
particular,

m1 .

ure 8.3.1 (b). Since

i

m2

m′ ≠ m1

shown in Figure 8.3.1 (a).

on that path (just

m3 )

ν1∣1 (△A) = 0.

m1 S1 m3

is such that

In this case, the standpoint-specic relation is

S2

amounts to just

m1 S2 m2 ,

The

is a maximal

νm′ ∣1 (A) = 1.

S2 ,

In

illustrated in Fig-

there is only one path backwards along

and that path contains only one node preceding

ν1∣2 (△A) = 1.

m2 , namely m1 .

So

ν1∣2 (△A) = 1

i

S2

from

m1

S2

ν2∣2 (▽ △ A) = 1

The operative standpoint-specic relation in this case is still

only one path forwards along
such,

It can be shown that

ν3∣1 (A) = ν3∣3 (A) = 0.

ν2∣2 (▽ △ A) = 1.

from

Every

◽ S.
△

S2 .

and the only other node on that path is

There is

m2 .

As

ν2∣2 (A) = 1.

Standpoint-sensitive operators are very much like the modal and temporal operators dened in Section 8.1.3. There are two important things to notice. The rst is that standpointsensitve operators use the standpoint-specic relations
tical to

m.

Ss ,

which

s

may or may not be iden-

The second is that standpoint-sensitive operators pass their standpoints to their
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A↦1
2

Figure 8.3.1:
relation

S

A↦0
3

A↦1
2

A↦0
3

1

1

(a)

(b)

A general model depicting standpoint inheritance. (a) illustrates the given

independently of standpoints, which in this case is the same as

S1 . S2

is shown

in (b).

sub-propositions. This fact ensures that statements like:
(8.107) Jones was going to have coee. (▽ △ C )

use the initial standpoint for both temporal operators. As such,

(8.108)

C ⊧▽△C

That is, whatever is was going to be. It can be shown more generally that whatever was, is,
or will be was going to be; and that whatever was, is, or will be was either going to be or
going to not be. (The latter principle is ExP-S-FLEM, discussed in Section 7.3.4.)

(8.109)

▽φ ∨ φ ∨ △φ ⊧ ▽ △ φ

(8.110)

▽φ ∨ φ ∨ △φ ⊧ ▽(△φ ∨ △¬φ)

It is crucial to dierentiate between standpoint-sensitive operators and other operators. This
may be done using notation or context.

Regarding notation,

since, in this exposition, little will be done with

will-always

used in their non-standpoint-sensitive, modal senses only.
by

△

and

▽,

◻

and

are not a problem

was-always
Will was
and

.

and

distinguishing them from the non-standpoint-sensitive

will/was-inevitably

◇

◻

and

◇

are

are represented

◽
△

and

◽
▽

used for

, respectively.

Non-standpoint-sensitive operators do not use standpoints to determine points of evaluation. It is tempting to dene non-standpoint-sensitive operators independently of standpoints, but this route yields some undesirable results. In particular:
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(8.111) Bad result from proposed denition: inequivalent:

The reason why the two statements are not equivalent is that

◽
▽

<

does not. The backwards-linearity of

▽ passes its standpoint on while

should yield that

By analogy, if physical determinism were to hold (that is,

◽ △ φ}
{▽ △ φ, ▽

▽

<

and

◽
▽

are interchangeable.

is linear), then whatever will

occur is inevitable. It is already granted that whatever is inevitable will occur, so

◽
△

would be equivalent if

<

were linear.

Thus,

▽

and

◽
▽

△

should be equivalent since

and

<

is

backwards-linear.25 To ensure this result, non-standpoint-sensitive operators must sometimes
pass on their standpoints.
Standpoints are only relevant to non-standpoint-sensitive operators because those operators pass standpoints on to sub-propositions that may be standpoint-sensitive.

Unlike

standpoint-sensitive operators, non-standpoint-sensitive operators are not limited by standpoints to designate nodes at which to perform evaluations. It is necessary to change standpoints in order to sensibly evaluate at a node that is unrelated to the standpoint by the
standpoint relation. For instance, the scenario depicted in Figure 6.3.1:

(8.112) Before Jones drank coee, it was the case that Jones will inevitably not have
a headache.

The initial standpoint is one in which Jones drank coee. The inner operator,

will-inevitably

,

has a point of evaluation at which Jones did not drink coee. That node is counterfactual
with respect to the initial standpoint.

To evaluate at the counterfactual node, one must

switch standpoints, asking what would have happened if Jones had not drunk coee.
The foundational non-standpoint-sensitive operators may be dened as follows.26 Let
be an accessibility relation such that
simple
and forwards-maximal.
25 Additionally,
the inequivalence of

Ss ⊆ R

for each moment

s.

R

Assume that paths are

◽ could be used to resuscitate Belnap and Green’s criticism
▽ and ▽
against IdxTF, discussed in Section 6.3.3, if not make the problem worse. The coin was-inevitably going to
come up heads would hold at the tails scenario although The coin was going to come up tails would also
hold.
26 The upcoming definitions presuppose transitivity.

224

Non-standpoint-sensitive operators:

(8.113)

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
1 i for every m′ ∈ M such that mRm′ ,
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
′
⎪
⎪
⎪ if mSs m , νm′ ∣s (φ) = 1; otherwise, νm′ ∣m′ (φ) = 1
νm∣s (◻R φ) = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
0 i for some m′ ∈ M such that mRm′ , either
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
(mSs m′ while νm′ ∣s (φ) = 0) or νm′ ∣m′ (φ) = 0
⎪
⎪
⎩

(8.114)

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
1
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
◽
νm∣s (△R φ) = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
0
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩

on

R

starting at

is on some

Ps

on

i for every path
on

P,

if

m′

i for some path

P,

if

Ss ,

m,

then

for some

m′ ≠ m

νm′ ∣s (φ) = 1;

νm′ ∣m′ (φ) = 1

otherwise,

on

P

m′

P

on

R

starting at

is on some path

Ps

on

m,

Ss ,

for every

then

m′ ≠ m

νm′ ∣s (φ) = 0;

νm′ ∣m′ (φ) = 0

otherwise,

The only dierence between the standpoint-sensitive and non-standpoint-sensitive operators
are those clauses involving

νm′ ∣m′

in the denitions for non-standpoint-sensitive operators.

Those operators' points of evaluations are not restricted by the standpoint to
evaluation not on

Ss

are deemed counterfactual with respect to

to the new point of evaluation,

s,

conditions for

m1 ,

so

▽

m′ .

◽ S.
△

worthwhile to check all

i

◽ A) = 0.
ν1∣2 (△

S -paths

◽ A) = 0,
ν2∣2 (▽△

In that model,

require checking nodes behind

◽ A) = 0
ν2∣2 (▽△

m2

along

S2 .

◽
△

as follows.

m2

m2 .

S2

is retained. It is necessary to check all

this simple example,

m2

is the only such

The truth

For the sake of illustrating the denitions, it is

(note that

Furthermore,

represent

There is only one such node,

S

is not standpoint-specic) from

m1

only the right path is needed. Consider the left path. The relevant evaluation is
the standpoint being

Points of

so the standpoint is reset

As an example, return to the model shown in Figure 8.3.1. For clarity, let
the non-standpoint sensitive

Ss .

although

◽ A),
ν1∣2 (△

includes the entire left path, so the standpoint

m′ ≠ m1

m′ ;

on the left path to see if

νm′ ∣2 (A) = 0.

In

but if there were others, the standpoint would
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still be

m2 .

using the right path that there is a path along
node on the right path,

S2 .

m3 ,

See Figure 8.3.1 (b).

switching standpoints to
thus,

m1 Sm3 .

The case is dierent along the right path. That path is
from

m1 by

which

is counterfactual with respect to

m3

Since

m′ ,

S

is not along

S2 ,

m2

◽ A) = 0.
ν1∣2 (△
because

m3

the truth conditions for

which in this case is just

It is shown

m3 . ν3∣3 (A) = 0,

so

The only

is not along

◽
△

demand

◽ A) = 0;
ν1∣2 (△

◽ A) = 0.
ν2∣2 (▽△

8.3.3 Standpoint Inheritance for True Futurism
Standpoint inheritance is here applied to (branching) IdxTF. The standpoint aects only
the temporal relation, which in this case is
amounts to

TRL

. As such, that

s

is taken as the standpoint

s being the operative temporal relation. One more bit of terminology needs

to be claried here. A node

TRL

TRL

m

is counterfactual with respect to

s

just in case

m

is not on

s.

The method of implementing standpoint inheritance for IdxTF is quite simple. Roughly,

(8.115) All and only standpoint-sensitive operators are those that use
those representing

will was will-always
,

,

, and

was-always

TRL

, namely,

.

(8.116) Only switch standpoints when the point of evaluation becomes counterfactual.

Observe that only operators that do not use the temporal relation are capable of accessing
relatively counterfactual nodes when the standpoint is held xed. Suppose the standpoint is
held at
to

s.

Any member of a consecutive string of temporal operatorsthose corresponding

will, was, will-always,

and

was-always
TRL

limitation is due to the fact that

only specify points of evaluation on

In symbols, those temporal operators are
and

◻−TRLs .

s . That

s is designated as the accessibility relation for those

operators, which is what holding the standpoint at

◻TRLs ,

TRL

s

amounts to.

◽ TRL , ▽TRL = ▽
◽ TRL
△TRLs = △
s
s
s

(i.e.

△−TRLs ),

◇TRLm = △TRLm

and

◇−TRLm =

Note that the TRL's linearity yields that

▽TRLm , so there is no need to account for those ◇ operators directly.

Only operators that use
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accessibility relations other than

TRL

nodes counterfactual with respect to

will-inevitably was-inevitably
▽ ◻ ◇ ◻ ◇ et cetera
,

◽ <,

<,

<,

s , the non-standpoint-sensitive operators, can access

, and various forms of

L,

L,

TRL
necessarily possibly

s, those moments not on

, and corresponding

◻

s . Such operators include

and

and

◇

. In symbols,

◽ <,
△

operators along inverse relations.

The mechanics of these operators are specic instances of the general analysis provided in
Section 8.3.2.
Standpoint inheritance avoids Belnap and Green's criticism, discussed in Sections 6.3.3
and 6.3.4. The criticism has not been addressed using traditional branching time logics, but
standpoint inheritance xes the issue. Without standpoint inheritance, TRLs at counterfactual nodes are hijacked, so to speak, by a dominant TRL somewhere in the past. Standpoint
inheritance blocks such hijacking by ensuring that the inner operator,
point of the outer

▽.

△,

retains the stand-

This technique corresponds to actual usage by avoiding standpoint

shifts as long as it makes sense to do so.
Standpoint inheritance yields:

(8.117) When anything is the case, it has always been the case that it will be the
case.27 (φ

⊧ ◻−TRL △ φ)

(8.118)

φ⊧▽△φ

(8.119)

φ ⊧ ▽t △t φ

for any

t>0

Without standpoint inheritance, (8.117)(8.119) do not hold in any of the systems here
(except AbsTF, which was seen to be decient).

Belnap and Green showed that IdxTF

gives the wrong answer for (8.118) and (8.119) at counterfactual nodes. More generally,

(8.120) consistent:

{φ, ▽ △ ¬φ}

(8.121) consistent:

{φ, ▽t △t ¬φ}

27 [Prior(1955)],

p. 210.
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heads
mh

tails
mt

TRL h
TRL p

TRL t
past
mp

Figure 8.3.2: Indexical true futurism: Coin toss revisited. The red TRL (heads) dominates
the blue TRL (tails), indicating that the actual timeline contains the heads moment, not the
tails moment.

hold for some

φ

and

t>0

at some nodes in any model that has future contingents.28 Stand-

point inheritance avoids this unwelcome result by satisfying (8.118) and (8.119).

Example TF1:
For the sake of illustration, recall Belnap and Green's coin toss example, illustrated in
Figure 8.3.2.
Let

mh , mt , and mp

be the heads moment, tails moment, and past moment, respectively;

TRL TRL TRL
TRL TRL
m
T ∶= The result is tails
and let

h,

t , and

t , but

t contains

p , as indicated in Figure 8.3.2. Dene

and

where

T

is equivalent to

(standpoints are irrelevant to literals like
Consider

νt∣t (▽ △ T ),

some moment
moment

m

m

m

mt

along

preceding

x = τt − τp .) νm∣t (△T ) = 1
contains a moment

28 In

and

m′

mt

¬H .

Assume

h

νh∣h (H) = 1 and νt∣t (T ) = 1

T ).

at/from

TRL

since for every (the only) path backwards along

TRL

along

t makes

TRL

νm∣t (△T ) = 1.

νm∣t (△T ) = 1.

t makes

(For the non-metric

For the the metric

νm∣t (△x T ) = 1.

mt )

such that

△,

△x ,

That moment is

because for every (the only) path forwards along

(namely,

p

The coin was going to come up tails

along that path is such that

preceding

one moment

H

the truth value of

νt∣t (▽ △ T ) = 1

the tails node.

TRL = TRL ≠
H ∶= The result is heads

p be the corresponding TRLs. Suppose that

TRL

t,

every

at least

mp

t from

for

m

νm′ ∣t (T ) = 1.

particular, the problem occurs at nodes that are not on a special TRL, which may be called the real
TRL. The real TRL is a unique TRLm such that if m′ < m, then TRLm′ = TRLm . Not all IdxTF models
have real TRL. There is such a TRL if and only if the ATC tree has a root node or a trunk; that is, the tree
has a least m or is linear behind some m. There are nodes that are not on the real TRL if and only if there
are future-contingents.
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Standpoint inheritance retains the following.

(8.122)

◽ φ
∣≈ ▽ △
φ

(8.123)

◽
▽=▽

Example TF2:
Here is an illustration of (8.122) using the coin example above. Consider

x = τh − τp .

◽ H)
νh∣h (▽x △
x

(Metric operators are used for convenience. Showing that the non-metric

false requires showing that

H

is false at

every

for

◽ H
△

is

node on some branch, which is an unnecessary

hassle for this example. There is no need to address what happens if the coin is tossed again
in an hour, for instance. One could achieve the same eect by ignoring all nodes except

mt ,

and

◽ H) = 0
mp .) νh∣h (▽x △
x

the time is

τh − x

is

mp

and

◽ H) = 0. νp∣h (△
◽ H) = 0
νp∣h (△

two nodes at which the time is
along

TRL

the atom

because the only node preceding

x

τp + x

x

forwards along

h so the standpoint is kept at

H ).

The relevant evaluation is

standpoint switches to

mt

H

<

from

mh

since

mp ,

TRL

along

◽
△

uses

namely,

<

mh

mh ,

h at which

and there are
and

mt . mh

is

(although it makes no dierence for evaluating

νh∣h (H) = 1. mt

and the relevant evaluation is

TRL

is not along

νt∣t (H) = 0.

path, the coin does not come up heads at the requisite time, ensuring

h . As such, the

Thus, along the tails

◽ H) = 0.
νp∣h (△
x

Two examples were just given. The rst emphasizes standpoint retention for temporal
operators. The second example illustrates the fact that

◽
△

is not bound by the standpoint.

The next example shows how standpoint retention and switching work together.

Example TF3:
Consider again the coin toss scenario. It will be shown that:

(8.124)

◽
νp∣p (△
((H ⊃ ▽ △ H) ∧ (T ⊃ ▽ △ T ))) = 1
x

Again, the metric
above.

◽
△

uses

<

◽
△

x

is used for convenience as in the second example.

and there are two paths forwards along

<

from

mp ,

x = τh − τp ,

as

the heads path and

the tails path. The only node along the heads (tails) path at which the time is

τp + x

is

mh
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(mt ).

mh is along

TRL = TRL

but

p

instead.

TRL

p , so the rst relevant evaluation is

h , so it is all the same if

νh∣h ((H ⊃ ▽ △ H) ∧ (T ⊃ ▽ △ T ))

mt

νt∣t ((H ⊃ ▽ △ H) ∧ (T ⊃ ▽ △ T )).

νh∣h (H) = 1, νh∣h (H ⊃ ▽ △ H)

ing the argument in Example TF1.
both conjuncts are true.

Similarly,

is not along

TRL

p , so the second evalua-

The two evaluations are symmetric, so consider

only the rst WLOG. The right conjunct of
that

is evaluated,

(The otherwise useless standpoint switch makes the two evaluations symmetric,

allowing for a WLOG argument shortly.)
tion is

νh∣p ((H ⊃ ▽ △ H) ∧ (T ⊃ ▽ △ T ));

νh∣h (T ⊃ ▽ △ T ) = 1

depends on
As such,

since

νh∣h (T ) = 0.

νh∣h (▽ △ H). νh∣h (▽ △ H) = 1

Given
follow-

νh∣h ((H ⊃ ▽ △ H) ∧ (T ⊃ ▽ △ T )) = 1

νt∣t ((H ⊃ ▽ △ H) ∧ (T ⊃ ▽ △ T )) = 1.

since

It follows that

◽
((H ⊃ ▽ △ H) ∧ (T ⊃ ▽ △ T ))) = 1.
νp∣p (△
x

8.3.4 Standpoint Inheritance for Open Futurism
Standpoint inheritance may be applied to BivOF and NBivOF. OF is not by default
equipped with any moment-sensitive accessibility relations. Moment-specic subtrees of
are dened using (8.104), as described above. That

<s

is a temporal standpoint amounts to

being the operative temporal relation.
A node

m

is counterfactual with respect to standpoint

Unlike the case for TF, that
is factual with respect to
and

m

s

<

s.

s < m′ , then m and m′

nor

m′

s

if and only if

m

is not on

<s .

m is not counterfactual with respect to s does not imply that m

If

m and m′ are distinct, contemporaneous nodes such that s < m

are incompatible, alternate possible futures from

are counterfactual with respect to

s.

s.

Thus, neither

Neither moment is factual with respect to

s

because OF never prioritizes one possible future of a standpoint over another.29
Standpoint inheritance for OF is roughly captured by these familiar tenets:

(8.125) All and only standpoint-sensitive operators are those representing

will-always

29 This

usage.

, and

was-always

will was
,

,

.

notion of counterfactuality is intended to clarify the discussion, but does not accord with all English
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mc
standpoint

m nc

mc
mp

m nc

mc

mp

mp

(b)

(c)

m nc
standpoint

standpoint
(a)

mc , but
is mp and

Figure 8.3.3: Open futurism: Jones drinking coee revisited. Jones drinks coee at
not at

mnc .

Her coee-drinking is future-contingent at

the corresponding ATC subtree is

<

gure. As such, (a) also shows
diagram).

<p .

In (a), the standpoint

independently of standpoint (ignoring nodes outside of the

In (b), the standpoint is

mc

include the non-coee branch containing

<nc .

mp .

That subtree includes all of the nodes shown in the
and the corresponding subtree is

<c . <c

mnc .

and the subtree,

In (c), the standpoint is

That subtree does not include the coee branch containing

mnc

does not

mc .

(8.126) Only switch standpoints when the point of evaluation becomes counterfactual.

Standpoint inheritance for OF is the same as that for TF, except for the dierence in
temporal/standpoint relations.
OF with standpoint inheritance, and not without, satises (8.118) and (8.119).

This

goal is accomplished respecting (8.122), (8.123), and S-FLEM's invalidity. OF can therefore
account for predictions without compromising those other important tenets.

Example OF1:
Here is an example of (8.118) that is the same for both BivOF and NBivOF. See Figure 8.3.3
for an illustration of the familiar scenario of Jones' future-contingent coee-drinking, now
including subscripts.

Let

mc

be a node at which Jones drinks coee and

at which she does not (nc stands for no coee).
coee-drinking is contingent.
Consider

νc∣c (▽ △ C),

the truth value of

mp

Jones was going to drink coee

νc∣c (▽ △ C) = 1 since there is a moment prior to mc

νp∣c (△C) = 1. νp∣c (△C) = 1

be a node

is a past node at which Jones'

node at which Jones drinks coee. The ATC subtree corresponding to
Figure 8.3.3 (b).

mnc

at/from

mc , <c ,

on

mc ,

the

is depicted in

<c , namely mp , such

because every path forwards from

mp

contains a moment at

which Jones drinks coee. In particular, every such path contains

mc

and

that

νc∣c (C) = 1.
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Example OF2:
This second example shows that

◽ C) = 0
νc∣c (▽t △
t

for

t = τc − τp = τnc − τp in

the coee

scenario. The example works for both BivOF and NBivOF. As in Example TF2, metric
operators are used for convenience to skirt unnecessary considerations like whether or not
Jones drinks coee next Thursday on the no-coee branch.
node backwards from

◽
△

uses

<

mc

at which the time is

<-path

τp + t, namely, mc

mnc .

mc

is on

is

mp

t

and

<c

mp

t

mnc

Evaluating at

mc

is depicted in

does not require a standpoint switch because

requires switching standpoint from

νnc∣nc (C) = 0.

<

Recall that

contains exactly one of two nodes at which the time

as in Figure 8.3.3 (b), so the relevant evaluation is

so evaluating at
is therefore

and

from

since the only

◽ C) = 0.
νp∣c (△

and is not limited by standpoint. Ignoring the standpoint, the

Figure 8.3.3 (a). Each
is

τc − t

◽ C) = 0
νc∣c (▽t △

There is at least one

<-path

mc

from

to

νc∣c (C) = 1. mnc
mnc .

mp

is not on

<c ,

The relevant evaluation

along which Jones does not

drink coee at the relevant time.
Another advantage to standpoint inheritance is that it greatly simplies many expressions. All strings of non-metric and metric

△/▽

can be reduced to a string with at most

two of those operators.
The eight possible strings of three operators are

▽ △ ▽, ▽ ▽ △,

and

▽ ▽ ▽.

(8.127)

△ △ φ â⊧ △φ

(8.128)

▽ ▽ φ â⊧ ▽φ

△ △ △, △ △ ▽, △ ▽ △, △ ▽ ▽, ▽ △ △,

Density yields that:

By those two equivalences, six of the eight length-three strings reduce to length two. The
remaining strings are

△▽△

and

inheritance.

(8.129)

△ ▽ △φ â⊧ ▽ △ φ

(8.130)

▽ △ ▽φ â⊧ △ ▽ φ

▽ △ ▽.

The following hold, regardless of standpoint
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Standpoint inheritance yields that all operators in

s,

corresponding to the subtree

<s .

△/▽

strings use the same standpoint

Standpoint inheritance grants (8.129) and (8.130) intu-

itively. Without standpoint inheritance, (8.129) and (8.130) may require a temporal operator
applying over an arbitrarily small interval. That is somewhat inelegant, but the reduction
works nonetheless.
The case is dierent for metric operators. Let

t, u > 0.

Regardless of standpoint inheri-

tance, the following equivalences hold.

(8.131)

△t △u φ â⊧ △t+u φ

(8.132)

▽t ▽u φ â⊧ ▽t+u φ

The next equivalences are only supported by standpoint inheritance. Let

(8.133)

△t ▽u △v φ â⊧ ▽x △y φ

(8.134)

▽t △u ▽v φ â⊧ △x ▽y φ

The equivalences hold for

x = u and y = t+v .

t, u, v, x, y > 0.

Without standpoint inheritance, it is impossible

to specify a relationship between, on the one hand,

t, u, v ;

and

x, y

on the other. For any

proposed expression, it is possible to construct a countermodels of the following sorts:

(8.135)

△t ▽u △v φ ⊭ ▽x △y φ

(8.136)

△x ▽y φ ⊭ ▽t △u ▽v φ

Such countermodels always exist because the rst operator on the left is
operator on the right is

▽.

△,

but the rst

One can always ensure that the past operator dips below a

confounding branch that changes the result. This is accomplished by placing such a branch
below the standpoint closer than

min(x, t).

There are no confounding branches below the

initial standpoint given standpoint inheritance. The standpoint's subtree only begins to fork
at the standpoint.
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8.3.5 Supervaluationism based on Open Futurism
There is nothing inherently true-futurist about Sup. Sup does not choose a privileged
future. The only thing that Sup has in common with TF is that
and S-FLEM are both valid under those theories.

will/not

commutativity

It is incidental that semantics for Sup

involve a TRL under Thomason's portrayal.30 This section provides an alternative semantics
for Sup built from OF with standpoint inheritance.
The idea behind Sup more broadly is that some things are underspecied.31 Those types
of things that can be underspecied are associated with all of their possible resolutions.
There is something to designate only insofar as possible specications are in agreement. In
the case of temporal logic, what is underspecied is how the future will turn out.
represent possible specications of the future.

The Sup truth function

N

TRLs

yields truth or

falsity to the extent that what will happen is resolved.
Using TRLs might not seem sensible to a friend of OF. In OF, the future is resolved as
time passes. Whatever will happen tomorrow, for instance, will be resolved two days from
now. Structurally, this resolution amounts to ATC subtree pruning over time; in terms of
statements, ExP-S-FLEM holds in all OF systems with standpoint inheritance. A TRL that
represents a particular contingent future is arbitrary if not empty from today's standpoint.
A TRL might be legitimate if there were a standpoint to look back from, a standpoint from
which everything is past. What will happen tomorrow will be resolved two days from now,
but there is no time at which everything will be resolved, assuming time is unbounded and
there is no point at which the future is determined. Creating something like a TRL from the
perspective of OF requires a time beyond all other times. Put another way, the ATC tree
must have maximal elements. OF does not presuppose a time after all others. Even though
the TRL is arbitrary or senseless from the perspective of OF, ATC subtree pruning yields
intermediate resolutions that are sucient to provide a Sup semantics. There need not be

30 [Thomason(1970)]
31 [van

Fraassen(1966)]
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a time at which everything is resolved as long as each aspect of the future will be resolved
at some time.

(8.137)

The node

s0

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
1 i
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪ s0
Nm (φ) = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
0 i
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
s0
⎪
⎪
⎩

every

P

on

every

P

on

is a point at which

< -path P

starting at

such that for all

< -path P

φ's

truth at

m

contains a moment

s > s0 , νm∣s (φ) = 1

starting at

such that for all

m

m

contains a moment

s > s0 , νm∣s (φ) = 0

is resolved.

When a fact is resolved, it

no longer changes. No amount of waiting and seeing can aect something that is resolved.
(8.137) is designed to capture this notion of resolution. If it can be determined in advance
how

φ

will be resolved, then

get a truth value at

N,

assigns the truth value accordingly. Otherwise,

φ

does not

m.

When employing the denition in (8.137), it does not matter whether BivOF or NBivOF
is taken as the basis. That is because BivOF and NBivOF only disagree on the handling
of unresolved propositions. Sup draws from its foundational logic only insofar as resolution
is concerned.
(8.137) yields a Sup logic with all of the essential features of Thomason's original presentation.

LEM, S-FLEM, and

contingent at
undened.

m,

will/not

commutativity are all valid.

not all paths agree on whether or not

φ

When

will be true. As such,

φ

is future-

Nm (△φ)

is
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Chapter 9

Conclusions and Further Research

The arguments of the preceding chapters indicate that TF is not the best view to hold in
a dynamic framework. If TF works at all, it is under absolutism (eternalism, the B-theory,
and company). At the end of the day, BivOF is the position of choice for avoiding fatalism
within a branching time framework. Standpoint inheritance, a theory proposed to enhance
all branching time views alike, was seen to have a number of advantages.

These results

endorse freedom/foreknowledge incompatibilism while avoiding theological fatalism.

This

chapter reviews those conclusions and proposes some avenues for further research.

9.1

True Futurism and Ockhamism

TF is the only theory to accommodate S-FLEM,

will/not

commutativity, and bivalence.

As a logic that is relatively simple and keeps basic intuitions, TF seems ideal. The criticisms
proposed by Belnap and Green were addressed using IdxTF combined with standpoint
inheritance. In those respects, TF is in good standing.
The introduction of standpoint inheritance claries what it is for statements characterizing God's beliefs to be soft facts. Ockhamists hold that God's past and present beliefs are
soft when they are about soft facts, although the tenet is not part of TF more generally.
To retain their occasional softness, God's beliefs must be standpoint-dependent.

The be-

236

liefs of other agents are not standpoint-dependent and it is not clear how an agent in time
can have standpoint-dependent beliefs. Ockhamists must explain how God's beliefs can be
standpoint-dependent to justify the view his beliefs are soft. Lacking such an explanation,

ad hoc

it is

to propose that God's beliefs are so drastically unlike other beliefs.

If God's

beliefs are not standpoint-dependent and are instead like the beliefs of other agents, then he
is fallible although in fact never wrong. At least, given a model in which there is a dominant
TRL, God is never wrong along that TRL. God holds some false beliefs at counterfactual
moments.

A nal option for TF is to maintain that God's beliefs are like those of other

agents, but he lacks comprehensive foreknowledge. This position is a type of open theism
akin to Hasker's.1
Another challenge for TF is to justify S-FLEM, strong future bivalence, and
commutativity.

will/not

Several arguments were given indicating that those principles cannot be

taken for granted.

The supposed validities might stem from confusion, as the rst few

arguments in Section 7.3.1 indicate. The last argument in that section points out that other
grammatical modalities, like
treat

will

will

can

and

not

, do not commute with

not

. A unied theory would

like other grammatical modalities. These arguments do not conclusively show that

does not commute with

not

, in which case S-FLEM would fail, but that the burden

of proof is on TF to give solid arguments for S-FLEM and commutativity.
argument for S-FLEM and strong future bivalence is the
in Section 7.3.4 shows that the

ex post

ex post

A candidate

argument. The discussion

argument does not really support S-FLEM or strong

future bivalence at all, but instead endorses the weaker ExP-S-FLEM. ExP-S-FLEM holds in
OF systems equipped with standpoint inheritance. As such, TF isn't as intuitively plausible

as it may seem at rst glance. TF is challenged to nd independently plausible evidence for
S-FLEM that does not just endorse W-FLEM, M-FLEM, or ExP-S-FLEM.
Two arguments were given against TF to show that interpreting
does not help.

1 [Hasker(2001)]

Both arguments draw from the fact that

will

will actually-will
as

is formally modal and thus
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actually-will
actually-possibly

is logically equivalent to

that

not actually-possibly not
actualizably

. The rst argument proposes

should be interpreted as

contingency if not outright identical to ATC possibility.

actually
not

is truth-functionally redundant. So

necessarily
will

, which is just

must show how

. Actualizability is necessary for

The second argument adds that

not actually-possibly not

amounts to

not possibly

in some relevantly modal sense. To rebut these arguments, TF

ought to be understood so as to secure its non-modality.

Actually-will

does not get the job done. TF cannot avoid fatalism without such an explication.
The arguments involving
fatalism.

hoc

actually-will

just mentioned directly conclude that TF yields

A related concern is the general grounding problem, by which TF is either

or entails fatalism.

ad

The temporal relation of TF, the TRL, can be specied with a

comprehensive set of soft facts (given all of the hard facts). Conversely, the TRL designates
a comprehensive set of soft facts. The general grounding problem challenges TF to explain
either why the TRL selects one future over others or, equivalently, why the set of soft
facts is constituted as it is. For instance, why will Jones drink coee tomorrow instead of do
otherwise? Any such explanation, so goes the criticism, yields fatalism. Grounding soft facts
and the TRL requires a chronologically backwards dependence relation, for soft facts depend
on future events. Chronologically backwards dependence is at best anomalous, especially in
the context of dynamic time.
The grounding problem has another facet when God is involved. In particular, it is not
clear how God or anyone else in time can come to infallibly know soft facts. Any conclusive
evidence for a soft fact's truth would make the corresponding event determined. Molinism
gives a popular candidate explanation for God's knowledge of soft facts and the TRL. The
underlying ATC tree is known by God through his natural knowledge. Soft facts and the TRL
are specied via God's middle knowledge (as far as agents go, in terms of counterfactuals
of freedom). Everything stems from God's essence and God perfectly understands his own
essence.

So he knows what free agents and indeterministic subatomic particles would do

in every possible situation. Commentators tried to justify middle knowledge of free agents'
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behavior using soft facts. Soft facts, however, cannot be taken for granted. Molinists need
to explain soft facts in the rst place. Molinism does not serve as an explanation of TF, but
instead presupposes TF.
The only viable alternative for TF is general eternalism, which would be combined with
ThEtrn if God is in the picture.

Eternalism removes the mystery of the backwards de-

pendence of soft facts on corresponding events.

Truth itself is atemporal.

Soft facts are

(atemporally) true because the events that they are about are (atemporally) occurring. If
God is atemporal, then he has epistemic access to events at all times, unlike temporally restricted agents who have much more limited evidence. General eternalism is part of a more
thorough absolutism, involving the B-theory and perdurantism. By turning to eternalism,
TF may be exiled from all aspects of the dynamic framework.

9.2

Open Futurism

OF does not have the same initial plausibility as TF, but considerations like those men-

tioned above have led some thinkers to accept OF. OF provides a way out of both logical and
theological fatalism while yielding unied linguistic and philosophical analyses of temporal
language. The evidence considered in this project leans towards BivOF, which was Prior's
favored position, at least in his later writings.2 Contra Prior, it was seen that OF requires
standpoint inheritance.
All forms of OF emphasize a wait-and-see semantics for
determining factors for

will-inevitably

will

. The distinction between

, but look only at presently

will

and

will-inevitably

was

formally evident in traditional NBivOF and is brought out formally in BivOF by standpoint
inheritance (the dierence was there to begin with, but somewhat hidden by the formal
system). Thus, neither BivOF not NBivOF can be charged with conating

inevitably

will

and

will-

.

Traditional OF cannot represent predictions and guesses that come out true. This is-

2 [Prior(1967)].

Cf. [Prior(1957)].
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sue stems from a deeper problem, a failure to capture the wait-and-see semantics of

will

.

Standpoint inheritance provides a framework to naturally handle predictions and faithfully
represent wait-and-see semantics. In addition to granting a superior characterization of true
predictions and clarifying the dierence between

will

and

will-inevitably
will
was

for BivOF, stand-

point inheritance allows OF to reduce all strings of consecutive
two such operators.
Arguments against
option.

will/not

's and

's to at most

commutativity and S-FLEM show that BivOF is the best

NBivOF retains commutativity while sacricing bivalence and LEM. Sup keeps

LEM, S-FLEM, and commutativity; but not bivalence. As a result, Sup develops a chasm
between object- and meta-theory that is at best awkward, if not incoherent. The sacrices
required by NBivOF and Sup are unnecessary if commutativity and S-FLEM lack foundation to begin with, as proposed in Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.4. Among varieties of OF, the only
obstacle for traditional BivOF was the apparent conation

will

and

will-inevitably

. BivOF

with standpoint inheritance avoids the confusion, which was based on other confusions from
the start.

9.3

Standpoint Inheritance

Traditional branching time logics eectively switch standpoint with every new point of
evaluation. Every modal or temporal operator switches standpoint. Standpoint inheritance
suggests a more conservative approach, motivated by counterexamples to traditional logics
and corresponding to the empirical claim that speakers do not change standpoint unless they
have to. Temporal operators do not aect standpoint at all. For modal operators, instead of
switching standpoint with every new point of evaluation, a new standpoint comes into play
only when a moment is incompatible with the current standpoint. Formally, this scenario
is detected using standpoint-specic accessibility relations.

For this project, the relevant

accessibility relations are TRLs and ATC trees. If a moment is not on the standpoint's own
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relation, then the moment is incompatible with the standpoint.
All major theories using branching time semantics need to incorporate temporal standpoints. Belnap and Green showed that traditional TF gets incorrect results at counterfactual scenarios.

AbsTF cannot handle temporal statements at counterfactual moments at

all. Here is an example demonstrating the point made by Belnap and Green against IdxTF.
Given that Jones drank coee, the following holds at a counterfactual moment at which
Jones did not drink coee:
(9.1) Jones did not drink coee although she was going to. (¬c

∧ ▽ △ c)

(9.1) and its kin indicate the most prominent linguistic obstacle for IdxTF. Standpoint
inheritance eliminates oensive propositions like (9.1) for IdxTF.
Standpoint inheritance also sheds light on the hard/soft fact distinction. The standpointdependence of propositions allows IdxTF to get correct results, avoiding statements like
(9.1). Suppose that Jones' coee-drinking is contingent. Thus:

(9.2) Jones will drink coee

characterizes a soft fact. The softness of (9.2) is demonstrated by the fact that (9.2)'s truth
value depends on future standpoint.

In order for statements characterizing God's beliefs

to be soft, those propositions must be standpoint-dependent. That is, God's beliefs must
themselves be standpoint-dependent. Ockhamists are therefore committed to the view that
God's beliefs are standpoint-dependent, for they advocate statements like:

(9.3) Since Jones drank coee, God believed that she was going to drink coee.

(9.4) If Jones had not drunk coee, God would have believed that she was going to
not drink coee.

In the context of branching time, (9.4) requires that God's beliefs are standpoint-dependent,
unlike the beliefs of other agents. Standpoint dependence claries this observation.
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OF needs to account for temporal standpoints in order to account for predictions and

faithfully represent wait-and-see semantics.

If (9.2) was contingent, then it was untrue.

Assume that:

(9.5) Smith predicted that Jones would drink coee.

Smith's prediction was correct.

Under standpoint inheritance, (9.2) remains untrue from

earlier standpoints from which Jones' coee-drinking is contingent. From later standpoints
in which Jones drank coee, her coee-drinking and the veracity of Smith's prediction has
been armed with the passage of time. (9.2) is true and Smith's prediction was correct from
those later standpoints.
Under standpoint inheritance, temporal operators are restricted by standpoint. Like all
operators, temporal operators pass their standpoints on to subsequent operators.

was
will

facts together yield that a string of
As such, any string of

was

's and

's and

will

These

's uses the same standpoint throughout.

's can be reduced to at most two of those operators.

Unlike the traditional view, this result holds for metric operators and discreet (non-dense)
arrangements of moments.
Sup is traditionally formulated using IdxTF as a basis.

With standpoint inheritance,

Sup can be depicted in terms of OF, instead. This is an advantage for anyone who wants

to avoid the TRL instead using OF's wait-and-see semantics characterize Sup.

9.4

Research Avenues

There are a number of ways in which this project could be extended. One obvious loose
end is absolutism. Adequate treatments of eternalism, the B-theory, and related views are
beyond this essay.

A goal of this project is to enhance the dynamic approach, improving

A-theoretic systems in ways that challenge their static counterparts. Another task is to show
that the dynamic view is the best option for representing freedom and contingency. This
might be accomplished by demonstrating that accidental possibility, which is required for
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freedom and contingency, only makes sense within dynamic, branching systems.
This essay is relatively non-technical. It is not a logical treatise. For the sake of being
explicit, a system (MMBT) was given in Chapter 8 through which specic views were portrayed and standpoint inheritance was implemented. MMBT could use a lot of development.
Here are a few obvious improvements:

(9.6) Axiomatizations

(9.7) More operators: since, until, now, and so forth

(9.8) Property (predicate) calculus

(9.9) Additional meta-theorems

One might also add probabilities to MMBT. As mentioned in Section 3.1,

will

has a proba-

bilistic sense. A related advancement would be to add a non-relevance conditional. Linguists
have made a lot of headway in researching conditionals. Non-relevance conditionals might be
implemented using the restrictor analysis, Fintel's analysis, or Gillies' analysis.3 Probabilities and conditionals are interesting in their own right, but one could incorporate both. That
may seem gratuitous, but a system equipped with probabilities, conditionals, and modality
could shed light in a few intricate puzzles, like the problem of old evidence.

9.5

Looking Back

The main goal of this project is to address theological and logical fatalism. These goals
have been accomplished within the dynamic framework given here. OF, and in particular
BivOF, is the best option along with the associated type of OT. Along the way, standpoint

inheritance was proposed as a way to enhance branching time logics. Standpoint inheritance
allows branching systems to account for some linguistic diculties. The theory claries not

3 See,

for instance, [Fintel and Iatridou(2002), Gillies(2009)]. [Fintel(2009)] contains a useful summary.
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only the hard/soft fact distinction, but also what is required for characterizations of God's
beliefs to be soft.
Despite the achievements of this endeavor, there is still more to be done.

Absolutist

frameworks were beyond the scope of this analysis. There is also a lot more to be said about
standpoint inheritance and how branching logics with standpoint inheritance compare to
their static counterparts. It is hoped that the successes of this project will lead to excellent
developments that hitherto were only possible.
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Appendix A

Notations, Truncations, and Acronyms

The notations used in this essay are designed to conserve space without becoming overwhelming. It is a problem when most readers have to memorize lots of acronyms, especially
when many of those acronyms are not even used outside of a particular document. Here,
acronyms are used sparingly, with some truncation for clarity and with links to this section
for quick reference.

A.1

Ma jor Arguments

ArgLF

argument for logical fatalism (generalizable)

ArgThF

argument for theological fatalism (generalizable)

ArgLF-Act

A.2
OF

argument for logical fatalism using

actually-will

Open Futurism and Company
open futurism

BivOF

bivalent open futurism

(generalizable)
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NBivOF

Sup

OT

non-bivalent open futurism

supervaluationism

open theism

OF-OT

open futurist open theism

TF-OT

true futurist open theism

A.3
TF

True Futurism
true futurism

AbsTF

absolute true futurism

IdxTF

indexical true futurism

SmTF

semantic true futurism

OnTF

ontological true futurism

EpTF

epistemic true futurism

A.4

Theistic Eternalism

ThEtrn

DurEtrn

PtEtrn

theistic eternalism

duration theistic eternalism

point theistic eternalism
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PrdEtrn

A.5

LEM

perdurantist theistic eternalism

Logical Principles
law of excluded middle,

S-FLEM

⊧ φ ∨ ¬φ

strong future law of excluded middle,

ExP-S-FLEM

⊧ △φ ∨ △¬φ (△ = will)

strong future law of excluded middle,

M-FLEM

medium future law of excluded middle,

W-FLEM

weak future law of excluded middle,

A.6

⊧ △φ ∨ △¬φ (△ = will)

⊧ △φ ∨ ¬ △ φ (△ = will)

⊧ △(φ ∨ ¬φ) (△ = will)

Symbols

Many of the operators used here are more general than those used in other contexts. Most
operators given here (e.g.
case of NBivOF,

◽ )
△

can apply to any accessibility relation. Indeed, except in the

◽ along whatever is taken to be the temporal relation, the
△ is dened as △

relation used to explicate

will

and company. For clarity, other popular symbols are given in

accordance with the primary use of operators in this essay. It should be understood that the
operators here are typically not equivalent to those other operators, but more general. All
operators can be used with any suitable accessibility relation,
e.g.

R,

specied by a subscript,

◻T RL .

Symbol

Other popular symbols. English.

△

F. It will be the case that. (Works along the temporal relation)

▽

P. It was the case that. (Works along the temporal relation)
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△t

F(t). It will be the case

▽t

P(t). It was the case

◻T

G. It will always the case that. (T is the temporal relation)

◻−T

t

t

units (days/seconds/...) hence that

units (days/seconds/...) ago that

H. It was always the case that. (T is the temporal relation)

◇R

M/◇. Possibly. (Meaning depends on accessibility relation

◻R

L/◻. Necessarily. (Meaning depends on accessibility relation

A.7

ATC

R.)
R.)

Other
all-things-considered

MMBT

Multi-Modal Branching Time. MMBT is the generic system described in Sec-

tion 8.1.

StPt

TRL

TRLm

standpoint inheritance

thin red line

thin red line specic to moment

m,

as used in indexical true futurism

248

BIBLIOGRAPHY
[Adams(1967)] Adams, Marilyn McCord (Oct 1967): Is the Existence of God a Hard Fact?

The Philosophical Review

, 76(4):492503. 45, 46

[Akama et al.(2007)Akama, Nagata, and Yamada] Akama,

Seiki;

Yasunori Nagata;

and

Chikatoshi Yamada (Jun 2007): A Three-Valued Temporal Logic for Future Contingents.

Logique et Analyse

, 50(198):99111. 161, 168

[Akama et al.(2008)Akama, Nagata, and Yamada] Akama,
Chikatoshi Yamada (Mar 2008):
tingents.

Sudia Logica

Seiki;

Yasunori Nagata;

Three-Valued Temporal Logic

Qt

and

and Future Con-

, 88(2):215231. 161, 168

[Arbour(2013)] Arbour, Benjamin H (2013): Future Freedom and the Fixety of Truth: Closing the Road to Limited Foreknowledge Open Theism.

losophy of Religion

International Journal for Phi-

, pp. 119. 3, 162, 176

[Belnap(1992)] Belnap, Nuel (Sep 1992): Branching Space-Time.

Synthese

, 92(3):385434.

40, 52
[Belnap(2005)] Belnap, Nuel (2005): Branching Histories Approach to Indeterminism and

Truth and Probability: Essays in Honour of Hugues Leblanc

Free Will. In:

, ed. Francois

Brown, Bryson;Lepage, pp. 197211. 83
[Belnap and Green(1994)] Belnap, Nuel and Mitchell Green (1994): Indeterminism and the
Thin Red Line.

Philosophical Perspectives
Boethius: The Theological Tractates and The Consolation
, 8:365388. 6, 83, 132, 135, 149, 216

[Boethius(1973)] Boethius (1973):

of Philosophy

. Loeb Classical Library. 99

[Boolos et al.(2007)Boolos, Burgess, and Jerey] Boolos, George S; John P Burgess; and
Richard C Jerey (2007):

Computability and Logic

. Cambridge, 5th edn. 196

[Boyd(2003)] Boyd, Gregory A (2003): Neo-Molinism and the Innite Intelligence of God.

Philosophia Christi

, 5:187204. 3, 162, 176

249

[Boyd(2010)] Boyd, Gregory A (2010): Two Ancient (and Modern) Motivations for Ascribing Exhaustively Denite Foreknowledge to God:
Assessment.

Religious Studies

A Historic Overview and Critical

, 46(1):4159. 3, 176

[Braüner et al.(2000)Braüner, Hasle, and Øhrstrøm] Braüner, Torben; Per Hasle; and Peter
Øhrstrøm (2000):

Determinism and the Origins of Temporal Logic

, Kluwer Academic

Publishers, pp. 185206. 210

Philosophical Quarterly

[Brogaard(2008)] Brogaard, Berit (2008): Sea Battle Semantics.

,

58(231):326335. 145
[Burgess(1979)] Burgess, John P (Dec 1979): Logic and Time.

Logic

The Journal of Symbolic

, 44(4):566582. 125

[Copeland(1996)] Copeland, Jack (1996):

Prior

Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur

. Clarendon Press. 3, 37

[Cowan(2003)] Cowan, Steven B (Mar 2003): The Grounding Objection to Middle Knowl-

Religious Studies

edge Revisited.

, 39(1):93102. 86, 155, 157

[Fintel(2009)] Fintel, Kai Von (2009): Conditionals. pp. 134. 242
[Fintel and Iatridou(2002)] Fintel, Kai Von and Sabine Iatridou (2002):

If and When If-

Clauses Can Restrict Quantiers. (June):114. 242
[Fischer(1983)] Fischer, John Martin (Jan 1983): Freedom and Foreknowledge.

sophical Review

The Philo-

, 92(1):6779. 46

Introduction
God and the Soul
Providence and Evil

[Freddoso(1988)] Freddoso, Alfred J (1988):
[Geach(1969)] Geach, Peter T (1969):
[Geach(1977)] Geach, Peter T (1977):

. 153, 156

. Routledge and Paul. 92
. Cambridge. 106, 161

[Gillies(2009)] Gillies, Anthony S. (2009): On Truth-Conditions for If (but Not Quite Only
If ).

Philosophical Review

, 118(3):325349. 242

[Hasker(1989)] Hasker, William (1989):
Press. 175, 177

God, Time, and Knowledge

.

Cornell University

250

[Hasker(2001)] Hasker, William (Dec 2001): The Foreknowledge Conundrum.

Journal for Philosophy of Religion

International

, 50(1):97114. 86, 116, 157, 161, 174, 175, 236

[Hasle(2012)] Hasle, Per (2012):
Prior's Tense Logic.

Synthese

The Problem of Predestination:

As a Prelude to A. N.

, 188(3):331347. 2

[Hasle and Øhrstrøm(2004)] Hasle, Per and Peter Øhrstrøm (2004): The Flow of Time into
Logicand Computer Science.

Computer Science

Bulletin of the European Association for Theoretical

, 82:191226. 59

[Helm(1997)] Helm, Paul (1997):

Eternal God: A Study of God without Time

.

Oxford

University Press, revised edn. 96, 103, 106, 111, 113, 124
[Helm(2010)] Helm, Paul (2010): Eternity. Spring 2010 edn. 89, 96

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom

[Kenny(1969)] Kenny, Anthony J P (1969):

,

University of Notre Dame Press. 105, 106
[Kenny(1979)] Kenny, Anthony J P (1979):

The God of the Philosophers

. Clarendon Press.

92, 105, 176

Human Freedom in a World Full of Providence: An Ockhamist-Molinist Account of the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge
and Creaturely Free Will

[Kosciuk(2010)] Kosciuk, Christopher J (2010):

. Ph.D. thesis, University of Massachusetts - Amherst. 153,

156
[Leftow(1991a)] Leftow, Brian (1991a):

Time and Eternity

. Cornell University Press. 99

[Leftow(1991b)] Leftow, Brian (Sep 1991b): Timelessness and Foreknowledge.

Studies

Philosophical

, 63(3):309325. 99

[Locke(1690)] Locke, John (1690):

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

.

Locked

room: II.XXI.10. 78
[Lucas(1970)] Lucas, John Randolph (1970):
Press. 175, 176

The Freedom of the Will

. Oxford University

251

The Future: An Essay on God, Temporality,

[Lucas(1989)] Lucas, John Randolph (1989):

and Truth

. Blackwell. 58, 67, 162, 176, 220

[Luther(1525)] Luther, Martin (1525):

Bondage of the Will)

De Servo Arbitrio (On the Enslaved Will, or The

. 85, 175

[MacFarlane(2003)] MacFarlane, John (Jul 2003): Future Contingents and Relative Truth.

Philosophical Quarterly

, 53(212):322336. 170

[MacFarlane(2008)] MacFarlane, John (2008): Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths. In:

Relative Truth

, ed. M Garcia-Carpintero, M;Kölbel, Oxford University Press, pp. 81

102. 67, 170
[MacFarlane(2012)] MacFarlane, John (2012):

Relativism

, New York: Routledge, pp. 132

142. 27, 67, 104
[Malpass and Wawer(2012)] Malpass, Alex and Jacek Wawer (2012): A Future for the Thin
Red Line.

Synthese

. 11, 119, 122, 126, 128, 134, 142, 208

[McCall(1976)] McCall, Storrs (Sep 1976): Objective Time Flow.

Philosophy of Science

,

43(3):337362. 40
[McCall(1994)] McCall, Storrs (1994):

and Decision

A Model of the Universe: Space-Time, Probability,

. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 40, 52, 160

[McCall(1998)] McCall, Storrs (Jun 1998): Time Flow Does Not Require a Second Time
Dimension.

Australian Journal of Philosophy

, 76(2):317322. 39, 40, 160

[McTaggart(1908)] McTaggart, J M E (1908): The Unreality of Time.

Mind

, 17:456473.

51, 91
[Merricks(2009)] Merricks, Trenton (2009):

Truth and Freedom.

Philosophical Review

,

118(1):2957. 83, 165
[Molina(1988)] Molina, Luis de (1988):
153, 154

On Divine Foreknowledge

. Cornell University Press.

252

[Müller and Strobach(2012)] Müller, Thomas and Niko Strobach (2012): A Letter on the
Present State of Aairs: Prior, Indeterminism and Relativity 40 Years Later.

Synthese

,

188(3):469485. 52
[Nerlich(1998)] Nerlich, Graham (1998): Falling Branches and the Flow of Time.

Journal of Philosophy

Australian

, 76(2):309316. 39, 40, 160

[Pagis(1997)] Pagis, Anton Charles (1997):

and the Conduct of Life

Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Man

, vol. 2. Hackett. 102

[Pike(1965)] Pike, Nelson (Jan 1965): Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action.

sophical Review

The Philo-

, 74(1):2746. 49, 83, 86, 116, 157, 174

[Pike(1970)] Pike, Nelson (1970):

God and Timelessness

. Routledge and K Paul. 90, 102,

108, 157
[Plantinga(1974)] Plantinga, Alvin I (1974):
[Plantinga(1975)] Plantinga, Alvin I (1975):

The Nature of Necessity
God, Freedom, and Evil

. Clarendon Press. 102

. Allen and Unwin. 174

[Plantinga(1986)] Plantinga, Alvin I (Jul 1986): On Ockham's Way Out.

ophy

Faith and Philos-

, 3(3):235269. 84, 119, 138, 216

[Prior(1953)] Prior, Arthur N (Oct 1953):

Philosophical Quarterly

Three-Valued Logic and Future Contingents.

, 3(13):317326. 161, 168

[Prior(1955)] Prior, Arthur N (Jul 1955): Diodoran Modalities.

The Philosophical Quarterly

,

5(20):205213. 184, 226
[Prior(1957)] Prior, Arthur N (1957):

Time and Modality

. Clarendon Press. 39, 51, 96, 110,

198, 238
[Prior(1962)] Prior, Arthur N (Apr 1962):

The Formalities of Omniscience.

Philosophy

,

37:114129. 47, 110
[Prior(1967)] Prior, Arthur N (1967):

Past, Present and Future

. Clarendon Press. 4, 5, 39,

40, 43, 47, 51, 66, 83, 86, 96, 110, 117, 161, 167, 169, 189, 238

253

[Prior(1996)] Prior, Arthur N (1996):

Some Free Thinking about Time

, Clarendon Press,

pp. 4751. 51, 160
[Reichenbach(1947)] Reichenbach, Hans (1947):

Elements of Symbolic Logic

. Macmillan. 65,

217
[Rhoda(2003)] Rhoda, Alan R (2003):

and Divine Providence

Beyond the Chess Master Analogy: Game Theory

, Wipf and Stock. 3, 162

[Rhoda et al.(2006)Rhoda, Boyd, and Belt] Rhoda,

Alan

R;

Gregory

A

Boyd;

and

Thomas G Belt (Oct 2006): Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future.

Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers

, 23(4):432459.

3, 5, 162, 176
[Rogers(1994)] Rogers, Katherin A (Mar 1994): Eternity Has No Duration.

ies

Religious Stud-

, 30(1):116. 100, 101, 124

[Rogers(2000)] Rogers, Katherin A (2000):

Perfect Being Theology

. Edinburgh University

Press. 96
[Rogers(2006)] Rogers, Katherin A (2006): Anselm on Eternity as the Fifth Dimension.

Saint Anselm Journal

The

, 3(2):18. 103, 124

[Rogers(2007)] Rogers, Katherin A (2007): The Necessity of the Present and Anselm's Eternalist Response to the Problem of Theological Fatalism.

Religious Studies

, 43(1):2547.

91, 96, 103, 124
[Rowe(2007)] Rowe, William (2007):

Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction

. Wadsworth,

4th edn. 3
[Schleiermacher(1968)] Schleiermacher,

Friedrich (1968):

The Christian FaithEnglish

Translation of the Second German Edition
Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence
and Time
Mind
. T and T Clark Edingburgh. 90, 108

[Sider(2003)] Sider, Theodore (2003):

. Oxford University Press. 39, 110, 158, 160

[Smart(1949)] Smart, Jack (Oct 1949): The River of Time.

, 58:483494. 39, 40, 160

254

[Smart(1963)] Smart, Jack (1963):

Philosophy and Scientic Realism

. Routledge & Kegan

Paul. 50
[Stump and Kretzmann(1981)] Stump, Eleonore and Norman Kretzmann (Aug 1981): Eternity.

The Journal of Philosophy

, 78(8):429458. 93, 98, 99, 106, 109

[Stump and Kretzmann(1987)] Stump,

Eleonore

and

Norman

Kretzmann

(Apr

The Journal of Philosophy

Atemporal Duration: A Reply to Fitzgerald.

1987):

, 84(4):214

219. 99
[Stump and Kretzmann(1991)] Stump, Eleonore and Norman Kretzmann (1991): Prophecy,
Past Truth, and Eternity.

Philosophical Perspectives

, 5:395424. 99

[Stump and Kretzmann(1992)] Stump, Eleonore and Norman Kretzmann (Oct 1992): Eternity, Awareness, and Action.

Philosophers

Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian

, 9(4):463482. 99

[Swinburne(1977)] Swinburne, Richard (1977):

The Coherence of Theism

. Oxford University

Press. 105
[Swinburne(1994)] Swinburne, Richard (1994):

The Christian God

. Clarendon Press. 175

[Thomason(1970)] Thomason, Richmond H (1970):
Gaps.

Theoria

Indeterminist Time and Truth-Value

, 36:264281. 66, 161, 170, 211, 233

[Todd(2012)] Todd, Patrick (2012): Soft Facts and Ontological Dependence.

Studies

Philosophical

. 3, 45, 46, 151, 216

[Tuggy(1999)] Tuggy, Dale (1999): A Short Text of Lavenham.

World-Order

In:

Time, Creation and

, ed. M Wegener, pp. 260264. 161

[Tuggy(2007)] Tuggy, Dale (Jan 2007): Three Roads to Open Theism.

Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers

[van Fraassen(1968)] van Fraassen,
Reference.

Bas (1968):

Journal of Philosophy

Faith and Philosophy:

, 24(1):2851. 3, 5, 162, 170, 176, 177

Presupposition,

, 65:136152. 170

Implication,

and Self-

255

[van Fraassen(1966)] van Fraassen, Bas C (Sep 1966): Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps,
and Free Logic.

The Journal of Philosophy

, 63(17):481495. 233

[van Inwagen(2008)] van Inwagen, Peter (2008):

About the Future?

What Does An Omniscient Being Know

, Oxford University Press, vol. 1, pp. 216230. 175

[Ware(2000)] Ware, Bruce (2000):

ism

God's Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open The-

. Crossway. 166

The Dilemma of Freedom and Fore-

[Zagzebski(1991)] Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus (1991):

knowledge

. Oxford University Press. 111

[Zagzebski(2011a)] Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus (2011a):

Eternity and Fatalism

, Ashgate

Press. 111
[Zagzebski(2011b)] Zagzebski,

Linda Trinkaus (2011b):

Foreknowledge and Free Will.

2011th edn. 89
[Øhrstrøm(1981)] Øhrstrøm, Peter (1981): Problems Regarding the Future Operator in an

Danish Yearbook of Philosophy

Indeterministic Tense Logic.
[Øhrstrøm(1983)] Øhrstrøm,

, 18:8195. 3, 47, 161

Peter (1983):

Richard Lavenham on Future Contingents.

Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin

, 44:180186. 3, 47, 161, 165, 208

[Øhrstrøm(1984)] Øhrstrøm, Peter (Jul 1984):
Foreknowledge and Human Freedom.

Anselm, Ockham and Leibniz on Divine

Erkenntnis

, 21(2):209222. 3, 47, 84, 118, 121

[Øhrstrøm(2009)] Øhrstrøm, Peter (2009): In Defence of the Thin Red Line: A Case for
Ockhamism.

Humana Mente

, 8:1732. 3, 11, 47, 118, 135, 144, 146, 150, 157, 201, 210,

216
[Øhrstrøm and Hasle(2011)] Øhrstrøm, Peter and Per Hasle (2011): Future Contingents. In:

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Summer 2011 edn. 3

256

Index

A-theory, 91, 110
absolute true futurism,

see

solute
AbsTF,

see

see

true futurism, ab-

modality,

see

possibility

accessibility relation, 21, 37

see
see
see

see

ArgThF,

ATC,

178

see

Exp-S-FLEM,

fatalism, logical

ArgLF-ACT,

strong future, 59, 60, 81, 122, 130, 168,
weak future, 58, 60

antecedent conditions, 29
ArgLF,

strong future, 131, 189

medium future, 58

true futurism, absolute

accessibility,

ex post

excluded middle, 57

excluded middle,

strong future

fatalism, logical

fatalism, theological

possibility, all-things-considered

atemporal existence, 93

fatalism, 32
determinism, 35
logical, 34, 81, 142
modality, 33
theological, 34, 84

B-theory, 91, 96, 110

see
see
see
see
see

bivalence, 58

fatalism, theological, 97

BivOF,

formal modality,

see

see

open futurism, bivalent

Boethianism,

theistic eternalism

free action,
free will,

freedom/determinism, 78, 80, 85

see

freedom/foreknowledge, 86
context, 59, 61, 204

freedom

freedom, libertarian

epistemic, 78
of the will,

future, 34
conversational implicature, 59, 61, 204

duration theistic eternalism,
nalism, duration

see

theistic eter-

theistic eternalism, duration

see
see
see also

epistemic freedom,

freedom

true futurism, epistemic

eternalism,

everlastingness, 92

theistic eternalism, 157

see

ing objection
guesses,

determinism, 35

EpTF,

freedom, epistemic

grounding objection,

modality, 33

see

see

libertarian, 78

contingency, 32

DurEtern,

true futurism, Molinism

freedom

action,

freedom, epistemic

modality

freedom

free knowledge,

compatibilism

compatibilist freedom,

ex post

see

true futurism, ground-

predictions

hard fact, 44, 48
denition of, 47
IdxTF,

see

true futurism, indexical

immutability, 93
indexical true futurism,
dexical
law of excluded middle,

see
see

true futurism, in-

excluded middle

257

LEM,

see

see

excluded middle

see

libertarian freedom,
logical fatalism,

freedom

fatalism

Luther, Martin, 85
M-FLEM,

see

see

middle knowledge,

see also

ism
modality,

OT,

open theism

past
xedness of, 27

excluded middle, medium fu-

ture

see

true futurist, 175

perdurantism, 103
perdurantist theistic eternalism,

see theistic

eternalism, perdurantistvi

true futurism, Molin-

point theistic eternalism, see theistic eternal-

possibility

antecedent conditions, 29

see also

ism, pointvi
possibility,

modality

consistency and, 17, 22, 38, 40

all-things-considered, 20, 26, 40, 147

dynamic, 37, 39

logical, 17, 22

fatalism, 33

metaphysical, 17, 22

formal, 21

physical, 17, 22

grammatical, 26, 55

types of, 17

intensional classication of, 18

PrdEtern,

moment-specic, 19, 67

see

theistic eternalism, perdu-

rantist

see
see
see

ontological, 25

predictions, 137, 152, 183

propositional, 17, 22

PtEtern,

static, 38

S-FLEM,

Molina, Luis de, 153
moment, 27
natural knowledge,
NBivOF,

necessity,
necessity

see

SmTF,

true futurism, Molin-

God's knowledge of, 49, 73, 138, 151
possibility, all-things-

Ockham, William of, 28, 44

see

Ockhamism, 86

OnTF,

see
see

entailment view of, 45

possibility

considered

OF-OT,

soft fact, 44, 151, 153, 157

open futurism, non-bivalent
,

open futurism
open theism, open futurist
true futurism, ontological

open futurism, 42, 83, 159, 183
bivalent, 167, 178
epistemology, 165
non-bivalent, 168

true futurism, semantic

denition of, 47

neo-Molinism, 177

OF,

excluded middle, strong future

sempiternality, 92

see
see
per accidens see

ism

theistic eternalism, point

thin red line and, 44

space vs time, 94
standpoint inheritance,

see
see

point

StPt,
Sup,

see

standpoint inheritance

supervaluationism

supervaluationism, 44, 84, 170
semantics, 170, 172
temporal existence, 90
temporal operator
counterfactual, 132
temporal standpoint, 64, 126, 185

ontology, 165

counterfactual shift, 71

recent history, 160

criticism, 188

semantics, 162, 178

open futurism, 67, 186

open theism, 87, 140, 174
open futurist, 176

temporal stand-

operator reduction, 188
results of standpoint inheritance, 72

258

standpoint inheritance, 71, 185
true futurism, 69, 136

standpoint sensitivity, 188

temporally relational property/relation, 91

see

tense, 55
TF,

see

true futurism

TF-OT,

open theism, true futurist

theistic eternalism, 86, 89, 153
criticisms, 101, 102, 105
duration, 98, 101
perdurantist, 103
point, 101

see

true futurism, 112, 123

see

theological fatalism,
ThEtern,

fatalism

theistic eternalism

thin red line, 149, 157
modality, 149
soft facts and, 44
time
ow, 39
modality and, 27, 37

see

rate of passage, 40
TRL,

thin red line

true futurism, 43, 83, 86, 157
absolute, 121, 124, 132
epistemic, 125, 129
grounding objection, 141, 151, 153, 155
indexical, 122, 124
Molinism, 153
ontological, 123
semantic, 122, 125, 132
theistic eternalism, 112
true futurusm
grounding objection, 149
W-FLEM,
will

see

excluded middle, weak future

bleached, 56
commutativity with
178

not

, 130, 167, 169,

determination/intention, 56
grammar of, 55

see

probability, 57
semantics,

open futurism, supervalu-

ationism, and true futurism
will-actually, 142

will-inevitably, 163, 167, 169, 187

259

ABSTRACT

FUTURE CONTINGENTS,
FREEDOM, AND FOREKNOWLEDGE
by

MOHAMMED S. ABOUZAHR
December 2013

Advisor:
Major:
Degree:

John Corvino

Philosophy
Doctor of Philosophy

This essay is a contribution to the new trend and old tradition of analyzing theological
fatalism in light of its relationship to logical fatalism.

All results pertain to branching

temporal systems that use the A-theory and assume presentism.

The project focuses on

two kinds of views about branching time. One position is true futurism, which designates
what will occur regardless of contingency. The opposing view is open futurism, by which no
possible course of events is privileged over others; that is, there are no soft facts.
A contextualist theory of temporal standpoints, standpoint inheritance, is designed to
enhance Priorian temporal logics. The proposal helps all branching time systems, not only
those with an open future. Even though an account of temporal standpoints goes a long way
towards aiding various analyses from a linguistic standpoint, theories that designate a true
future ultimately succumb to philosophical diculties. Under open futurism, standpoint inheritance commandeers the best semantic evidence for true futurism. Standpoint inheritance
accounts for the evidence, but the evidence does not support true futurism's stronger claims.
Furthermore, attempts to explain why one timeline is privileged as the actual future lead to
fatalism. Open futurism and a related kind of open theism are the only viable alternatives
under dynamic, branching time. If true futurism is feasible at all, it is so only with a static
or eternalist basis.
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Standpoint inheritance is very general.

It is applied to every system discussed in this

analysis to handle damning linguistic shortcomings of traditional logics.
heritance yields several other fruitful results, too.

Standpoint in-

The theory helps clarify what it is for

characterizations of God's beliefs to be soft and how his beliefs must dier from normal
beliefs to retain softness. For open futurism, all strings of consecutive

will

's and

was

's can

be reduced to at most two such operators under standpoint inheritance, but not under traditional theories. The open futurist distinction between

will

and

will-inevitably

is claried,

too. Standpoint inheritance allows for a supervaluationist semantics using open futurism as
its basis instead of the usual true futurism. The theory of standpoint inheritance enhances
dynamic, branching accounts of time to better compete with their static correlates.
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